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INTRODUCTION
Despite its intimate character, sexual conduct is highly regulated
activity. At any given point, the picture that emerges of the complex web
of legal regulation is impressionistic, and some features are difficult to
discern. The law of sex, however, can operate as a value generating force
when those who create or are governed by it perceive in the law an
underlying vision of appropriate sexual conduct.1
This is not to say that the laws concerning sex embody any single
unifying conception, or that the ideology of sex embedded in our law is
consistent. Such coherence is impossible because legal regulations con-
cerning sex arise at different times and emanate from differing impulses.
Moreover, the law of sex is a volatile subject. Each generation is inter-
ested in legal reform, and one generation's vision of liberation may be
another generation's nightmare of oppression. Finally, the law on the
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1. For a general discussion of the role of law in shaping ideology and the perception of values,
see K. O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAW 19-20 (1985). See generally J. WEEKS, COMING
OUT: HOMOSEXUAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN, FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT
(1977) (discussing the interplay between the laws regulating homosexual conduct and the develop-
ment of a consciousness among homosexuals); Olsen, Statutory Rape: 4 Feminist Critique of Rights
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387, 405-06 (1984) (discussing the interaction between statutory rape
laws, ideology, and sexual encounters).
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books often differs markedly from the law in action. This area of law is
especially rife with unenforced statutes and dormant causes of action.2
For different periods of our history, however, it is possible to iden-
tify certain dominant concerns that stand out in bold relief. These ele-
ments do not entirely overwhelm or cancel out conflicting elements. Yet,
as they shift, they alter the prevailing motif in the law's portrait of sexu-
ality. For three overlapping periods, covering at least the last three gen-
erations, there are three different dominant views or attitudes toward
sexual conduct that mark the law at each stage.3 This Article looks
briefly at the law of earlier generations as a prelude to the Article's cen-
tral objective: to lend focus to the contemporary law of sex. Briefly
stated, the thesis of this Article is that contemporary law has increasingly
embraced a new and more egalitarian conception of appropriate sexual
conduct. The clearest signal of this shift in motif is a change in the law's
understanding of the phenomenon of consent in sexual encounters.
A full analysis of the law of sex might well include a large segment
of family law as well as laws relating to marriage and reproductive rights.
For this Article, however, I have selected only those laws that directly
relate to interpersonal encounters between individuals that we typically
regard as involving a sexual component.4 The discussion concentrates,
2. See, eg., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 493 n.8 (1981) (from 1975-78, only
413 men were arrested for statutory rape, compared to almost 50,000 pregnancies among underage
women during 1976 alone); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 commentary at 373 (1980) (enforcement
agencies decline to enforce statutes outlawing deviate sexual activities unless some aggravating factor
exists); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 588 (1985) (laws against immorality were
enforced only sporadically, on the occasion of a "crackdown," or to "get" an unusually flagrant or
unlucky offender).
3. For a discussion of the three views of sexual conduct, see infra notes 16-31 and accompany-
ing text.
4. Even the boundary between sexual and nonsexual conduct is not a bright one. Alison
Jaggar is correct in her claim that we lack a philosophical theory of sexuality adequate to explain
how "non-genital activity can still be sexual" and how "genital activity may not be sexual." Jaggar,
Prostitution, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEx 363 (A. Soble ed. 1980). This lack of theoretical agree-
ment is at the core of the feminist debate regarding the appropriate characterization of forcible rape.
Some writers stress the sexual nature of the crime and view rape as aggression directed at female
sexuality. See C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 218-21 (1979);
Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Victims, 9 VICTIMOLOGY 95, 104-05 (1984) (date rap-
ists may use power for the acquisition of sexual gain); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635,
649-50 (1983). Others, perhaps mainly for politically strategic reasons, have stressed the assaultive
nature of the crime. They have argued that, from the victim's standpoint, the act of rape is not
sexually arousing and is "markedly different" from "normal sexual intercourse." See Comment,
Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1518, 1527-29
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therefore, on the legality of particular sexual contacts per se. This rela-
tively narrow focus still encompasses a wide spectrum of legal regula-
tions which, until recently, has not been analyzed as a conceptual unit.5
This Article explores criminal laws on rape6 and prostitution;7 civil
rights laws on sexual harassment8 and amorous relationships;9 and tort
actions governing deception in sexual relationships.1 ° Even when the
focus is limited to the sexual encounter itself, the above list is not exhaus-
tive." However, it does provide a sufficient base from which to form a
tentative hypothesis about emerging legal trends.
By way of background, Part 12 of this Article gives a brief overview
(1983). See generally R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 117-19 (1984) (discussing the theoreti-
cal dilemma generated by attempts to assimilate rape law into the law of assault).
This Article takes the broader view of sexual conduct and examines physicaly violent behavior
as well as nonviolent conduct. Implicit in the analysis is the belief that sex is so often interrelated
with force, power, and dominance in our society that it is not appropriate to treat forced sex as
conceptually distinct from consensual sex. Instead, the point of this piece is to analyze the notion of
consent to see how our ideas of acceptable sexual behavior may be changing, and to evaluate the
legitimacy of the varying kinds of pressure or force applied in sexual encounters.
5. Notable exceptions to the gap in the legal literature on the law of sex are R. TONG, supra
note 4, at 6-152 (discussing pornography, prostitution, sexual harassment, rape, and woman-
battering); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7
SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 515, 525-33 (1982) (discussing incest, contraception,
abortion, sexual harassment, pornography, prostitution, and rape).
6. See infra notes 93-108, 168-90, 196-206, 222-32 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 209-20 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 109-47, 193-94 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 254-313 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 148-63, 233-41 and accompanying text.
11. For example, this Article provides no detailed discussion of either laws prohibiting the
sexual abuse of children or of laws criminalizing sexual contact between homosexual adults.
Although each of these are important topics in the law of sex, they tend not to reveal as much about
the legal notion of consent as the topics selected for discussion here. With respect to the sexual
abuse of children, there seems to be a widespread consensus that young children should not engage
in sexual contacts of any kind with adults. Therefore, the legality of the sexual conduct does not
depend on the consent, however defined, of the child. With respect to antisodomy laws and similar
provisions targeting homosexual sexual conduct, consent of the parties also tends to be irrelevant.
The raging debate in this area centers on whether the liberal view of tolerating private consensual
conduct should displace the traditional view that approves only of heterosexual relationships that
occur within certain contexts.
I have also chosen not to focus on laws regulating pornography. Although the issue of consent
is important to any thorough treatment of pornography, the legal control of pornography raises
many other questions of an empirical and normative character which tend to make pornography a
special case. Our lack of knowledge regarding the relationship between sexual fantasy and sexual
conduct makes it particularly difficult to catalogue the harms of pornography with a high degree of
confidence. Further, the countervailing interest in free speech and press affected by legal control of
pornography may be different from the more generalized interest in autonomy affected by legal
control of sexual encounters.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 16-163.
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of the three views of sexual conduct, followed by a more in depth discus-
sion of each view. Detailed attention is given to recent feminist-inspired
legal reforms in the law of rape and sexual harassment, and in tort law
governing deception in sexual relationships.
Part II' synthesizes the recent legal reforms by demonstrating how
the legal notion of consent is being transformed to meet feminist objec-
tions. The principal point is that, under the emerging doctrine, a superfi-
cial appearance of nonresistance is no longer sufficient to demonstrate
consent. Most critically, it is becoming unacceptable to induce sexual
compliance by the use of physical force, economic pressure, or deception.
Part II also analyzes the legal impact of this trio of unacceptable induce-
ments in varying criminal and civil contexts.
Part III"1 offers a positive conception of mutuality in sexual
encounters that fits the mode of fem-inist reforms. Under this egalitarian
view of sexual conduct, approved encounters are those engaged in for the
purposes of creating intimacy or generating sexual pleasure. This Part
discusses why such encounters are closest to the egalitarian ideal and
how this view of sexual conduct differs from the traditional and liberal
views.
In Part IV,15 the egalitarian view of sexual conduct is applied to the
problem of asymmetric sexual relationships in employment and educa-
tional settings. This Part discusses legal control of amorous relationships
at work and at school. From an egalitarian perspective, these relation-
ships are problematic because of the difficulty in characterizing the moti-
vation behind them and in identifying the precise risks posed to parties
within and outside the relationship. Part IV concludes by proposing a
contextually sensitive approach to regulation designed to limit sexual
coercion in amorous relationships, without eliminating sexual freedom.
I. THREE VIEWS OF SEXUAL CONDUCT
A. OVERVIEW
Contemporary law simultaneously exhibits three overarching views
of sexual conduct. They can be roughly characterized as the traditional
view, the liberal view, and the egalitarian view of sexual conduct. 16
13. See infra text accompanying notes 164-241.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 242-53.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 254-313.
16. For additional discussions of these three views of sexual conduct, see 2 REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION
IN CANADA 15-22 (1985) [hereinafter CANADIAN REPORT] (detailing the liberal, conservative, and
(Vol. 61:777
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Although most contemporary legislative enactments and judicial innova-
tions appear to be in the egalitarian mode,17 there have been recent legal
developments characteristic of the other two views as well.18
The traditional view is the familiar moralistic notion that the only
sexual conduct that is acceptable is sex that occurs within marriage. The
traditional view is historically linked to an older, fundamentally religious
attitude toward sexual conduct which approves of sex only for the pur-
pose of procreation. By tying sex to procreation, the traditional view
functions to cement the relationship between biological parents and their
children and to promote the family as the key social institution. 19 When
the traditional view is expressed in the law, the critical fact tends to be
the status of the participants, rather than the purpose or nature of the
sexual encounter. Legal regulation in the traditional mode regards
nonmarital sexual activity, whether consensual or not, as properly sub-
ject to legal sanction. The traditionalist also tends to perceive the law as
an important mechanism for expressing moral values and maintaining a
morally decent society.20 Under the traditional mode of regulation, the
feminist philosophical traditions); Hoffman, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 504-07, 510-17 (1985) (analyzing conservative, liberal, and feminist positions on pornography);
see also A. JAGGER & P. ROTHENBERG, FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS, ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL
AccouNTs OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 381-85 (2d ed. 1984) (applying six
philosophical frameworks to the issue of sexuality: conservatism, liberalism, traditional Marxism,
radical feminism, socialist feminism, and women of color); PHILOSOPHY AND SEX 11-19 (R. Baker &
F. Elliston rev. ed. 1984) (thorough description of traditional view).
For this Article, I use "traditional" and "egalitarian" rather than "conservative" and "femi-
nist" to describe two of the views of sexual conduct. "Traditional" seems preferable to "conserva-
tive" because it connotes a more well-established position. In my lexicon, "egalitarian" and
"feminist" are interchangeable. My hope is that the term egalitarian is expansive enough to encom-
pass the various strands of feminism and feminist approaches. See infra note 26.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 97-163.
18. For example, North Carolina's obscenity law, which restricts several types of sexually
explicit material, was promoted by fundamentalist Christians and some feminist political forces. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-190.1 to 14-202.12 (1985). An example of recent legislation in the liberal
mode is New York City's 1986 ordinance banning discrimination against homosexuals in housing,
employment, and public accommodations. Pornick, Homosexual Rights Bill is Passed by City Coun-
cil in 21 to 14 Vote, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. I.
19. For a discussion of the works of Thomas Aquinas advancing the theory that procreational
sex is the only "natural" kind of sexual activity, and that disapproval of nonprocreational sex is
essential to discourage fathers from abandoning their wives and children, see PHILOSOPHY & SEX,
supra note 16, at 12-16. Robert Solomon describes the traditional conception of sex as "strictly [for]
ulterior purposes," ie., procreation. The paradigm sexual act is heterosexual intercourse, character-
ized as "male 'evacuation lust' (coupled with female submissiveness)." Solomon, Sex and Perver-
sion, in PHILOSOPHY & SEX 273 (R. Baker & F. Elliston eds. 1975). The traditional view disdains as
a perversion any alteration from this model, in particular "any attempt or desire on the part of either
[partner to seek] ... equal enjoyment on the part of the female." Id.
20. The most widely cited author expounding the traditional position on the role of law in
sexual matters is Lord Devlin. See R. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); see also
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law functions actively to enforce the moral code, and immoral activity is
likely to be unlawful. The emphasis is on community standards, and
individuals are expected to conform to communal norms.
In marked contrast to the traditional view, the most salient feature
of the liberal view is the distinction it draws between morality and legal-
ity.21 Under this view, sexual conduct is quintessentially private conduct
with which the law should not interfere. This conception of private sex-
ual activity tolerates nonmarital sex in some circumstances. In place of
marital status, the concept of consent emerges as the central demarcation
line to separate lawful from unlawful sexual conduct.2 The liberal defi-
nition of consensual conduct in turn defines the sphere of protected pri-
vate conduct.23 The liberal view finds no warrant for legal intervention
with consensual sex unless external harm to third parties can be
proven.24 While not all forms of consensual sexual conduct between
CANADIAN REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-18, 22 (1985); Hoffman, supra note 16, at 505-06 (1985);
Letwin, "Unchaste Character, "Ideology, and the California Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
35, 55-56 (1980).
21. The liberal position is usually traced to John Stuart Mill's essay, ON LIBERTY (1859).
Mill's thesis is that the only ground for justifying legal coercion of an individual is to prevent harm
to others. When the "harm principle" is accepted, a wide area is carved out for private morality that
is immune from state intervention. Judge Richard Posner has recently described the "fundamental
tenet of classical liberalism" as "delimit[ing] the proper role of the state" by generally proscribing
government intervention in "voluntary transactions that impose no uncompensated costs on non-
parties." Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1431, 1431 (1986). Adhering to the liberal split between legality and morality, Posner is quick
to add that not every "consensual transaction between informed adults having no effects on third
parties should receive our moral approbation." Id. at 1442.
22. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE
WOLFENDEN REPORT 48-49 (1963) [hereinafter WOLFENDEN REPORT] (recommending that con-
sent of parties determine legitimacy of homosexual as well as heterosexual relationships); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.5 commentary at 277 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (recommending decriminaliza-
tion of private consensual sexual relations between adults).
23. For example, nonconsensual sexual conduct, even if it takes place in seclusion, is not pro-
tected by the constitutional right of privacy. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992,
996-98, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (1984) (no constitutional right to privacy when consent is vitiated
by intentional deception); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y. 2d 152, 165, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574, 485 N.Y.S.
2d 207, 214 (1984) (marital rape excluded from constitutional protection because "right of privacy
protects consensual acts, not violent sexual assaults").
24. This statement is somewhat of an oversimplification, given the several variations on the
liberal view. Some liberal philosophers, for example, would defend legal intervention if such were
necessary to prevent offense to others, even if the questioned activity did not cause harm to others. 2
J. FEINBERG, MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS xiii (1985); H.L.A.
HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 47-48 (1963). It is not even anathema to some liberals to
endorse a limited form of legal paternalism in which legal intervention is used to prevent tangible
harm to the actor. Id. at 32-33. But see J. FEINBERG, supra, at xiii (legal paternalism is a view
excluded by liberalism). A liberal view of any stripe, however, seems to be opposed to laws that are
based solely on a moral distaste for the practice or on a belief that the practice causes moral harm to
the actor. CANADIAN REPORT, supra note 16, at 16.
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adults are affirmatively encouraged, the liberal ideology displays a
greater tolerance for diversity among individuals than does the tradi-
tional view."
Because the egalitarian view is the newest to emerge, it is the most
difficult of the three to characterize. Unlike the traditional view, the
egalitarian conception of sexual conduct is not opposed to nonmarital
sex. Instead, the fundamental animating concern is fostering equality
between the sexes.2 6 The paramount goal of the egalitarian view is to
afford women the power to form and maintain noncoercive sexual rela-
tionships, both within and outside of marriage. Perhaps the most impor-
tant force behind the development of the egalitarian view has been the
feminist critique of the liberal view.27 In particular, feminists have con-
tended that the liberal notion of rights is inadequate to protect women
against the coercive power exercised by men in society. Feminists theo-
rize that the unequal status of women stems not only from biased govern-
mental actions, but from the greater economic and social power exerted
by men in the private sphere. Since liberalism's primary concern is with
limiting governmental coercion, feminists charge that it is incapable of
producing equality for women.2" Many recent legal reforms are thus
based on a reassessment of the notions of consent and privacy that are
central to the liberal attitude.29
Like the traditional view, the egalitarian conception of sex tends to
be moralistic and often calls for active legal intervention to regulate some
25. A good example of liberal tolerance of diversity is Judge Merhige's dissent in Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), in which
he argued for constitutional protection for the consensual sexual conduct of homosexual persons.
Merhige took a Millian view of the Constitution and declared that even "socially condemned activ-
ity, excepting that of demonstrable external effect, is and was intended by the Constitution to be
beyond the scope of state regulation when conducted within the privacy of the home." Id. at 1205.
26. Like the many strands of liberalism, feminism has been described as too diverse to consti-
tute a "discrete philosophy," better understood as "a broad coalition of interests dedicated to the
common purpose of improving the status of women in society." CANADIAN REPORT, supra note 16,
at 18. Zillah Eisenstein contends that the common thread running through all "feminisms" is the
"demand for equality, freedom of individual choice, and the recognition of woman as an autono-
mous being." Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM & SEXUAL EQUALITY, CRISIS IN LIBERAL AMERICA 12
(1984).
27. A concise summary statement of feminist criticism of liberalism is found in the CANADIAN
REPORT, supra note 16, at 20-21; see also Petchesky, Introduction to Amicus Brief: Richard Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RPTR. 3, 5 (1986)
(critique of liberal notion of privacy and argument for "subversive, radically democratic dimension
to the idea of individual choice").
28. CANADIAN REPORT, supra note 16, at 20 (citing Clark, Liberalism and Pornography, in
PORNOGRAPHY & CENSORSHIP 45 (D. Copp & S. Wendell eds. 1983)).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 95-114 and 161-63.
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forms of unacceptable sexual conduct.3" In this view, however, immoral
sex is no longer associated with nonmarital sex or a person's status per
se. Instead, for a feminist, immoral sex most often is synonymous with
exploitive sex. The various legal reforms in the egalitarian mode repre-
sent a search for a refurbished notion of consent-a new conception of
mutuality in sexual encounters that is capable of separating moral from
exploitive sex. My tentative hypothesis is that moral sex is coming to be
identified with sexual conduct in which both parties have as their objec-
tive only sexual pleasure or emotional intimacy, whether or not tied to
procreation.3 Good sex, in the egalitarian view, is noninstrumental con-
duct. Sex used for more external purposes, such as financial gain, pres-
tige, or power, is regarded as exploitive and immoral, regardless of
whether the parties have engaged voluntarily in the encounter.
B. THE TRADiTIONAL VIEW OF SEXUAL CONDUCT
From the turn of the century until World War II, the traditional
view of sexual conduct dominated legal culture. The law treated sex
within marriage as qualitatively different from other sexual conduct and
tended to punish nonmarital sex through a variety of legal sanctions. In
addition to criminal laws prohibiting forcible sexual abuse, victimless
crimes-such as fornication and sodomy-were outlawed without regard
to consent.32 Restrictive criminal obscenity laws also limited the volume
of explicit sexual material available and tended to reinforce the view that
sex without the sanctity of marriage was immoral.33
Perhaps more important than these direct criminal prohibitions,
however, were an elaborate array of indirect civil sanctions that bolstered
30. See, e.g., CANADIAN REPORT, supra note 16, at 19 (majority of feminist writers favor "vig-
orous use of legal as well as political and social strategies").
31. See infra text accompanying notes 246-50.
32. For a discussion of the history of these laws, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment
on Adultery and Fornication at 430-36; id. § 213.2 commentary at 357-62 (discussing history of
sodomy laws). Although some antisodomy laws prohibited sexual practices engaged in by married
as well as unmarried persons, a key target of such laws were homosexual persons who were (and still
are) legally prohibited from marrying. See, eg., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W. 2d 185
(1972) (rejecting constitutional challenge to prohibition on same sex marriage); see also H. KAY,
SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 235-41 (2d ed. 1981) (discussion of case law on same sex marriage).
33. For a historical overview of the legal treatment of obscene and pornographic materials, see
ATV"Y GEN. COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT, 233-48 (1986) [hereinafter ATr'Y GEN.
REPORT]; Penrod & Linz, Using Psychological Research on Violent Pornography to Inform Legal
Change, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 245, 251-57 (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein
eds. 1984).
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the legal and moral ban on nonmarital sex. Nonmarital sex was discour-
aged by denying contraceptives to unmarried persons34 and by victimiz-
ing nonmarital children for the unacceptable conduct of their parents.3"
Additionally, unmarried parents and homosexuals were often branded as
immoral persons who deserved to lose their jobs36 or be denied educa-
tional opportunities.3"
For married persons, the chief legal deterrent to adultery was a
fault-based divorce system that threatened the adulterous spouse either
with loss of financial support or punitively high support obligations.38 A
wife's adultery was also likely to be punished by the denial of custody of
the children upon divorce.39
34. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down Massachusetts law forbid-
ding distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
35. See, e.g., Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967); Note,
The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1962-63).
36. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting Title VII chal-
lenge to dismissal based on sexual preference); Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507
F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), (invalidating school rule against hiring unwed parents as teachers' aides), cert.
granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert dismissed as improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976); Gaylord
v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977) (en bane) (upholding dismis-
sal of gay public school teacher). Even at present, only the state of Wisconsin and approximately 30
cities ban discrimination based on sexual preference. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Ori-
entation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286 n.5 (1985). For a
thorough review of the law relating to discrimination against gay men and lesbians in employment,
see Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United
States, 30 HAST. L.J. 799, 805-74 (1979); Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-
Eighties Part I, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459, 464-540 (1985); Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual
Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 312-24 (1980-81).
37. See, e.g., Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971) (striking down school
policy banning pregnant unmarried students); Perry v. Grenada Mun. Separate School Dist., 300 F.
Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (successfully challenging school policy barring unwed mothers). Until
the 1970s, moreover, many school districts limited educational opportunities for married students as
well as unmarried parents, often barring them from extracurricular programs. M. YUDOF, D. KIRP,
T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 757-59
(2d. ed 1982). For a general discussion of the history and legal status of policies on pregnancy and
marriage affecting students, see NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, SEx DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCA-
TION: LEGAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 2-10 to 2-16 (1983). For a discussion of school policies
affecting gay student organizations, see Stanley, The Rights of Gay Student Organizations, 10 J.C. &
U.L. 397 (1983-84).
38. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.5, at 445-46 (1968); L. WErr-z-
MAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 6-14 (1985) (description of traditional divorce law).
39. H. CLARK, supra note 38, § 17.4, at 585.
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Nonmarital sex could also give rise to tort actions. Claims for
seduction' or breach of a promise to marry,4' brought by unmarried
women42 against former sexual partners, dramatically underscored the
principle that nonmarital sex was socially and legally risky conduct.
Moreover, in addition to claims brought by injured women, the husbands
or parents of these women were permitted to seek damages for their own
intangible injuries under the tort rubrics of criminal conversation 43 or
alienation of affections.44
40. The cause of action for seduction was originally granted to fathers for the seduction of
their daughters. See W. MALONE, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL: INJURIES TO FAMILY, SOCIAL AND
TRADE RELATIONS 78-79 (1979); Sinclair, Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman, 5 LAW &
INEQUALITY 33, 41-60 (1987). One writer describes the motivation behind the seduction cause of
action as "[tihe social interest in the preservation of female purity and in the prevention of illegiti-
macy." Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm", 33 MICH. L. REv. 979, 988 (1935). At
common law, the seduced woman was denied a civil remedy for damages on the ground that she was
a consenting party or equally at fault. Several states statutorily changed the common law to confer
upon the woman the right to maintain a cause of action for her own seduction. Other states later
recognized a common law action. All the statutes required the plaintiff to be unmarried; two stat-
utes required the woman to be under twenty years of age at the time of seduction; three states
required the woman to be over twenty-one. 4 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN -FAMILY LAWS 267-68
(1936). The maximum age limit probably reflected a belief that an adult woman should be capable of
preventing her own seduction. The rationale for the requirement that the plaintiff be over twenty-
one probably stemmed from the desire to prevent double recovery, assuming that the father had a
common law action to sue for the seduction of his child. Feinsinger, supra, at 986-87.
41. The action for breach of a promise to marry could be brought even if no formal or express
promises were exchanged, as long as an agreement could be implied from the circumstances. See H.
CLARK, supra note 38, § 1.2, at 3. For a discussion of the history of the cause of action, see id. § 1. 1,
at 1-3.
42. In virtually all states, there was no formal limitation of the cause of action to female plain-
tiffs. In practice, however, only women sued, either because male defendants were often better eco-
nomic targets or because it was socially unacceptable for men to admit that they had been deceived
and injured. See, e.g., Kelly v. Renfro, 9 Ala. 325, 328 (1846) ("the action is common to either sex,
though in our own country, ajust regard to public morals, has long since confined the action alone to
the female sufferer"); H. CLARK, supra note 38, § 1.2, at 5 (men are "incapable of assuming the air of
wronged innocence" required by plaintiffs); Turano, Breach of Promise: Still a Racket, 32 AM.
MERCURY 40, 45 (1934) (a man would hesitate to testify that "his tender heart has been completely
busted by the inconstancy of a weaker vessel").
43. The cause of action for criminal conversation could be established merely by showing that
the defendant voluntarily had intercourse with the spouse of the plaintiff. The gravamen of the tort
was the violation of the marital right of exclusive sexual access. Criminal conversation was by its
nature a strict liability tort because the defendant could not avoid liability by proving either that he
did not initiate the encounter or that he did not know his sexual partner was married. W. MALONE,
supra note 40, at 70-71. Some'states formally limited this cause of action to husbands, reasoning that
the action was intended only to protect the husband's interest in the legitimacy of children born to
his wife. Other states allowed wives to sue, taking the view that the tort protected against the
broader interest in preventing interference with familial relationships. Feinsinger, supra note 40, at
990.
44. The cause of action for alienation of affection could be established by proving that the
defendant took action directed toward impairing the marital relationship and caused a loss of affec-
tion between the spouses. W. MALONE, supra note 40, at 72-77.
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Starting in the mid-1930s, many state legislatures enacted anti-heart
balm legislation abolishing these causes of actions." The claim for
breach of a promise to marry, in particular, fell into disfavor. The repeal
movement was principally fueled by a perception that unscrupulous
female plaintiffs abused the law by bringing unfounded claims against
innocent men.46 There was as yet little criticism of the traditional view
of sex supporting the tort claims themselves.47
Besides being intolerant of nonmarital sex, the traditional view of
sexual conduct functioned to maintain a patriarchal social system in
which women were perceived as being sexually different from and
45. The first anti-heart balm legislation was passed by the Indiana legislature in 1935. The
Indiana act made it a crime for any person to seek damages for breach of a promise to marry,
seduction, alienation of affections, and criminal conversation. 1935 Ind. Acts ch. 208. In the same
year, New York also abolished these causes of actions and criminalized the institution of suits for
these claims. 1935 N.Y. Laws ch. 263. See Sinclair, supra note 40, at 65-71. The trend toward
abolition has persisted. Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have statutorily abolished
the action for alienation of affections. See Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1770, 1771 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Heartbalm Statutes]. Twenty-two states and the District
of Columbia have statutorily abolished the action for breach of a promise to marry; twenty-one
states and the District of Columbia have statutorily abolished the claim for criminal conversation.
Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780, 794-95 (1984), vacated, 313 N.C. 324, 327
S.E.2d 888 (1985). Courts in two states have abolished the claim for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation has been judicially abrogated in four states. See, e.g., H. CLARK, supra note
38, at 15-22; W. MALONE, supra note 40, at 80-81; Note, Alienation of Affections and Criminal
Conversation: Unholy Marriage in Need of Annulment, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 323 (1981); Note,
Heartbalm Statutes, supra, at 1770.
46. The author of the 1935 New York legislation, for example, declared that the bill was
directed at "a tribute of$ 10,000,000 paid annually by New York men to gold-diggers and blackmail-
ers. Nine out of ten recent breach of promise suits have been of the racketeer type." N.Y. Times,
Mar. 30, 1935, at 3, col. 1. He further stated in a radio broadcast that "New York state refuses to be
a party to blackmail any longer; the... [s]tate will not be a coconspirator of a certain type of lawyer,
who, working in cahoots with the modem female racketeer seeks to become rich at the expense of
reputation, embarrassment, and wide-spread [sic] publicity." The Outlawry of Heart-Balm Suits,
119 LIT. DIG. 22 (Apr. 13, 1935). Similar sentiments were repeatedly expressed by legal critics of
the cause of action. See, eg., R. BABER, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 53-56 (1953); 2 J.
SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 128 and 1303, at
1518, 1547 (1870); 4 C. VERNIER, supra note 40, at 268-70 (1936); Brown, Breach of Promise Suits,
77 U. PA. L. REv. 474, 490-95 (1929); Feinsinger, supra note 40, at 985; Hadley, Breach of Promise
to Marry, 2 NOTRE DAME LAW. 190, 193 (1927); Note, Breach of Promise, 7 HARV. L. REV. 372
(1893).
47. Although the early anti-heart balm statutes probably did not emanate from a greater toler-
ance for premarital sex, there is evidence that they reflected a new, more romantic view of marriage.
Couples were expected to marry for love, not for material advantage. The breach of a promise to
marry action was criticized as a relic of an older, more property oriented view of marriage. See H.
CLARK, supra note 38, § 1.1, at 2-3; Lawyer, Are Actions for Breach of the Marriage Contract
Immoral?, 38 CENT. 272, 273 (1894); Turano, supra note 42, at 46.
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subordinate to men.4" Stated as an abstract proposition, the traditional
view of sex might seem egalitarian because the prohibition against
nonmarital sex looks gender neutral. But the traditional system is insep-
arable from and gains much of its meaning from two sources of inequal-
ity: the subordinant social and economic position of wives and the
double standard of sexual morality. When the only legally sanctioned
sex is marital sex, the quality of the relationship between spouses takes
on a special importance. The subordination of wives meant that the only
legitimate environment for sex was destined to be controlled by men.49
Although men as well as women could feel trapped by a traditional mar-
riage, women typically had more to lose from divorce than men. Women
were less likely to remarry50 and were far more vulnerable to poverty if
they had no support from a man.51
Moreover, the traditional view of sex coexisted peacefully with the
double standard of sexual morality. 2 Under the double standard, men
were expected to be sexually active before marriage and on occasion to
48. Two integral theses of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, for example, were that women
were naturally inferior to men and that men should act as "female's governor" in marriage. PHILOS-
OPHY & SEX, supra note 16, at 11.
49. For a sampling of the literature on the male dominated traditional family, see Bernard,
Marriage: Hers and His, Ms. MAG. 46, 47-49, 110, 113 (Dec. 1972), reprinted in B. BABCOCK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1975) (traditional mar-
riage is far healthier for men than for women); Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordi-
nation and the Rule of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 121-24 (D. Kairys, ed. 1982); Thorne,
Feminist Rethinking of the Family: An Overview, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY-SOME FEMINIST
QUESTIONS 3-20 (B. Thorne & M. Yalom eds. 1982) (summarizing feminist criticisms of traditional
ways of thinking about the family).
50. See Hetzel & Cappelta, Marriages: Trends and Characteristics, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, Div. OF VITAL STATISTICS, Series 21, at 17 (1971) (in 1967, the remarriage rate
for divorced men was over 1 1/ times the rate for divorced women). This disparity has persisted into
the 1980s. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Marital Status and Living Arrangements, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-20, No. 389, at 3 (March 1983) (higher incidence of remarriage for
divorced men than for divorced women).
51. See London, Women Bear the Brunt of Economic Crises, in A. JAGGER & P. ROTHEN-
BERG, supra note 16, at 44 (in first year after separation, former husbands improved standard of
living 42%, while standard of former wives and children decreased by 73%); Greenwood-Audant,
The Internalization of Powerlessness: A Case Study of the Displaced Homemaker, in WOMEN: A
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 264-81 (J. Freeman 3d ed. 1984) (discussing structural and psychological
barriers facing displaced homemakers).
52. Frances Olsen describes the double standard of morality as having two aspects:
First, nonmarital sex, or sexual activity separated from emotional commitment, is consid-
ered desirable for men but devaluing for women. The second aspect is a corollary of the
first: some women have to be "immoral" in order to serve as sexual partners for males
outside of marriage. Thus, women are categorized as moral or immoral, good girls or bad
girls, virgins or whores, wife material or playmate material.
Olsen, supra note 1, at 402 n.70; see also Brief of Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Task
Force at 4-8, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing legal
manifestations of the sexual double standard).
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engage in casual extra-marital sex. Women were ordinarily denied such
freedom and were subjected to harsh social penalties if they exerted sex-
ual independence. One serious threat a woman could face in a society
that embraced this double standard was to be labeled "immoral" and
ineligible for the respectable roles of wife and mother. Perhaps the
harshest feature of the double standard was that it generated a demand
for a class of prostitute women whose chief function was to service the
illicit sexual desires of men who would not be stigmatized by their partic-
ipation as customers of commercial sex.
Some restrictive sex legislation in the traditional mode was spon-
sored by feminists and other reformers who sought to eliminate the
double standard and to promote male chastity.53 Whether these laws
had a chilling effect on the nonmarital sexual activity of men is uncertain.
It now seems indisputable, however, that the traditional view of sexual
conduct had a disparate negative impact on women.
One reason why women were disproportionately victimized under
the traditional system is that the legal apparatus simply did not operate
at the behest of nonvirtuous women. As a matter of formal legal doc-
trine, the unchaste woman could not sue for seduction54 or breach of a
promise to marry.55 The promiscuous teenage girl could not be the vic-
tim of statutory rape. 6 The financial interests of prostitutes and mis-
tresses were not protected by the law of contract or by the principles of
equity.5 7
At the level of formal legal doctrine, women perceived as "virtuous"
were technically protected from sexual exploitation by men other than
their husbands. But a "Catch-22" occurred in that exploitation or vic-
timization itself often served to degrade the female victim. For example,
a woman who had been raped suffered disgrace as well as physical and
53. Olsen, supra note 1, at 402-04 (historical background of statutory rape laws); Walkowitz,
The Politics of Prostitution, in WOMEN: SEX AND SEXUALITY (C. Stimpson & E. Person eds. 1980)
(historical analysis of Victorian anti-vice movements in Great Britain and United States).
54. See, eg., Amburgey v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1967) (plaintiff must be of a
chaste character at time of intercourse); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 commentary at 391-97 (dis-
cussing crime of seduction and requirement of chastity).
55. See H. CLARK, supra note 38, § 1.3, at 5-6 (unchastity of plaintiff is a defense if defendant
did not know of her "condition" at the time of the engagement).
56. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(3) commentary at 419-20 (1980) (proof of prior sexual
promiscuity rebuts the "presumption of naivete and inexperience" that underlies imposition of crimi-
nal penalties for statutory rape).
57. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 1476 (1962); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 589 (1932)
(bargain based in whole or in part on illicit sexual intercourse or promise of such intercourse is
illegal and unenforceable).
1988]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:777
emotional injury.58
The debate over the desirability of permitting tort actions for sexu-
ally related injuries also reveals how the legal system could taint even the
blameless female litigant. Proponents of anti-heart balm legislation
forcefully argued that no self-respecting woman would seek relief for sex-
ual abuse through the law. Many seemed to believe that any woman who
would sue for breach of a promise to marry probably was not worthy of
marriage.59
The law thus nominally functioned to protect the virtuous woman.
However, even virtuous women who relied on the legal system for pro-
tection ran the risk of being judged immoral and thus classified as outside
the protection of the law.
C. THE LIBERAL VIEW OF SEXUAL CONDUCT AND THE
CENTRALITY OF CONSENT
It is doubtful that the liberal view of sexual conduct ever clearly
dominated the American legal scene. The traditional view was too well-
entrenched to be wholly supplanted, even with the sexual revolution of
the 1960s. However, the two decades from the mid-1950s to the mid-
1970s now seem like the "golden age" of the liberal era.
58. Women who have been raped may blame themselves and experience guilt for not having
been able to prevent the crime. Herman, The Rape Culture, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
supra note 51, at 20, 33-34; Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395,
424-32 (1985) (describing phases ofrape trauma syndrome). Recent studies on mates and families of
rape victims also indicate that the rape victim is often viewed by others as "unclean," "tainted," or
"damaged" as a result of her victimization. R. TONG, supra, note 4, at 92-93; see also Herman,
supra, at 23 (discussing the victim blaming attitudes of husbands); Massaro, supra, at 406-09 (dis-
cussing victim blaming attitudes ofjudges and juries). For a discussion of victim blaming theories in
the academic literature, see D. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE,
AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 164-66 (1984).
59. See, eg., Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 474, 493-95 (1929) (action
was left to the "adventuress and the woman of shady character" because women of "modesty and
good breeding" would hesitate to institute suit); Know, The High Cost of Loving: What is a Breach
of Promise-Cupid's Indemnity?, 61 FORUM 735, 744 (1919) ("no woman with a vestige of pride
would air in court the fact that she had been jilted"); The Law and Lovers' Vows, 71 SPECTATOR 712,
713 (1893) (innocent and worthy women were less likely to sue). One writer agreed that only "the
vulgar" would bring suit because it would be "bad form" for a refined woman to sue while the
majority of working women, if jilted by working men, would find litigation too expensive. This
writer nevertheless endorsed breach of promise suits because they prevented "whole classes of very
decent young women from being victimised by men who make an amusement of lovemaking, and
who would, but for the law, delight in a succession of 'engagements,' after each of which the girl
would be deserted." A Word for Amelia Roper, 64 SPECTATOR 83 (1890).
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The reports of two highly controversial legal commissions studying
sexual matters epitomize the ideology of the era. In 1957, the Wolfenden
Committee60 recommended the repeal of laws criminalizing consensual
homosexual conduct in Britain.61 The same committee endorsed the
existing legal scheme which provided for punishment of prostitutes who
solicited clients in public, without classifying the underlying commercial
sex itself as unlawful.62 In the United States, the President's Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography 63 in 1970 recommended the abolition of
legal restraints on the dissemination of sexually explicit materials to con-
senting adults.'
The hallmark of the Wolfenden Report is the importance it attaches
to individual freedom of choice. The Committee recommended
decriminalization of consensual homosexual conduct because of its belief
that all persons should be free to act in matters of private morality, such
as sex. In the Committee's view, attempts at legislating sexual morality
were destined to be ineffective and, in any event, were "not the law's
business."' 6 The Committee rejected arguments that the decriminaliza-
tion of homosexuality would encourage homosexual activity and have a
negative impact on the heterosexual family. These arguments had little
persuasive impact because the Committee believed that the law had little
influence on either human behavior or social forces.66 By so separating
the law from its social context, the Committee was able to recommend
legal change without simultaneously advocating social reform.
The Wolfenden Committee purported to follow the same restrictive
view of the proper ambit of legal regulation when it analyzed prostitu-
tion. Without condoning prostitution, the Committee was able to sup-
port the then current legal scheme that did not make commercial sex
criminal in and of itself. Similar to its views on homosexual conduct, it
regarded prostitution as consensual activity and saw no reason for the
law to impede the choice of an adult prostitute and her customer, so long
60. After its publication in 1957, the Wolfenden Report generated a decade of controversy in
academia and in Parliament. See W. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 125-31 (1979).
61. WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 22, at 187-89. However, decriminalization did not
occur in Great Britain until 1967. See Sexual Offenses Act, 1967 § (I) I, in 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND 1033 (4th ed. 1976).
62. WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 22, at 189-90. However, the Committee did recommend
that the law no longer require proof of annoyance to establish the crime of street solicitation and
advocated harsher maximum penalties. Id. at 141-43, 151.
63. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970) [hereinafter OBSCENITY COMM'N REPORT].
64. Id. at 51.
65. WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 22, at 48.
66. Id. at 47.
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as no concrete harm to third parties occurred. Significantly, the
Wolfenden Committee started from the assumption that, in the great
majority of cases, women voluntarily choose to become prostitutes
because that occupation is "easier, freer and more profitable" 67 than
other lifestyle choices. The Committee reasoned that the desire to
become a prostitute stemmed predominantly from the "psychological
makeup" of the woman, rather than from any economic constraints. 68
From this perspective, the institution of prostitution could be reduced to
an aggregation of private, individual choices and its social significance
thereby minimized.
Like the Wolfenden Report, the 1970 Report of the President's
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (the 1970 Report) placed
paramount normative importance on freedom of individual choice. The
majority of the President's Commission argued that consenting adults
should have the right, free from government-imposed obstacles, to
purchase obscene materials. In this respect, the President's Commission
went further than the Wolfenden Committee in its conception of the pri-
vate realm. For the President's Commission, privacy and individual
autonomy were so closely linked that the act of purchasing obscene
materials should be immunized, even though it occurs in the public
marketplace.
The tone of the 1970 Report differed somewhat from the tone of the
Wolfenden Report. While the Wolfenden Report accepted the tradi-
tional view that prostitution and homosexual activities are morally evil,
the 1970 Report departs from this traditional view and conveys the
impression that obscenity might also have positive uses.
The 1970 Report noted that obscenity can provide information and
entertainment for adults or may satisfy the curiosity of adolescents.69
The President's Commission also reviewed the empirical studies on the
relationship between obscenity and sex crimes and concluded that there
was no established causal link between them.7" The 1970 Report cited
evidence that sex offenders typically had less, rather than more, adoles-
cent experience with erotica than did other adults. 71 The 1970 Report
thus went beyond the Wolfenden Committee's advocacy of toleration
and indicated approval of this form of sexualized activity, at least for
67. Id. at 131-32.
68. Id. at 131.
69. OBSCENITY CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 63, at 24, 33-39, 53.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Id. at 52.
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some individuals. The President's Commission placed positive weight on
diversity in sexual and aesthetic tastes among individuals and viewed
government intervention not simply as unwise or unnecessary, but as
potentially harmful.72
The liberal ideology embodied in the reports of both commissions
had a significant influence on legal reforms in this country. The cele-
brated constitutional right to privacy73 emerged during this period and
immunized procreative decisions involving sterilization,74 contracep-
tion,75 and abortion 76 from most forms of government intervention.
Moreover, by the end of the liberal era, various constitutional doctrines
had been employed to dismantle many of the indirect sanctions on
nonmarital sex. For example, the Supreme Court no longer permitted
the interests of unwed fathers7 7 and of nonmarital children 78 to be sacri-
ficed to preserve the privileged status of marriage. Although the
Supreme Court's decisions provided no direct protection for nonmarital
sex, they made it much easier for individuals to eschew marriage without
incurring grievous emotional or financial losses.
Legislative reform in the liberal mode was probably even more sig-
nificant in this period than were the constitutional developments. No-
fault divorce caught hold in nearly every state79 and permitted even the
adulterous spouse to escape legal sanctions for extramarital sexual behav-
ior. During this period, a sizeable number of states also repealed their
72. The President's Commission went so far as to suggest that government restriction might
have a corrosive effect on moral standards: "Governmental regulation of moral choice can deprive
the individual of responsibility for personal decision which is essential to the formation of genuine
moral standards. Such regulation would also tend to establish official moral orthodoxy, contrary to
our fundamental constitutional traditions." Id. at 55.
73. For general discussions of the constitutional right to privacy, see Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 665-92 (1980); Note, Developments in the Law: The Consti-
tution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1161-66, 1177-87 (1980).
74. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
75. Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
78. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (determining permissible extent of state's
restrictions on interstate inheritance rights by illegitimates); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating system denying worker's compensation death benefits to dependent
unacknowledged illegitimate children); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (striking down legisla-
tion denying unacknowledged illegitimate child the right to sue for mother's wrongful death).
79. By 1980, every state except Illinois and South Dakota had adopted some form of no-fault
divorce. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1980, 6 FAM. L.
REP. 4043, 4046 table 1 (1980).
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anti-sodomy laws.8" Moreover, because existing laws were virtually
never enforced, many gay men and lesbians felt secure enough in the
1970s to agitate publicly for an end to discrimination against them.8'
With respect to prostitution and pornography, however, the liberal
ideology did not succeed in changing formal legal doctrine. Prostitution
remains illegal in all states but Nevada,82 and the courts have uniformly
rejected the claim that the constitutional right of privacy insulates prosti-
tutes from criminal prosecution.83 Additionally, in 1973, the Supreme
Court in Miller v. California84 sided with the dissenting commissioners
on the 1970 Commission8" and allowed states to ban hard core obscenity.
Despite the Court's rejection of the liberal view on obscenity in
Miller, pornography seemed to flourish as a social institution after 1973.
One study reports the surprising finding that prosecutors were more
reluctant to prosecute obscenity cases after Miller, even though they per-
ceived that obscene materials were increasingly available in their commu-
nities.86 Thus, while the liberal view did not succeed in revamping legal
doctrine, its permissive ideology probably had some impact on legal
actors who were reluctant to allocate limited resources to enforce
existing obscenity laws.
As the liberal view of sex began to permeate the law, consent of the
parties simultaneously emerged as the crucial determinant of the lawful-
ness of sexual conduct. Because consent replaced marriage as the legiti-
mating force in many contexts, the extent of the legal control of sexual
80. Until 1961, every state criminalized sodomy. Currently, twenty-four states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia provide criminal penalties for sodomy engaged in by consenting adults in private.
Hardwick v. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2845-46 (1986) (citing Survey on the Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 524 n.9 (1986)).
81. See J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMO-
SEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970, 223-39 (1983); THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEO-
PLE: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE To A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS 1-2 (rev. ed. 1983).
82. See Note, Right of Privacy Challenges to Prostitution Statutes, 58 WASH. L.Q. 439, 472-80
(1980). In Nevada, legalized licensed brothels operate in two counties. Prostitution is illegal if it
occurs outside the licensed facilities. Id. at 444 n.24.
83. See, e g., United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 50 (D.C. App. 1975) cert. denied, 426 U.S.
920 (1976); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Iowa 1976); In re Dora P., 68 A.D. 2d 719, 731,
418 N.Y.S.2d 597, 604 (1979). In the latter two cases, however, the trial courts held the statutes
unconstitutional on privacy grounds, but the rulings were reversed on appeal. United States v.
Moses, 41 U.S.L.W. 2298 (Nov. 3, 1972); In re P., 92 Misc. 2d 62, 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 469 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1977).
84. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
85. See OBSCENITY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 63, at 383-424 (statements of Morton A. Hill
& Winfrey C. Link).
86. Penrod & Linz, supra note 33, at 263.
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conduct often depended on the definition given to "consent" in the par-
ticular setting.
Perhaps more than in other areas of the law, the concept of consent
as it relates to sexual activities is a complicated notion. Central to both
the lay and legal notions of consent are considerations other than the
subjective desires of the parties. Consent is a devilishly malleable term
which may describe a wide spectrum of responsive behavior, ranging
from the mere failure to engage in active resistance, to active participa-
tion in and encouragement of another's initiatives.8 7 For that reason, a
decision as to what conduct constitutes consent in any particular context
may mask value judgments implicit in the choice of definition. A deter-
mination of sexual consent may, for example, serve as a proxy for moral
judgments about the behavior of the parties88 or as a shorthand method
for classifying certain forms of sexual behavior as normal.8 9 Particularly
in an era greatly influenced by Freudian psychology, there was a willing-
ness to label sexual conduct as consensual, even if it could be seen as
fulfilling only the unconscious desires of the actors.90 The Freudian con-
cern for the ill effects of repression also provided a theoretical justifica-
tion for a loose operative definition of consent.
87. Carole Pateman has compared consent in everyday relationships to the notion of consent in
political obligations. Her thesis is that most liberal consent theorists have transformed the concept
of consent into a mere "'constituent' of liberal democratic ideology" without looking for evidence
that consent has actually been given by individuals. Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 POL. THEORY
149, 162 (1980). When the focus is on hypothetical consent, rather than actual consent, consent may
be used to describe "habitual acquiescence, assent, silent dissent, submission, or even enforced sub-
mission." Id. at 150. Joel Feinberg has also argued that it is helpful to think of consent as masking a
"spectrum of voluntariness," corresponding both to "degrees of coercive pressure" exerted on the
actor and to "variations in fraudulently produced inducement used" to procure agreement. Fein-
berg, Victims' Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent, 96 ETHICs 330, 335-36 (1986).
In a similar vein, a legal commentator explains that to distinguish consent from submission, the law
looks to a number of factors:
the value placed on the personal freedom to make various kinds of choices; the severity of
the damage which different types of coercion are capable of inflicting; the amount of resist-
ance to coercion that the law expects of victims; and the degree to which coercion can serve
an evidentiary function in determining issues of fact with respect to nonconsent.
Note, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 641 (1976).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 133-46, 207-208, 227-28.
89. Catharine MacKinnon claims, for example, that the legal definition of rape corresponds to
"the level of acceptable force starting just above the level set by what is seen as normal male sexual
behavior, rather than at the victim's, or women's, point of violation." MacKinnon, supra note 4, at
649.
90. A student law review comment written in 1952 drew heavily upon Freudian psychology to
argue that a man should not be convicted of rape if a woman's response was ambivalent. Comment,
Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Stan-
dard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 66-68 (1952). The writer characterized the victim's attitude as often ambiva-
lent, even if her overt behavior looked like resistance. Id. at 66. The writer believed that women
often harbored an "unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
D. THE FEMINIST RESPONSE TO LIBERALISM AND THE
CRITIQUE OF CONSENT
In the 1970s, feminists developed a critique of both the traditional
and the liberal views of sex. Perhaps the most important aspect of the
critique was its exposure of the inadequacy of the concept of consent that
had operated in the law of sex. The broad claim was that the legal notion
of consent had failed to safeguard the sexual freedom of women. Femi-
nists sought to prohibit many forms of sexual conduct which, although
not always overtly resisted by the women involved, were not truly con-
sensual.91 The feminist critique demonstrated that the liberal ideology,
like the traditional view of sex, could be discredited for being fundamen-
tally male oriented and for operating to bolster male dominance in sexual
matters. Feminists charged that the law of sex legitimated a social order
in which the sexual abuse of women was commonplace. Moreover, by
purporting to treat consent as the decisive factor redeeming sex, but
defining consent narrowly to mean no more than acquiescence or submis-
sion, the liberal ideology made the sexual exploitation of women less visi-
ble and more impervious to reform.92
Three contexts that demonstrate feminist disaffection with the legal
concept of consent are rape, sexual harassment, and tort actions for
deception in sexual relationships. In each of these areas, feminists con-
tended that the law blinded itself to the sexual abuse of large numbers of
... guilt feelings." Id. at 67 (footnote omitted). Citing Freud, the author claimed that many women
required "aggressive overtures by the man" and would experience erotic pleasure by an "accompa-
nying physical struggle." Id. at 66. The author also regarded crying by the victim as a sign of an
ambivalent attitude. Id. at 68.
For a study disputing the psychoanalytic position that women subconsciously desire physically
forced intercourse, see Kanin, Female Rape Fantasies: A Victimization Study, 7 VICTIMOLOGY 114,
115-18 (1982). The study contends that there is a difference between physically forced sex and the
quality of fantasies women often describe as their "rape fantasies." While 57% of the university
women respondents reported having rape fantasies, id. at 115, their responses indicated that many of
the situations labeled as rape fantasies were in fact aggressive seductions, devoid of violence and
pain, in which the women actually consented to intercourse. Id. at 116-17.
91. An extensive bibliography of the feminist writings on rape, battery, sexual harassment,
forced prostitution, and the sexual abuse of children is contained in MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 12 n.20 (1985).
92. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 219 (restricting legal punishment to sexual
encounters that are unusually abusive prevents women from examining "the ordinary conditions of
their own consent"); MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 648 ("As with protective labor laws for women
only, dividing and protecting the most vulnerable becomes a device for not protecting everyone."),
Olsen, supra note 1, at 427-28 (arguing that there is "no bright line" between consensual sexual
intercourse and coercive sex and that it is harmful to conceive of sex as comprising only two catego-
ries); Scully & Marolla, Rape and Vocabularies of Motive: Alternative Perspectives, in RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDEOOK 305-06 (A. Burgess ed. 1985) (use of a vocabulary of
motive can excuse and justify sexual violence in normal males).
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women, while purporting to punish nonconsensual activity. Within the
last decade, the feminist critique has profoundly changed the law of rape
and is the force behind the recognition of sexual harassment as a prohib-
ited form of sexual abuse. A new genre of tort actions based on decep-
tion in sexual relationships has also emerged. Although this sexual
liability law is still in its infancy, it also has potential to reshape the legal
notion of consent in sexual relationships.
1. Forcible Rape
The legal definition of consent has been a primary target of feminist
criticism of forcible rape laws. Consent plays a pivotal role in the law of
rape because most states define rape as sexual intercourse without the
consent of the woman.93 Despite this seemingly straightforward defini-
tion of rape, feminists argued that nonconsensual sexual abuse often went
unpunished because the notion of consent was manipulated in a sexist
fashion.94
The most glaring example of the failure of rape laws to punish all
forms of nonconsensual sex is the exemption traditionally afforded to
marital rape-an exemption which should be anathema even to the lib-
eral view of sex. The marital rape doctrine still operates in most states
either to immunize spousal rape completely or to provide a limited
immunity for less aggravated rapes when the defendant is the husband of
the victim.95 In the marital rape context, consent is reduced to a legal
93. Traditionally, rape was defined as sexual intercourse by force and against the victim's will.
The two elements of force and nonconsent often translated into a requirement that the state prove
the victim's nonconsent by showing that she physically resisted a show of physical force. For discus-
sions of the history of the legal definition of rape, see Weiner, Shifting the Communication Burden:
A Meaningful Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 146 (1983); Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 1518-37.
94. The burgeoning feminist literature on rape has been most influenced by Susan Brownmil-
ler's celebrated book. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
Prior to the 1970s, much less attention was devoted to the crime of rape, particularly in the legal
literature. A popular criminal law hornbook, for example, had no separate heading for rape,
although separate chapters were devoted to such crimes as burglary, robbery, receiving stolen prop-
erty, and mayhem. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTt, HORNBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972). Starting
in the mid 1970s, feminist legal writers devoted considerable attention to the legal definition of con-
sent in the law of rape. See, eg., Bienen, Rape ll-National Developments in Rape Reform Legisla-
tion, 6 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RPTR. 170, 180-96 (1980); Wiener, supra note 93, at 143; Comment, supra
note 4, at 1518; Note, supra note 87.
95. Only ten states authorize prosecutions of husbands for the rape of their wives on the same
terms as other rape defendants. Some states authorize prosecutions of husbands only for first or
second degree rape, and immunize husbands for lesser sexual offenses not entailing the application of
physical force or resulting in serious additional physical injury. See infra note 100. Other states
.immunize husbands unless the spouses are no longer living together or are judicially separated. See
Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99
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fiction based on status. The marital rape exemption permits husbands to
force their wives to have sex and implies spousal consent simply from the
fact of the marital relationship.
Feminists argued that this form of implied consent represented a
severe incursion on sexual freedom of women, and was a clear example of
how the legal notion of sexual privacy operated to legitimate the sexual
dominance of males.9 6 In the past few years, these arguments against the
marital rape exemption have been particularly effective and the trend is
now against affording the exemption.
The New York Court of Appeals, for example, recently held that
the marital rape exemption violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.97 The court took the unusual step of declaring
the exemption "irrational" and thus constitutionally impermissible, even
without classifying the exemption as a form of sex-based discrimina-
tion.9" In the political arena, feminists have also persuaded many state
legislatures to eliminate or restrict the scope of the exemption.99
In contexts other than marital rape, consent is not so readily dis-
cernible from the status of the parties alone but is to be gleaned from the
facts surrounding the encounter."°° At this evidentiary level, the princi-
pal strategy of feminists has been to press for a change in the legal stan-
dard by which certain facts are deemed relevant to the issue of consent.
HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1258-60 nn.28-35 (1986). For a review of the empirical work on the incidence
and effects of marital rape, see Y116 & Finkelhor, Marital Rape, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT,
supra note 92, at 146-58.
96. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 94, at 380-82; K. O'DoNOVAN, supra note 1, at
119-22; R. TONG, supra note 4, at 94-96.
97. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 166-67, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574-75, 485 N.Y. S.2d 207, 214-
15 (1984); see also Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 156 & n.l1, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 & n.lI (1985)
(indicating that an implicit exemption for marital rape would conflict with the constitution); accord
Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986). But see People v. Brown, 632 P.2d
1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (finding a rational basis for the marital exemption in averting "difficult
emotional issues and problems of proof" and facilitating "resumption of normal marital relations"),
98. Liberta, 64 N.Y. 2d at 163, 167, 447 N.E. 2d at 573, 575, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213, 215. The
court viewed the exemption as distinguishing between married and unmarried defendants. The oper-
ative classification thus became the marital status of defendant, rather than the sex of the victim. Id.
at 163-64, 447 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213. For an argument that the marital rape exemp-
tion constitutes sex discrimination against married women in violation of the equal protection clause,
see Note, supra note 95, at 1267-72.
99. Since 1979, eight state legislatures have rejected the marital rape exemption. Note, supra
note 95, at 1259 n.28.
100. One exception to the irrelevance of status can be found in the Model Penal Code's grading
of rape offenses. First degree rape is limited to those cases in which serious bodily injury is actually
inflicted or to rapes perpetrated by strangers in which serious injury is threatened. If the victim is a
"voluntary social companion" of the defendant or had "previously permitted him sexual liberties,".
the rape is downgraded to second degree unless actual physical injury is sustained. Thus, date rape
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The two feminist reforms that stand out as most significant in this area
are the elimination of the resistance requirement and the enactment of
rape shield laws.' These two reforms have generated a deeper under-
standing of the complexities underlying the legal notion of consent and
have spawned debate about the need for further reform of rape laws to
eliminate all forms of nonconsensual sexual conduct.
The once common requirement that the victim prove actual physical
resistance in order to negate consent has been modified or rejected in
most jurisdictions.1 0 2  The resistance requirement was successfully
attacked as codifying the perpetrator's perspective by which even com-
pelled silence could be transformed into assent. Many forcefully argued
that the resistance requirement was especially harsh on victims because it
prescribed a course of action that significantly increased their chances of
suffering additional physical injury. 0 3 In response to these objections,
most states have changed their basic definition of rape to include cases
where the victim was too frightened by a defendant's behavior to resist.
Landmark reform legislation in Michigan eliminated the consent
issue altogether and framed the crime of rape solely in terms of the type
and amount of force used by the defendant."m Underlying the Michigan
approach is a presumption that certain types of coercive behavior (for
example, where a weapon is displayed) are per se unlawful. In such
cases, there is no need to address the question of the subjective consent of
the victim.
is by definition a less serious offense under the Model Code than stranger rape. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1(1) commentary at 355 (1980).
101. Grading of the offense of rape according to both the degree of force exerted by the defend-
ant and the vulnerability of the victim is another widespread reform aimed at increasing the likeli-
hood of rape convictions. Other significant reforms include the elimination of the requirement of
corroboration of the victim's testimony, reformulation of jury instructions that cast doubt on a rape
victim's credibility, expanding the definition of the crime to include vaginal and anal penetration by
objects as well as by a penis, redefining the crime in sex neutral terms, and creating a new crime of
sexual contact to cover touchings that do not amount to penetration. See Searles & Berger, The
Current Status of Rape Reform Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
RPTR. 25, 25-27 (1987); Comment, supra note 4, at 1519-20 n.14.
102. See Bienen, supra note 94, at 181-84; Kneedler, Sexual Assault Law Reform in Virginia-A
Legislative History, 68 VA. L. REV. 459, 474-85 (1982).
103. See, eg., People v. Barnes, 42 Cal.3d 284, 299-302, 721 P.2d 110, 119-20, 228 Cal. Rptr.
228, 237-39 (1986) (collecting social science data on the riskiness of resistance by rape victims). The
studies cited also indicate that a common response to sexual assault is "frozen fright" in which the
victim panics and is not able to resist actively. Id. at 298-301, 721 P.2d at 118-19, 228 Cal. Rptr. at
236-38.
104. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1982). Passed in 1974, the Mich-
igan statute was the first feminist inspired reform legislation and has been used as a model in eight
other states. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1537-43; Note, Michigan Criminal Sexual Assault Law,
8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 217, 225-27 (1974).
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Other states have taken a different approach and have tried to reha-
bilitate the concept of consent by defining consent from the victim's
standpoint. Wisconsin, for example, has narrowed the definition of con-
sent to include only those overt acts or words of the victim indicating
freely given consent. "5 Under such a standard, a man is subject to crimi-
nal prosecution if he has sexual intercourse with a passive woman with-
out first securing her express consent. Additionally, Illinois has
demonstrated more trust in the credibility and reliability of rape com-
plainants by shifting the burden of production to the defendant to pres-
ent some evidence of consent before the issue is interjected into the
criminal prosecution.10 6 This represents an important change from the
traditional allocation which assigns the victim's lack of consent as an
element of the state's case.
In addition to narrowing the scope of encounters deemed consen-
sual, the law has also broadened the class of victims who may receive
protection. The proliferation of rape shield laws was prompted by femi-
nist concerns that juries would not punish men accused of raping women
who were sexually active outside of marriage. To ensure that legal judg-
ments regarding consent were not used as proxies for condemnations of
an unacceptable sexual life-style, the new shield laws barred admission of
the victim's past sexual history in most cases.107 To complement the new
legal doctrine, pressure has also been put on law enforcement personnel
and district attorneys to investigate and prosecute "date" and "acquain-
tance" rapes,10 8 and to counteract the notion that a woman tacitly con-
sents to intercourse if she accepts a date or is voluntarily alone with a
man.
105. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West Supp. 1982) ("words or overt actions by a person
who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual inter-
course or sexual contact"). For explanations of the Wisconsin statute, see Comment, supra note 4, at
1543-47; Weiner, supra note 93, at 155-61.
106. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 % 12-17 (Smith-Hurd 1986). The Illinois legislation still requires
the prosecution to prove nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt, once the defense meets its burden of
production. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1549-55.
107. A very influential article examining the need for rape shield laws and their operation is
Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-
84 (1977). For a listing of the various types of rape shield laws, see Searles & Berger, supra note 101,
at 37.
108. For data on the incidence of date and acquaintance rape see, S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 12-
14 (1986); Herman, supra note 58, at 26-27. One study concluded that date rape was not exceptional
and that there were marked differences in the personal and social characteristics of the rapists, the
rape interaction, and the experience of victim between date rapes and stranger rapes. Kanin, supra
note 4, at 95.
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2. Sexual Harassment
Perhaps even more dramatic than the feminist inspired reformation
of forcible rape laws has been the success of the feminist campaign to
recognize sexual harassment as a distinct legal harm. Prior to the mid-
1970s, the term "sexual harassment" was not even in the popular vocab-
ulary." 9 Conduct that is now widely condemned as a form of noncon-
sensual sexual conduct was not very often discussed and, when it was
discussed, it was apt to be dismissed as just another benign feature of the
battle of the sexes.
Feminists discovered that many of the insights as to the inadequacy
of rape laws were equally applicable to the sexual harassment context.
For example, the reluctance of sexual harassment victims to complain
about the harassment to the proper authorities within the workplace mir-
rored the dilemma of rape victims who were afraid to report the crime to
the police. 11o Both types of victims risked being disbelieved 11' and, if not
supported by the authorities, were left open to retaliation by the offend-
ers. In both the rape and sexual harassment contexts, resistance on the
part of the victim was apt to be risky. The noncompliant employee
risked losing her job; the resistant rape victim risked additional physical
harm. Both classes of victims were also likely to feel complicit in their
own victimization and experience shame and mental anguish for not
being able to control male initiatives.11a The male oriented legal system
tended to minimize the extent and degree of both types of harms, perhaps
because men were far less likely to be victims of either form of sexual
aggression.'13
109. Catharine MacKinnon states that the term was apparently first used as a term of art by
activist groups in 1975. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 4, at 27.
110. A study of federal employees indicated that the vast majority of sexual harassment victims
did not complain through established channels because of ignorance of procedures, fear of reprisals,
or preference for informal methods. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 88-92 (March, 1981) [hereinafter U.S. MERIT SYS.
STUDY]. One litigator was quoted as saying that the "fear factor" prevents victims from com-
plaining above the level of the harasser, because of the numerous opportunities for retaliation. Cook,
The New Bias Battleground: Sex Harassment, Nat'l L.J., July 7, 1986, at 11, col. 2.
111. For a comparison of the use of prior sexual conduct to discredit both rape and sexual
harassment victims, see Krieger & Fox, Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J., 115-30 (1985).
112. See R. TONG, supra note 4, at 66 (discussing sexual harassment syndrome); Martin, Sexual
Harassment: The Link between Gender Stratification, Sexuality, and Women's Economic Status, in
WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE supra note 51, at 58-59 (survey of studies on effects of harass-
ment); see also Estate of Scott v. deLeon, 603 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (harassment of
decedent alleged to have precipitated drug overdose).
113. Men rarely sue for sexual harassment, although the cause of action is not limited to
women. For cases involving male plaintiffs, see Huebschen v. Department of Health and Soc. Serv.,
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Proponents of bans on sexual harassment argued that women had
never genuinely consented to the myriad forms of sexual harassment they
experienced at work. Rather than indicating genuine consent, their lack
of protest reflected the considerable economic power of employers and
supervisors. Women tended to tolerate or acquiesce to the milder forms
of sexual harassment. What passed for consent could better be described
as a grudging accommodation to the fact of women's powerlessness to
change the tone of the working environment or the social conventions of
the workplace. When harassment became intolerable, the most common
response by women employees was to quit their jobs. 14
The recognition of sexual harassment as a legal harm has generated
such a large body of case law that it is now fair to describe the law of
sexual harassment as a "subspecialty" in the practice of law.' 15 For the
most part, the cases have involved sexual harassment in the workplace,
and claims are most often brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.116 The primary thrust has been to establish sexual harass-
ment as a form of sex discrimination in employment, and to emphasize
its similarity to other discriminatory mechanisms that have operated
against women, such as unequal pay and job segregation.
Sexual harassment also has been the driving force behind civil suits
based on a wide variety of legal theories other than sexual equality. Vic-
tims of sexual harassment have prevailed in contract, 17 and tort cases, "18
716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (male employee alleges harassment by female boss); Wright v. Meth-
odist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (male alleged discharge for rejecting
advances of male supervisor). The incidence of sexual harassment of males may actually be higher
than the low number of reported cases suggest. The federal study found that 15% of male employees
(compared to 42% of female employees) had been harassed within the preceding two year period.
U.S. MERIT SYS. STUDY, supra note 110, at 36.
With respect to rape, the number of male victims of female aggression is very rare, but not
nonexistent. See Sarrel & Masters, Sexual Molestation of Men by Women, 11 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL
BEHAV. 117 (1982). The limited data indicate that men are more often raped by men, particularly in
prison. The overall rate of male victimization, however, is apparently much lower than that for
females. For a review of the studies on male victimization, see D. RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 67-77.
114. The federal study, for example, reported that 12% of all rape victims and 7% of all
severely harassed women reported quitting their jobs or transferring. U.S. MERIT SYS. STUDY,
supra note 110, at 80. Another study found that 17% of sexual harassment victims reported quitting
or transferring. Martin, supra note 112, at 63.
115. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 427 n.29 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (speculat-
ing that sex harassment may be "the hottest present day Title VII issue") (emphasis in original),
aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
117. A leading case creating a public policy exception to the common law at-will employment
doctrine is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (finding a breach of
contract resulting from plaintiff's discharge for not acceding to her supervisor's sexual demands).
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administrative hearings for unemployment compensation," 9 labor arbi-
trations, 120 and even in a civil action for damages under RICO.'21 The
speed with which sexual harassment claims have surfaced in these vary-
ing contexts indicates that unwanted sexual behavior permeates the pub-
lic as well as private sphere.
Sexual harassment doctrine has progressed to the point where
women who actively resist their harassment are entitled to a legal rem-
edy. For example, when a woman's job is expressly conditioned on sex-
ual compliance, technically she has a good claim if she refuses the
advances, suffers the adverse consequences, and files a complaint. If a
woman is the target of a milder form of harassment, not directly result-
ing in a job detriment of a tangible character, her chances of success
depend on whether she has consistently manifested her objection to the
harassing behavior or complained to management.
Only recently have the courts confronted the problem of the compli-
ant sexual harassment victim. These cases focus directly on the issue of
consent and provide the best counterpoint to the recent developments in
rape law. Compliance in the context of sexual harassment potentially
encompasses a wide spectrum of victim behavior. It may include, for
example, submission to sexual intercourse or silence in the face of offen-
sive conduct or language. Even a woman who participates in conduct
that is characteristic of a sexually abusive work environment may argue
that she too is a sexual harassment victim if her contribution is minimal
or remote in time.
The leading case is Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 22 the Supreme
Court's only sexual harassment decision. Before Vinson, the principal
force behind lower court decisions had been the Guidelines on Sexual
Harassment issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in 1980.123 The EEOC Guidelines broadly prohibit unwelcome
118. See, eg., Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (awarding sexual harassment
victim $110,000 compensatory and punitive damages for battery, wrongful imprisonment, and inten-
tional infliction of mental distress); Moffett v. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (award-
ing harassment victim $93,810.24 compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of
mental distress and wrongful discharge).
119. See, e.g., McEwen v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 32, 637 S.W.2d 617 (1982); Hussa v. Depart-
ment of Employment Sec., 34 Wash. App. 857, 664 P.2d 1286 (1983).
120. See, e.g., Fisher Foods Inc., 80 La. 133 (1983); Dayton Power & Light Co., 80 La. 19
(1982).
121. See, e.g., Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986) (damages allowed under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1984)).
122. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
123. Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
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sexual contacts124 by both supervisory personnel 125 and co-employees 126
and hold employers accountable for harassment that results in economic
or psychological harm either to resistant or compliant employees.
127
In large measure, the Supreme Court's decision in Vinson approved
the approach taken by the Guidelines. Although the majority opinion
waffled on the issue of an employer's vicarious liability, 128 the Court
declared that "without question" sexual harassment constitutes a form of
sex discrimination under Title VII.'29
Vinson held that even a sexually compliant victim of sexual harass-
ment may recover, if the victim was subjected to severe harassment that
124. The Guidelines define sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Id. § 1604,1 1(a).
125. The Guidelines hold employers strictly liable for the actions of supervisors, regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment. Id. § 1604.1 1(c). A majority
of the U.S. Supreme Court has now rejected this aspect of the Guidelines and directed courts to
apply agency principles on a case by case basis to determine whether employers should be held liable
in the absence of actual notice. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
126. The Guidelines hold employers responsible for harassment by co-employees when the
employer "knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate
and appropriate corrective action." Guidleines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)
(1980). The same negligence standard is applied in cases of harassment by non-employee third par-
ties (eg., clients or customers) over whom the employer exerts control or legal responsibility. Id.
§ 1604.11(e).
127. The Guidelines prohibit (1) quid pro quo harassment, often resulting in direct economic
harm to a sexually noncompliant employee, and (2) offensive environment harassment, in which the
primary harm is psychological injury to employees who are targets of repeated sexually offensive
behavior. Id. § 1604.11(a). For an explanation of the two types of harassment, see Vinson, 477 U.S.
at 65-66; C. MAcKINNON, supra note 4, at 32, 40.
128. The majority held that the court of appeals was wrong to impose strict liability on employ-
ers for the harassing acts of supervisors and instructed lower courts to apply agency principles in this
area. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69-72 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-37 (1958)).
The Restatement approach permits courts to examine such factors as whether the act is commonly
done, whether the employer has reason to expect the act will occur, whether the act is seriously
criminal, and whether the act serves the employer's objectives, rather than merely the supervisor's
personal motives. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 229, 235 (1958).
The majority hinted that it would be possible for employers to escape liability under the
Restatement approach if a victim bypassed a special procedure for investigating sexual harassment
complaints and the employer actively encouraged reporting. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72-73. In contrast,
the four concurring Justices would insulate an employer only if the offending supervisor had no
authority over the harassed employee, "because the two work in wholly different parts of the
employer's business." Id. at 2411 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ., concurring). Justice
Stevens, however, believed that there was no inconsistency in the majority and concurring opinions
and thus joined both. Id. at 2411 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64. The Court gave no attention to an oft-mentioned concern
expressed by Judge Bork in dissent in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Bork had
remarked that classifying sexual harassment as sex discrimination would create a "doctrinal difli-
culty" because of the hypothetical possibility of a bisexual supervisor who indiscriminately harasses
both sexes. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork J., dissenting) (dissent
from denial of rehearing).
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could be characterized as "unwelcome." 13  The plaintiff in Vinson
charged that her supervisor coerced her into having sexual intercourse
with him on numerous occasions. The plaintiff prevailed even though
she had never reported her supervisor's actions to higher management
and did not prove that she would have been fired if she had not com-
plied. 13  The Court's analysis was simple, yet victim oriented: unless the
supervisor could establish that his advances were welcome, the plaintiff
could recover. The Court was willing to believe that the sexual harass-
ment victim often could be coerced into submission because of the dispa-
rate power relationship between the supervisor and employee.
Resistance-either in the form of physical resistance or a prompt com-
plaint to higher management-was not required. For the Vinson Court,
the existence of an asymmetric relationship alone was enough to consti-
tute intimidation, even if the supervisor had no specific intent to retaliate
against the noncompliant employee.
Despite this protective holding, it is not entirely clear that Vinson
fully embraces the victim's perspective. In offensive work environment
cases, such as Vinson, the question of perspective is often important to
determine both whether any harassment has occurred and whether the
harassing conduct is sufficiently serious to warrant judicial intervention.
Because the plaintiff in Vinson alleged that she was forced to engage in
intercourse on numerous occasions, there was no doubt that the supervi-
sor's conduct was of a kind serious enough to trigger Title VII relief.
The only debatable issue was whether the serious sexual conduct should
be classified as harassment or whether it should be regarded as freely
consented-to intercourse.
The Court recast the consent issue as an inquiry as to whether the
conduct was unwelcome. The Court's use of the term "welcomeness,"
rather than "voluntariness" or "consent," suggests a victim perspective
because it tends to focus on the victim's desires, rather than on the per-
ceptions of the perpetrator or even those of a reasonable third party. The
term "welcomeness" arguably possesses a subjective quality, such that it
seems strained to ask whether a third person believed that a particular
130. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69-73. The term "unwelcome" was borrowed from the definition of
sexual harassment in the EEOC Guidelines. See supra note 124.
131. Vinson did allege that she initially submitted to sexual intercourse out of a fear of losing
her job. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60. However, she did not prove that she would in fact have been fired if
she had resisted. On the record before the Supreme Court, only Vinson's claim of offensive working
environment was presented because the district court had refused her permission to amend her com-
plaint to add a claim for constructive discharge. Brief of Respondent at 3, Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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overture directed at another was unwelcome. Moreover, the Court
describes the relevant determination as "whether [the victim] found par-
ticular sexual advances unwelcome,"' 132 suggesting that the victim's
actual subjective attitude is determinative.
Other aspects of the Vinson opinion, however, do not support a stan-
dard premised on the subjective attitude of the victim. The Court
explained that "[t]he correct inquiry is whether [the victim] by her con-
duct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome .... "133
The wording calls for a focus on the victim's actions, rather than on her
state of mind. This behavioral focus tends to support a standard under
which the encounter is gauged from either the offender's perspective or
the perspective of a third party. 134 More importantly, the Vinson Court
ruled that testimony about the victim's provocative clothing and sexual
fantasies might be relevant to prove that the sexual initiatives of the
supervisor were welcome. 35 Even given a liberal standard for admissi-
bility, it is difficult to understand why provocative dress should tend to
132. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
134. Of course, it is possible that the Court's focus on the victim's actions represented only the
realization that it would be very difficult to ascertain the victim's subjective state of mind without
referring to the victim's actions. Actions are often the best guide to subjective intent, although in
some circumstances the victim's unexpressed desires may contradict her actions. See Ukarish v.
Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315 (D.N.J. 1983) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 145-46). Another possibility is that in interpreting the victim's conduct under a
purportedly objective "reasonableness" standard, the Court would adopt an objective victim ori-
ented perspective. This shift in perspective from a perpetrator, or third party perspective, to a victim
perspective may be important because what is welcoming conduct from a reasonable male perspec-
tive may not signify welcomeness from the reasonable woman's or victim's perspective. See Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449,
1458 (1984) (advocating adoption of reasonable victim standard).
Such a reasonable victim perspective, however, does not fit as well when it is the victim's
response, rather than the harasser's actions, that is the focus of inquiry. The most plausible reading
of the sentence in the opinion is that the Court was concerned either with how the harasser in fact
interpreted the victim's conduct, or with how a reasonable person in the position of the harasser
would interpret the victim's conduct. The perspective seems to be that of the perpetrator, using
either an objective or subjective standard. One court has interpreted Vinson as requiring the
employee to "deliberately and clearly make ... her nonreceptiveness known to the alleged offender."
Jackson-Colley v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 617, 620 (E.D. Mich.
1987). This extreme defendant oriented standard is not supported by the language of Vinson, which
makes no mention of the clarity or deliberateness of the victim's response.
135. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67-69. The plaintiff argued that the welcomeness issue was not before
the Court because the supervisor denied having any sexual relationship at all with the plaintiff. Brief
of Respondent, supra note 131, at 42. The evidence concerning plaintiff's sexual fantasies consisted
of a conversation between plaintiff and a co-worker in which plaintiff related "an imagined reincar-
nation of her deceased grandfather." Id. at 44. Because the supervisor did not hear or know of this
conversation, plaintiff claimed that the evidence was offered for the "single purpose" of providing "a
pornographic image of the kind of woman plaintiff is." Id. at 43.
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establish a woman's desire to have sexual intercourse with a particular
man at work. Only if certain clothing is regarded as signalling that the
wearer is generally sexually receptive (i.e., sexually indiscriminate) could
it be regarded as relevant to the issue of whether a particular sexual
encounter was indeed welcome from the victim's perspective.136 Attrib-
uting such probative value to clothing or to intimate conversations with
co-workers tends to resurrect the "good girl/bad girl" dichotomy which
ignores women's subjectivity and may legitimate male sexual aggression.
Thus, even with its endorsement of unwelcomeness as the operative stan-
dard, the Vinson ruling conceivably could be interpreted to deny recov-
ery to a sexually compliant employee who has not convinced the judge
that her submission to sexual intercourse was justified under the
circumstances.
In cases of sexual harassment less egregious than in Vinson, where,
for example, the behavior complained of falls short of coerced inter-
course, the debate centers on the choice of perspective and the related
question of whether the standard should be formulated as subjective or
objective. In several offensive working environment cases,137 female
plaintiffs have complained of persistent abusive behavior by male co-
workers, typically taking the form of sexually offensive language, jokes,
and the open display of pornography. These cases are often constructive
discharge cases involving allegations that the working environment
became so intolerable that the plaintiffs were forced to quit their jobs.13
When the plaintiff's allegations do not include coerced sexual inter-
course or other unequivocably serious abusive behavior, the courts are
called upon to decide the interrelated questions of whether the conduct
complained of is sufficiently serious to warrant judicial intervention, and
whether the target of the conduct should be denied recovery because of
136. Two cases prior to Vinson seem to have applied a more restrictive standard for the discov-
ery and admission of evidence bearing on the sexual history of a sexual harassment victim. Priest v.
Rotary, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1064 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Dep't of Fair Empl. & Housing v.
Fresno Hilton Hotel, No. FEP80-81C7-0514se, Precedential Decision No. 84-03 (1984) (decision of
Cal. Fair Empl. and Hous. Comm'n), analyzed in Krieger & Fox, supra note 111, at 119-28. Exclu-
sion of sexual history evidence was justified by analogy to FED. R. EVID. 412, the rape shield law
limiting admission of the rape victim's sexual history. Priest, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1069. The decisions also reflect the view that a woman's consensual sexual conduct with others has
no factual bearing on her response to the harasser's conduct. Krieger & Fox, supra note 111, at 123.
137. For a thorough discussion of the cases and a proposal to adopt a victim oriented overt
consent standard, see Note, Perceptions of Harm: The Consent Defense in Sexual Harassment Cases,
71 IOWA L. REv. 1109 (1986).
138. See, eg., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 907 (11th Cir. 1982); Gan v. Kepro
Circuit Systems, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
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her own attitudes or actions. 139 The courts have chosen to apply an
objective standard to determine whether the challenged conduct is seri-
ous enough to be regarded as actionable. 140 Some courts have acknowl-
edged the importance of perspective and have embraced a victim oriented
objective approach, in which the severity of the conduct is gauged from
the perspective of the reasonable victim-that is, the average female
employee. 141
Even under such a victim oriented standard behavior that is custom-
ary may be viewed as tolerable, regardless of whether the women
employees have had sufficient opportunity to affect the customary work-
ing atmosphere. 142  For example, a court in one case 143 tolerated the
139. Courts do not always distinguish these two issues. The first issue goes to whether the
harassment results in a cognizable employment consequence, that is, the creation of an offensive
working environment. The second issue involves the existence of harassment, because welcomed
conduct is by definition non-harassing. The leading case prior to Vinson treated these as distinct
issues and indicated that a subjective victim oriented standard may be appropriate to determine
"welcomeness," even if the question of sufficient pervasiveness is determined by an objective stan-
dard that is less obviously victim oriented. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04. Thus, the Henson court
formulated the welcomeness issue as whether the conduct was "unwelcome in the sense that the
employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as
undesirable or offensive." Id. at 903 (emphasis added). Its formulation of the pervasiveness issue
was more objectively phrased: "[w]hether sexual harassment at the workplace is sufficiently severe
and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well being of employees is a question to be deter-
mined with regard to the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 904.
140. See, eg., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1986); Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423, 1425 (N.D.
Ill. 1984); Sand v. Johnson Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 716, 720 (E.D. Mich. 1982). If the
subjective response of the target is not determinative, presumably evidence of the target's psychologi-
cal state should not be routinely admissible. Jennings, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1425.
However, despite endorsement of an objective standard, one court relied on psychiatric testimony to
conclude that the plaintiff had "an ambivalent attitude toward relationships with men and because of
her particular personality had a tendency to exaggerate male conduct towards her." Sand, 33 Fair.
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 725.
141. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); EEOC Decisions, 84-1, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1887, 1892 (Nov. 28, 1983).
142. See, eg., Scott, 605 F. Supp. at 1051 (men were a "close-knit" group); Ukarish v. Magne-
sium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315, 1319 (D.N.J. 1983) (distasteful language
pervaded work atmosphere before plaintiff became an employee); EEOC Decisions, 84-1, 33 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1889 (commonplace to engage in sexual jokes and pass around "dirty"
materials); Gan, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 640 (work environment "permeated by an exten-
sive amount of lewd and vulgar conversation and conduct"). Ukarish and Gat are analyzed in Note,
supra note 137, at 1132-34.
143. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 433. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the objective
reasonable victim approach and instead applied the familiar "reasonable person" perspective.
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co. 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986). The majority agreed with the trial
court that sexually explicit posters should not offend reasonable persons, given the pervasiveness of
pornography in our society. Id. at 622. Dissenting Judge Keith contended that "reasonable
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open display of pornography by co-workers, reasoning that the average
American woman should not be offended by depictions of explicit sex.
When the victim's perspective is applied in this objectified form, there is
always risk that the judge's view of the reasonable woman may reflect
male bias. The victim perspective may not encourage judges to treat
women as moral agents capable of assessing the offensive quality of
behavior when judges are asked to search for the opinion of the hypothet-
ical reasonable victim.
Moreover, even in cases where the working environment is regarded
as abusive from an objective standpoint, evidence that the plaintiff's
actions contributed to the sexually offensive atmosphere is likely to dis-
qualify the plaintiff.1" For example, a woman who uses profanity may
not be given a right to complain about a sexually offensive environment
characterized by the use of profane language. In one case, the court dis-
counted an entry in the plaintiff's diary indicating that she was offended
by her co-worker's sexually abusive behavior towards her. Because the
plaintiff herself had behaved abusively on occasion, she was deemed to
have "welcomed" similar behavior. 45 This "clean hands" approach
means that a plaintiff who belatedly realizes that she cannot safely
behave like "one of the boys" '1 46 is likely to have no legal recourse for
subsequent harassment.
By uncritically equating even limited participation with welcome-
ness, the courts fail to appreciate that some women may feel pressured to
women" would not "condone the pervasive degradation and exploitation of female sexuality perpetu-
ated in American culture." Id. at 627 (Keith, J. dissenting). Keith's view was followed in Barbetta
v. Chemlawn Serv. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
144. See, eg., Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 532, 533 (S.D.
Miss. 1986), aff'd, 824 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987); EEOC Decisions, 84-1, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1888; Ukarish, 31 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1318-19; Gan, 28 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 639. However, some courts have allowed recovery despite evidence of arguably offensive
behavior by the plaintiff. Swentek v. U.S. Air, 44 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1808, 1812 (4th Cir.
1987) (despite plaintiff's use of "foul language" in a consensual setting, she did not welcome har-
asser's lewd conduct); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's use of sexual
nickname for a friendly co-worker did not excuse unwelcome obscenity by unfriendly co-workers);
Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 267-68 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (victim of racial harass-
ment need not be "a saint in a den of sinners"). The EEOC has taken the position that, if a party
participates in sexual conduct at one time in the workplace, she will be deemed to welcome otherwise
harassing conduct, unless she clearly indicates to the harasser that sexual conduct is now unwel-
come. In the EEOC's view, simply ceasing the participatory behavior is not enough to indicate
unwelcomeness. EEOC Decisions, 84-1, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1890.
145. Ukarish, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1315, 1319, 1321.
146. Id. at 1319. One litigator remarked that many "smart women" in corporate life unsuccess-
fully try to deal with sexual harassment by making it a joke or trying to be one of the boys. Cook,
supra note I10, at 11, col. 1-2 (comment of Judith P. Vladeck).
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conform to a male dominated workplace that does not take into account
the sensibilities of female employees. A no participation requirement
means that recovery will be limited to women who resist and who are
willing to risk escalation of harassment either by complaining or by
refusing to conform to the community norm. 47 The woman who goes
along rather than resists may well be told that she has suffered no legal
harm.
3. Sexual Liability Law
In addition to threats of physical force and economic coercion, it is
well recognized in other areas of the law that deception may serve to
vitiate consent.148 These limitations on the scope of legally effective con-
sent often represent attempts to equalize power between contending indi-
viduals or groups. 149 The feminist critique of consent in laws governing
sexual conduct specifically seeks to ameliorate the disparity in power
between men and women. In reforming rape laws, feminists have con-
centrated principally on refining the legal notion of consent to ensure
that physically disadvantaged women who submit to sex out of fear for
their physical safety are protected. The focus of the campaign against
sexual harassment has been to prohibit employers from using their supe-
rior economic strength to force sexual compliance. In a few significant
tort cases,150 female plaintiffs have recently contended that sex induced
by deception should also be classified as nonconsensual and subject to
147. The "Catch-22" for some employees is that if they complain of an abusive environment,
their complaints may be rejected if the judge believes that the incidents fail to rise to an intolerable
level, given the "prevailing work environment." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; Williams-Hill v. Dono-
van, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 253, 257-58 (M.D. Fla. 1987). Thus, an employee may walk a
fine line between failing to be tolerant enough of the status quo and waiving her right to complain
because of her prior willingness to go along with prevailing behavior.
148. See, eg., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4-9 to 4-15, at 232-57 (1982) (cause of action
for misrepresentation in contract law); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS § 105, at 725-35 (5th ed. 1984) (tort remedies for misrepresentation).
149. The organization of labor represents the classic example of action taken to reduce eco-
nomic coercion and equalize bargaining power. By requiring employers to bargain collectively
rather than deal with individual employees, the law may be said to vitiate the consent of the individ-
ual worker. Justification for a labor union is premised on the view that an individual employee is
usually powerless in dealing with the employer and the employee's bargaining power can only be
increased by substituting collective strength for individual weakness. A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 11-12 (1981).
150. See, eg., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984) (cause
of action for transmission of herpes); Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr.
422 (1983) (cause of action for damages due to ectopic pregnancy); S.A. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651
(MO. 1986) (herpes); Maharam v. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1986) (herpes);
Alice D. v. William M., 113 Misc.2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1982) (cause of action for costs of
abortion due to negligent misrepresentation of sterility).
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legal disapproval. The concern here is to assure that a party to a sexual
encounter is not put at a disadvantage by misinformation designed to
induce acquiescence.'
The new genre of sexual liability cases has involved claims of injury
resulting from sexually transmitted diseases"' or physical complications
stemming from pregnancy. 153 The gravamen of these complaints is that
the defendant either lied about or failed to disclose critical facts about his
physical condition, consequently physically harming the plaintiff. For
example, a defendant may be held liable if he fraudulently tells the plain-
tiff that he is sterile or free from disease.' 54 Plaintiffs in these cases allege
that, absent such deception, they would not have agreed to sexual inter-
course with the defendant, and therefore their apparent consent should
not bar recovery in a tort action. 155
So far, a few courts have permitted a cause of action if the harm
alleged is physical, such as herpes or tubal pregnancy. 156 In one case
where a male plaintiff alleged only economic and psychological harm
arising from unwanted fatherhood, the court refused to recognize a cause
of action.' 57 Such a limitation of recoveries to cases of physical harm
151. Sisela Bok explains that deceit, like violence, can coerce people into acting against their
will. Deceit, however, "controls more subtly, for it works on belief as well as action." S. BOK,
LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 18 (1978). Bok argues that deceit affects the
distribution of power by augmenting the power of the liar and diminishing the power of the deceived.
Id. at 19.
152. For a discussion of unreported cases involving claims for transmission of disease, see Note,
Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the Law, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 101 (1984).
153. See, eg, Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
154. In addition to intentional tort claims for fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment, a
claim for negligence may be asserted based on a failure to exercise reasonable care to ascertain and
disclose critical facts about defendant's physical condition. See, e.g., Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d
at 994, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (seeking damages under negligence, battery, intentional infliction of
mental distress, and fraud); Alice D., 113 Misc. 2d at 946, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 355 (negligence claim
sustained).
155. The same deception, however, might not give rise to criminal liability for rape or sexual
abuse. For a discussion of the effect of fraudulent inducement in the criminal context, see infra notes
222-26. The deceiving party might be guilty of a misdemeanor under a specific criminal statute
prohibiting intercourse by persons who are aware that they have an infectious venereal disease. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-631 (1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3198 (West 1979);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1985). A few states make it a crime to knowingly
expose another person to the HIV (AIDS) virus. See FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1986); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-601 (1987).
156. Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276; Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d
at 381, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31. Each case held that a cause of action existed against a sexual
partner who by intentional tortious conduct causes physical injury to the other.
157. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980) (dismissing father's
wrongful birth cross complaint in paternity action); accord Fashe v. Bonanno 357 N.W.2d 860
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means that women are more apt to be plaintiffs because of the potential
physical hazards they face from pregnancy and abortion.15 It is also
possible that courts may require plaintiffs in sexual liability suits to prove
that they had good reason to rely on defendants' representations,' 5 9 and
cannot be faulted for not taking additional precautions against disease or
pregnancy. If such a justifiable reliance requirement is imposed, the sex-
ual liability suit might be further limited to those cases in which vulnera-
ble women have been induced to have sex with men who have abused a
position of trust, such as psychiatrists and divorce lawyers. 6 '
At this early stage in the development of sexual liability law, plain-
tiffs have encountered two initial doctrinal obstacles. First, defendants
have claimed that the constitutional right of privacy bars the recognition
of a cause of action for deception in intimate affairs. Second, defendants
have sought immunity under anti-heart balm legislation abolishing the
tort action of seduction.
(Mich. App. 1984); Pamela P. v. Frank S., 88 A.D.2d 865, 451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1982); Hughes v.
Hughes, 455 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1983); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 38 Wash. App. 288, 687 P.2d 223 (1984); see
also Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1987) (wife could not recover
for AIDS phobia resulting from husband's concealment of extra-marital homosexual relationship).
158. See Spake, Trial and Eros, MOTHER JONEs 25, 28 (July 1985) (quoting Mary Dunlap,
plaintiff's attorney in Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 422).
159. A common justification for trusting a lover may be that the lover occupies some role in
addition to that of sexual partner. In Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 383, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432, for
example, the defendant was the plaintiff's divorce lawyer. The court declared that the existence of a
pre-existing confidential relationship between the parties was relevant to a determination of whether
the defendant had exerted "undue influence." The existence of undue influence was relevant to the
consent issue in the plaintiff's claim for battery and the issue of justifiable reliance in her claim for
misrepresentation. Id. at 384, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432. If the plaintiff proved that the lawyer-client
relationship was dominant and that the parties did not function on an "equal basis," the burden of
proof would shift to the defendant to prove that the plaintiff's consent was "informed and freely
given" or that her reliance was unjustified. Id. In Maharam v. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165, 170, 510
N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (1986), the court held that the thirty-one year marital relationship between the
parties was a sufficient relationship of trust to trigger a duty of disclosure. But cf Long v. Adams,
33 S.E.2d 852, 854 (Ga. App. 1985) (every sexually active adult owes a duty of disclosure of venereal
disease).
160. See Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242-43 (Nev. 1986) (physician may be liable
for sexually exploiting a patient by taking advantage of her "vulnerabilities"). One court has, how-
ever, allowed recovery for the costs of an abortion and attendant emotional distress even though the
defendant had no pre-existing fiduciary or confidential relationship with plaintiff. Alice D. v. Wil-
liam M., 113 Misc. 2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1982). The court, taking into consideration "the
length of time the parties had known one another, the regularity with which they saw each other, the
degree of intimacy between them and the seriousness to the claimant of the issue of birth control and
of an unwanted pregnancy," held that the defendant had a duty to speak truthfully, Id. at 944, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 354. The court warned that it might have found no such duty if the sexual intercourse
had resulted from a more "casual encounter." Id.
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In rejecting the constitutional challenge to sexual liability claims,
the courts have emphasized that the right of privacy is not absolute, but
can be counterbalanced by other weighty personal interests, such as the
interest in health.61 For these courts, the right to privacy is more allied
with individual procreative or sexual choice than with a guarantee of
freedom from governmental intervention in certain private settings. The
feminist critique of privacy surfaces here to warn against using the con-
cept of privacy to legitimate sexual coercion in the private sphere by
immunizing sex coerced through deception.
With respect to the applicability of anti-heart balm legislation, the
prevailing view has been to characterize the new sexual liability claims as
qualitatively different from old fashioned claims for seduction or breach
of a promise to marry. Under this approach, anti-heart balm legislation
bars only claims grounded on injury to reputation and not claims for
physical harms. 62 Complementing their narrow view of the right to pri-
vacy, the courts in sexual liability cases have thus far refused to interpret
the anti-heart balm legislation as broadly prohibiting judicial interven-
tion in tort claims involving intimate relationships.
On a doctrinal level, the sexual liability suits are significant because
they indicate that apparent consent to sexual intercourse will not suffice
to forestall legal intervention if consent of the injured party is unin-
formed. Although the law is far from requiring every sexual participant
to disclose all relevant information prior to intercourse, the courts may
be willing to punish those persons who display the most blatant disregard
for the physical well-being of their sexual partners.
Beyond doctrine, the sexual liability suits are significant because
they dramatically illustrate that some sexually active women are now
insisting that they deserve legal protection, even if their sexual
encounters take place outside of marriage and in the context of casual
relationships. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new sexual lia-
bility law is that it is only in the last few years that women have been
bold enough to assert that they have a legal right to expect honesty from
men in sexual relationships.
163
161. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1984);
Barbara.A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 381, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31. But see Stephen K, 105 Cal. App. 3d
at 644-45, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620-21 (right to privacy prevents courts from supervising "promises
made between two consenting adults").
162. See Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276; Barbara A., 145 Cal. App.
3d at 376-77, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28.
163. In the past, unmarried women who sued for deception in connection with sexual
encounters were apt to be barred from recovering because of the illegality of their nonmarital sexual
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II. TRANSFORMING THE CONCEPT OF CONSENT IN
THE EGALITARIAN MODE: THE TRIO OF
UNACCEPTABLE INDUCEMENTS
The common thread that runs through the various legal develop-
ments just described is dissatisfaction with a narrow, behavior oriented
definition of consent that equates consent with nonresistance. The femi-
nist objection is that such a definition of consent is oblivious to the
greater social and physical power of men. In the face of this inequality,
women may not resist unfair inducements to male sexual initiatives, yet
at the same time may not welcome those initiatives.
The feminist critique has prompted a refurbishment, but not an
abandonment, of the concept of consent in the law of sex. Under the
refurbished version of consent, consent is not considered freely given if
secured through physical force, economic pressure, or deception. Con-
sent secured by these inducements is no longer routinely treated as true
consent-even if the woman conceivably could have avoided the sexual
encounter by resisting.
In the view of some feminists, legal reforms that only refurbish, but
do not displace, the concept of consent as a central feature of the law of
sex may not be deep enough to effect substantial change.1" This radical
critique of consent asserts that the social meaning of "consent" is inher-
ently tied to a system of unequal sexual relationships in which the man
actively initiates the sexual encounter and the woman is relegated to the
more passive role of responding to initiatives.165 In the abstract, consent
activity. See Note, supra note 152, at 135-37. Only wives or women who were induced by fraudu-
lent promises to marry were entitled to complain of injuries stemming from sexual intercourse. See
supra text accompanying notes 54-57. Although the doctrine of interspousal immunity operated as a
ban on tort liability, the willful communication of venereal disease was grounds for divorce, Farden
v. Farden, 179 A. 317 (N.J. 1935), and could be considered when distributing property of the marital
estate. Schultz v. Christopher, 118 P. 629 (Wash. 1911).
164. Andrienne Rich, for example, has argued that women will not be freed from male oppres-
sion until they are free to reject heterosexuality. In her view, the common belief that women are
inevitably drawn to men means that women have little real choice in sexual relationships and "in the
absence of choice, women will remain dependent upon the chance or luck of particular relationships
and will have no collective power to determine the meaning and place of sexuality in their lives."
Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNs 631, 659 (1980).
165. An eloquent statement of this position is the concluding passage in Pateman, supra note 87,
at 164 (1980):
The conventional use of "consent" helps reinforce the beliefs about the "natural" charac-
ters of the sexes and the sexual double standard discussed in this article. Consent must
always be given to something; in the relationship between the sexes, it is always women
who are held to consent to men. The "naturally" superior, active, and sexually aggressive
male makes an initiative, or offers a contract, to which a "naturally" subordinate, passive
woman "consents." An egalitarian sexual relationship cannot rest on this basis; it cannot
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may be gender neutral. But as long as women do not in fact have the
opportunity to initiate sexual relationships on equal terms with men, the
concept of consent continues to suggest that women are appropriately the
passive parties in sexual relationships.
This argument stresses the importance of rhetoric to our thinking
and has considerable force. Thus, to avoid any connotation of inequality
in sexual decision making, I will use the term "mutual," rather than
"consensual" to denote the touchstone of acceptable sexual encounters
under the refurbished concept of consent that I see emerging in the
law. 166
Nonetheless, I am not seriously alarmed by the durability of consent
rhetoric in the law. Whatever the law's language, its utility to women is
likely to depend heavily on the presence of institutions responsive to
women that exert pressure on the law. Rape crisis centers, shelters for
battered women, and sensitivity training programs to counteract sexual
harassment are some examples of female dominated institutions that
were created to assure that changes in formal law of consent actually
operate to benefit women.
The following discussion analyzes each of the three inducements to
sex that are becoming increasingly unacceptable, noting both the egalita-
rian elements in the law and the remaining areas untouched by the femi-
nist critique. This trio of unacceptable inducements may not seem
exceptional to anyone with a passing acquaintance with twentieth cen-
tury contract law.' 67 They are novel, however, in their application to the
sexual encounter, a relationship the law seldom treats as contractual.
be grounded in "consent." Perhaps the most telling aspect of the problem of women and
consent is that we lack a language through which to help constitute a form of personal life
in which two equals freely agree to create a lasting association together.
Expanding on the Pateman position, Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the failure to
expose the "presuppositions" behind the conventional use of the term "consent" is "integral to gen-
der inequality." MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 655. She sees consent as operating as "women's form
of control" in sexual encounters with men. The fundamental inadequacy of this form of control or
power is that the "model does not envision a situation the woman controls being placed in, or
choices she frames, yet the consequences are attributable to her as if the sexes began at arm's length,
on equal terrain, as in the contract fiction." Id.
166. Pateman suggests that new language is needed to characterize egalitarian sexual relation-
ships "in which free and equal individuals can mutually commit themselves or assume obligations."
Pateman, supra note 87, at 164. MacKinnon argues that the view that a woman's consent is an equal
form of control to the custom of male initiative is incorrect and does not reflect genuine "mutual"
control over intercourse. MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 655.
167. A contract compelled by physical force is void and those compelled by economic duress or
misrepresentation are voidable. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 148, at §§ 4.15-4.17 (1982).
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A. PHYSICAL FORCE
The use or threat of physical force is universally condemned as an
inducement to sex. If the recent drive to abolish the marital rape exemp-
tion is successful,168 the law on the books will criminalize virtually all
forms of nonconsensual intercourse effected by physical force. In addi-
tion to criminal penalties, physically forced sex may now trigger civil
liability as well. An employee who is compelled to have sex with her
supervisor because he exerts physical force is likely to have a good claim
for sexual harassment against her employer,169 and certainly has a tort
action against the offending supervisor.'70 Moreover, rape victims now
have a better chance of recovering damages in third party actions against
landlords, 7 ' educational institutions,172 prisons,173 and other defendants
who could have taken precautions to avoid the crime."
Despite the growing realization that physical force should not be
used to induce submission, the formal legal rules governing rape are still
not entirely free from a bias that accepts physical force as legitimate in
some contexts. In addition to the continued vitality of the marital rape
exemption in some jurisdictions, the intractably sexist nature of the legal
concept of consent is most evident in cases involving the victim's revoca-
tion of consent. In three recent cases,' 75 courts have held that a victim
may not revoke consent if she initially consented to intercourse and pene-
tration has already occurred. Two of these cases involve an allegation of
168. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
170. For a general discussion of tort actions against rapists, see LeGrand & Leonard, Civil Suits
for Sexual Assault: Compensating Rape Victims, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 479, 479-95 (1979).
171. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (landlord
held liable to tenant raped in common area); O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d
798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977) (landlord liability for failure to warn that other tenants had been
raped and failure to provide adequate security).
172. See Duarte v. State, 88 Cal. App. 3d 473, 151 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1979) (cause of action against
university landlord for rape and death of student).
173. See Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 held to require
officials to protect male inmates against sexual assault).
174. See Kenny v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978) (mass transit
carrier held liable for inadequate lighting and oversight at train station); Lowers v. City of Streator,
627 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (successful civil rights action against city and police for failure to
prevent repeat rape). For general discussions of third party liability cases, see Ballou, Recourse for
Rape Victims: Third Party Liability, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 105 (1981); LeGrand & Leonard, supra
note 170, at 495-513.
175. People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1985); Battle v. State, 287 Md.
675, 414 A.2d 1266 (1980); State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 254 S.E.2d 760 (1979). For a contrary view
holding that the crime of rape is committed whenever the defendant continues intercourse after
realizing that his partner has withdrawn her consent, see Kaitamaki v. Queen, I A.C. 147 (1985)
(New Zealand).
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rape by an acquaintance of the victim and, in each of the cases, the victim
voluntarily accompanied the defendant to a bedroom.176 The victims tes-
tified that they had never given their consent to intercourse and that they
were physically brutalized and raped. 177
The issue of revocation of consent surfaced in each of these three
cases during jury deliberations. The jurors asked for clarification of the
legal notion of consent. In particular, the jury inquired whether consent
could be withdrawn by the victim. 178 In each case, the convictions were
overturned because the trial judge did not clearly charge that consent
could be withdrawn only prior to penetration.
The rule restricting revocation of consent after penetration is
unabashedly male oriented. The rule equates the harm of rape with pen-
etration alone and ignores the loss of sexual freedom that occurs when a
woman is forced to continue a sexual encounter against her will. The
revocation rule seems to analogize rape to theft of property in which,
once possession has been lawfully taken, it is too late to quarrel with the
terms of the transaction. Access to a woman's vagina (euphemistically
referred to as her "womanhood") 179 is viewed as a valuable thing, sepa-
rate and apart from the subjective desires and wishes of the woman
herself.
This sexist view of rape as a property violation underlying the rule
on revocation does not mesh with the contemporary view of rape, which
emphasizes the injury to the person and the feelings of the victim. 8 ' As
many feminist critics of traditional rape laws have observed, the empha-
sis on penetration is male oriented in that the sexual encounter is defined
by the male's actions-each relevant contact starts with penetration and
176. Battle, 287 Md. at 677, 414 A.2d at 1267; Way, 297 N.C. at 294, 254 S.E.2d at 760. The
recitation of the facts in the Vela case discloses only the ages of the victim (14) and defendant (19),
that the incident occurred in the evening, and that the prosecution's evidence was "more than suffi-
cient" to support a guilty verdict of forcible rape. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 239-40, 218 Cal. Rptr. 162.
177. Battle, 287 Md. at 677, 414 A.2d at 1267 (allegations that victim was beaten and
threatened with a screwdriver); Way, 297 N.C. at 295, 254 S.Ed.2d at 760-61 (victim's bruises sup-
port allegations of slapping, forced oral, anal, and vaginal intercourse, and threat of beatings).
178. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 239, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 162; Battle, 287 Md. at 678, 414 A.2d at
1268; Way, 297 N.C. at 296, 254 S.E.2d at 761.
179. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 243, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
180. The court in Vela apparently recognized this tension and struggled unsuccessfully to recon-
cile the rule on revocation with the contemporary view. The court claimed that the sense of outrage
of a woman who initially consented to intercourse could "hardly be of the same magnitude as that
resulting from an initial nonconsensual violation of her womanhood." Id. at 243, 218 Cal. Rptr. at
165. The court cited no support for this empirical observation and merely assumed that penetration
was an event of overriding significance, from a psychological as well as physical perspective.
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ends with withdrawal."8 ' By refusing to give women the authority to
stop unwanted intercourse, the revocation rule also reinforces the idea
that, beyond a certain point in a sexual encounter, men are powerless to
stop.182 The revocation rule places the blame on the woman who failed
to exercise control sooner, and thereby diminishes sexual freedom for
womeh in comparison to men. Albeit in a milder form than earlier evi-
dentiary doctrines, the rule on revocation also communicates the
message that sexually active women do not deserve plenary protection
against nonconsensual sexual activity."8 3
The most important issues regarding physically forced sex, however,
are not issues of formal legal doctrine but instead concern the adminis-
tration of the law. A de facto resistance requirement will still exist so
long as police and prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute cases lacking
tangible evidence of physical abuse.'" 4 More importantly, when force is
not actually applied but only threatened, there may be disagreement as to
what types of behavior constitute an implicit threat of physical force.
Some cases demand a special sensitivity to the particular predicament of
the victim. For example, a teenage girl who is instructed by her uncle to
engage in sexual acts may submit out of an amorphous fear of violence
that stems as much from her uncle's superior status as from his precise
words or actions."l 5 In such a case, the pressure exerted may be seen as
arising either from an implicit threat of physical force or from a kind of
deception that tricks the teenager into believing that her uncle has a legal
or moral right to demand her compliance.
Finally, the laws against physically forced sex will not be effective
unless victims also regard such force as unjustified and illegal. Recent
181. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 94, at 422; R. TONG, supra note 4, at 92-93. The femi-
nist criticism of the vaginal penetration requirement has led to a redefinition of rape in some states to
include sexual assaults with an object, as well as forced oral and anal intercourse. Sexual contact
offenses criminalizing offensive touchings other than penetration were also enacted as part of the
reform movement. Bienen, supra note 94, at 175, 178.
182. For an argument that judicial acceptance of the male sexual impulse as irresistible has
harmed women in a variety of contexts, see Aiken, Differentiating Sex from Sex: The Male Irresisti-
ble Impulse, 12 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1984).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
184. One study found that cases involving sexual assault need more "real evidence" to be
brought to trial than other types of cases involving other violence or property crimes. Myers &
LaFree, Sexual Assault and its Prosecution: A Comparison with Other Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1282 (1982). In addition to official reticence to pursue rape complaints, many vic-
tims may fail to report rapes because they believe conviction is unlikely. One study found that rape
victims tend only to report the crime when the probability of conviction is high. This did not hold
true for victims of nonsexual assault. Lizotte, The Uniqueness of Rape: Reporting Assaultive Vio-
lence, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 169, 185 (1985).
185. See State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 275 N.W.2d 715 (1979).
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studies indicate that both men and women still tolerate some kinds of
physically forced sex, and continue to place blame on the victim rather
than to assign sole responsibility to the aggressor.1 86 For example, in a
recent study of attitudes on sexual aggression,18 adolescents were
presented a series of vignettes depicting a sexual encounter between two
teenagers. In each of the vignettes, the story ended with the female sub-
mitting to intercourse, even though she did not want to do so.' 88 Only if,
the male in the vignette used actual physical force were the respondents
certain that the depicted incident should be labelled "rape." If the
aggressor only threatened physical force, many were unsure whether the
encounter was rape, particularly if they were told that the couple had a
dating relationship.' 89 The study also revealed that a significant minority
of the respondents placed blame for the rape on the nonconsenting girl,
even when the aggressor used actual physical force.' 90
In summary, the legal doctrine governing sexual encounters gener-
ally regards the use of physical force or threats of physical force as unac-
ceptable. Although there are still instances in which the law formally
legitimizes sex effected through physical force, these are exceptions to the
general prohibition. In both criminal and civil settings, women have a
theoretical right to seek legal relief from physically forced sex. In prac-
tice, however, both the parties themselves and the actors in the legal sys-
tem may tolerate forced encounters that are technically illegal. The
relationship of the parties and the severity of the physical force exerted
are still important variables in determining whether the conduct will be
sanctioned.
186. S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 13-14 (1987) (forced sex is often not viewed as criminal unless it
occurs outside dating context or is especially violent); Shotland & Goodstein, Just Because She
Doesn't Want To Doesn't Mean Its Rape: An Experimentally Based Causal Model of the Perception
ofRape in a Dating Situation, 46 Soc. PSYCHOLOGY Q. 220, 229 (1983) (male use of force more
acceptable if woman does not protest kissing or sexual activity other than intercourse). But cf Dull
& Giacopassi, Democratic Correlates of Sexual and Dating Attitudes; A Study of Date Rape, 14
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 175, 188 (1987) (males are significantly more likely to hold attitudes that
condone aggressive sexual behavior).
187. Goodchilds & Zellman, Sexual Signaling and Sexual Aggression in Adolescent Relation-
ships, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION supra note 33, at 233-43.
188. Each story ended with "[tihough the girl does not want to, they have sexual intercourse."
Id. at 239.
189. Id. at 241.
190. On average the female was assigned 20% of the blame even in the "worst-case" vignette.
Id. at 240.
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B. ECONOMIC PRESSURE
The objection to economic pressure as an inducement to sex is
neither as clear nor as pervasive in the law as the condemnation of physi-
cal force. Economic pressure is unlawful in some contexts but lawful in
others. When the pressure is regarded as unlawful, it is labeled coercion;
when the pressure is lawful, it is likely to be called a bargain. 191 More-
over, even coercive conduct that may not constitute a crime, may never-
theless subject the offender to a suit for damages or to some other
noncriminal sanction, such as dismissal from employment.'92
Despite this complex pattern, it is probably accurate to declare that
a man who tries to "buy" sex from an otherwise unwilling woman will
most often violate some formal legal rule. As discussed earlier, the pro-
hibition against economically coerced sex figures most prominently in
sexual harassment suits. The normative theory underlying sexual harass-
ment suits is that neither job benefits nor job detriments should be condi-
tioned on sex. Even the female applicant who reluctantly agrees to have
sex with the personnel director in order to get the job probably has a
good sexual harassment claim. In the employment context, technical
consent by a woman who is put to such an unfair choice is not regarded
as effective consent. 193 It does not matter that her submission also pro-
duced a corresponding benefit.' 94 The law is willing to find sexual har-
assment from the existence of the improper inducement alone, because
191. The Model Penal Code characterizes the distinction between "coercion" and "bargain" as
going to the "essential character of the threat." Coercion is described as overwhelming the will of
the victim, while a bargain is viewed as an offer of "an unattractive choice to avoid some unwanted
alternative." The comments recognize that it is "a task of surpassing subtlety" to differentiate the
two in borderline cases. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 314.
192. See, eg., Phillips v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 405 So. 2d 53 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (prin-
cipal dismissed for sexually harassing teacher and job applicant); Downie v. Ind. Sch. Dist., 367
N.W.2d 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (guidance counselor dismissed for harassing staff and students).
193. The EEOC Guidelines prohibit unwelcome sexual advances whenever "submission to...
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individu-
als." Guidelines on Sexual Harassment 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(2) (1982) (discussed supra at notes
123-27 and accompanying text).
194. In the rare case where the harassed woman secures a job benefit (e.g., a promotion) as a
result of her submission, it may be necessary to ask whether the woman was otherwise qualified for
the position. Catharine MacKinnon, for example, draws a distinction between qualified women who
must comply and nonqualified women who comply. She argues that the compliant woman should
recover if sex was required "in addition to all the job-related standards." C. MACKINNON, supra
note 4, at 196. If, however, sex is required in lieu of meeting the standards, MacKinnon is less
willing to permit a harassment claim. Id. at 196-97. If harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual
advances, however, it is possible that even a nonqualified woman who secures a promotion is also a
victim of harassment. The promoted woman may reasonably believe that if she does not accept the
promotion (and the sex), there will be retaliation at some future date, beyond simply the loss of the
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the personnel director abused his position to secure sex. Even if the
applicant's choice to submit made sense given her own personal predica-
ment, her acquiescence does not override the fact that the employment
decision was unlawfully tainted by an impermissible consideration.
The presence of economic pressure outside the employment relation-
ship, however, does not always vitiate consent. In the law of rape, for
example, an important unanswered doctrinal question is whether submis-
sion effected by economic coercion constitutes legally effective consent.
There are no reported cases of criminal prosecutions for sexual assault in
which the compulsion used was of an economic nature. Moreover, in
most jurisdictions, the paradigm case of sexual harassment in which the
supervisor forces the employee to have sex with him to avoid dismissal is
probably not criminally punishable as rape or sexual assault of a serious
nature. 195 These states characterize the employee's submission as con-
sensual, unless the supervisor also threatens physical force.
There have been some initiatives to change the law of rape to
encompass economically coerced sex. As of yet, however, no jurisdiction
has passed a provision similar to the Swiss and Soviet criminal codes,
that specifically punish persons who use their leverage as employers or
supervisors to sexually exploit employees.1 96 Instead, the reforms that
promotion. Her claim may be one of offensive work environment rather than quid pro quo harass-
ment, however, because the adverse consequences she fears have not yet materialized.
195. Two of the most influential statutory schemes-Michigan and New York-do not appear
to classify economically coerced sex as a serious sexual crime. Under the Michigan statute, the
various degrees of criminal sexual conduct are defined as sexual penetration or contact accomplished
by "force or coercion." MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(b) (West Supp. 1987). The specific
examples of "force or coercion" given are mainly limited to the use of physical force or threats of
physical force. Id. § 750.520(b)(1)(f)(i)-(v). Because the statutory definition is expressly "not lim-
ited to" the specific examples, it is possible that economic coercion is covered. See id.
§ 750.520(b)(1)(f). But with the exception of threats of extortion, id. § 750.520(b)(1)(f)(iii), the
statute gives no notice that coercion of a nonphysical type is contemplated. Eight states have based
their statutes on the Michigan legislation. Comment, supra note 4, at 1541.
New York defines rape as sexual intercourse accomplished with "forcible compulsion." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.35(1) (McKinney 1987). "Forcible compulsion" is defined to include only the use
of force, threat of force, or kidnapping. Id. § 130.00(8). Eight states have adopted the New York
approach. Comment, supra note 4, at 1534.
In the ten or so states that follow the approach of the Model Penal Code, economic coercion
may be criminalized as a less serious form of sexual abuse than rape. See infra notes 197-99 and
accompanying text. The commentary to the Model Penal Code describes its approach as extending
liability for "coercion by threat far beyond anything contemplated by prior law." Commentary to
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 312 (1980). The general approach of the Model Penal
Code is discussed in Comment, supra note 4, at 1529-33.
196. One comparative law writer reported that the Soviet Code punished the "coercion" of a
woman "by any person on whom she is dependent materially or by reason of her employment."
Donnelly, The New Yugoslav Criminal Code, 61 YALE L.J. 510, 527 n.l 19 (1952) (citing CRIMINAL
CODE, R.S.F.S.R., art. 154); see also id. at 527-28 (citing YUGOSLAV CRIMINAL CODE art. 182
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have been suggested in this country are more global in nature and
attempt to outlaw all forms of unreasonable coercion, including psycho-
logical as well as economic coercion. For example, under the Model
Penal Code, nonconsensual sexual intercourse resulting from coercion of
a nonphysical nature may constitute the crime of gross sexual imposition,
a third degree felony.197 In determining what is prohibited coercion for
this offense, the test of the Model Penal Code is whether the threat made
by the defendant "would prevent resistance by the woman of ordinary
resolution." '198 The commentary indicates that economic coercion is suf-
ficient to satisfy the test and notes that if the defendant threatened to
deprive the woman of a "valued" possession or caused her to lose her job,
he would be guilty of the crime of gross sexual imposition. 199
In a similar vein, legislation was introduced in Virginia in 1978 to
impose criminal liability for rape if the defendant abused his position of
authority to accomplish sexual intercourse.2" Unlike the Model Penal
Code's focus on the reasonable resistance of the victim, the Virginia bill
attempted to define prohibited encounters by reference to the status or
position of the defendant. In general terms, the Virginia bill defined
which made it a crime if a person through "misuse of his position procures a female person
subordinated or dependent upon him to have carnal knowledge"). The Swiss Penal Code criminal-
ized intercourse accomplished by a person's "taking advantage... of authority which he possesses
over her by virtue of his official capacity or as employer or in a comparable relationship." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 311 n.105 (1980) (citing Swiss PENAL CODE art. 197 (Pan-
chand 1951)).
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1980). In other respects, the Model Penal Code is not
particularly reformist in its approach to sexual offenses. For example, the Code requires corrobora-
tion of a rape victim's testimony, a complaint within three months, and an instruction directing the
jury to evaluate complainant's testimony "with special care in view of the emotional involvement of
the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to the alleged sexual activities
carried out in private." Id. § 213.6(4)-(5). One commentator describes the Code as "based upon a
1950's view that rape was a crime fantasized by pseudo-victims." Bienen, supra note 94, at 176. She
notes, however, that the Code does incorporate some progressive features. Id.
198. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1980). The commentary noted that "[u]nlike the con-
struct of the 'reasonable man,' the 'woman of ordinary resolution' is not a staple of the law... [and]
lacks a history of judicial explication and accumulated refinement." Id. commentary at 313. The
reasonable victim perspective has surfaced recently in the sexual harassment context. See supra note
134.
199. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) commentary at 312 (1980). The economic coercion
must relate to an important interest. Threats of trivial harm are not included. An example of a
threat of trivial harm is that of a policeman who persuades a woman to submit to intercourse to
avoid a parking ticket. Id. at 313. The commentators expressed the sexist opinion that such over-
reaching by the police officer was only a "minor abuse of office" and that a woman in such a situa-
tion would probably be tempted to acquiesce because of the officer's "own attractiveness." Id.
Although I doubt whether the example is a realistic one, it seems just as likely that a woman in such
a situation would submit out of a misguided notion of the power and authority of the officer, rather
than out of sexual attraction or desire.
200. The Virginia bill is discussed in R. TONG, supra note 4, at 111.
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"position of authority" as "[a]ny relationship in which the actor appears
to the victim to have a status which implies the right of the actor to
expect or demand obedience, acquiescence or submission on the part of
the victim."2 ' The bill lists certain potentially abusive relationships,
including those in which the defendant had apparent authority over the
victim by reason of age, maturity, occupation, blood relationship, or
because he had been entrusted with the care, education, or counseling of
the victim.2 °2 Although not concerned principally with economic
exploitation, the Virginia bill seems expansive enough to include at least
the egregious case of sexual harassment where the victim is unusually
dependent on her job.
Proposals such as these to criminalize economically coerced sex are
not likely to be adopted, in part because it is difficult to draft a precise
statute that captures the many unacceptable forms of economic and psy-
chological coercion without prohibiting what many perceive as less cul-
pable conduct. The inadequacy of the Model Penal Code illustrates this
problem.
The comments to the Model Penal Code, for example, attempt to
draw the line between criminal coercion and noncriminal pressure by dis-
tinguishing between a bargain and coercion.20 3 The comments stress that
it is not a crime for a man to induce submission from a woman as a result
of a bargain, even if it is a bargain that she is in no position to refuse.
The commentary to the Model Penal Code gives the example of a
wealthy man who threatens to withdraw economic support from his
unemployed girlfriend, unless she agrees to continue their sexual rela-
tionship.2" The Code regards such pressure by the man as a legitimate
offer of a bargain, rather than as coercion calculated to overcome the will
of the girlfriend. If the man were the victim's employment supervisor,
however, and threatened to have her fired if she refused to submit, the
201. Id.
202. Id. The bill provided:
Authority or appearance of authority may be established by, but is not limited to, evidence
of the relative ages, maturity, or occupations of the victim and actor; the blood or house-
hold relationship of the actor to the victim; or the actor's position of trust relative to the
victim such as that involved in the support, care, comfort, discipline, custody, education or
counseling of the victim.
Id. (footnote omitted).
203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 314 (1980); see also supra note 195 (discuss-
ing statutory definitions of coerced sex).
204, MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 313-14 (1980). The comments acknowl-
edged that the "woman of ordinary resolution" might submit under such pressure, but nevertheless
excluded such a situation from criminal liability.
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supervisor would be subject to criminal liability under the Code.2 °5
What makes the first instance a "bargain" and the second instance "coer-
cion" is not immediately apparent. The distinction might turn on the
assumption that the girlfriend freely entered into the association with the
man, knowingly exchanging sex for financial support, whereas the
employee never bargained for sex as a condition of employment. Such a
distinction would make it difficult to criminalize a case of sexual harass-
ment in hiring where the person responsible for hiring made it clear that
he would select only those applicants who agreed to engage in sex with
him. If there were such knowledge of the sexual demands of the job, the
compliant applicant might be said to have entered into a bargain. I sus-
pect, however, that we would regard such a bargain as unduly coercive
because most of us believe that sex should never be made a condition of
employment.2 "6 The above judgment, however, only raises the equally
troubling question of whether sex should ever be made a condition of
material support, even outside the employment context.
It is significant that the concern for distinguishing between coercion
and a bargain has stymied expansion of the law of rape, but has been of
205. Id. at 312. The Model Penal Code commentary on the related crime of extortion indicates
that the wealthy man in the hypothetical example might also be immunized from criminal liability
for extortion because the harm he threatens (i.e., withdrawal of support) will benefit him economi-
cally. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 commentary at 223-24 (1980). The Code draws a distinction
between one "who in an economic bargaining context attempts to maximize his own advantage and
one who attempts to use his position, status, knowledge, or any other unique characteristic of a
situation, to his own personal advantage." Id. Because the wealthy man threatens to withdraw
support, he may be treated differently from the supervisor who has nothing to gain personally by
firing the noncompliant employee. While the commentary does not explain why this distinction
should make a difference, it may be that we are more confident in characterizing an actor's behavior
as an abuse of power if such behavior could not conceivably be justified by other rational considera-
tions, such as economic gain. However, if the wealthy man's motiviation was not to lessen his own
financial obligation but simply to apply economic pressure on his girlfriend, it is doubtful that the
incidental economic benefit to him should make a moral difference. Under similar reasoning, a
professor who refuses to write a recommendation for a sexually noncompliant student might argue
that he has saved himself the effort of drafting the recommendation and thus his "threat" was not
gratuitously cruel because it inured to his benefit as well.
206. Disapproval of economically coerced sex was expressed by the Eighth Circuit in holding
that the dismissal of a female worker for refusing to engage in sex with her foreman constituted a
wrongful discharge, actionable under the public policy exception to the "at-will" employment doc-
trine. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984). The court reasoned that the
foreman was "in effect" asking the employee to become a prostitute. Because prostitution was
unlawful under state law, the employee's refusal was characterized as tantamount to a refusal to
commit a crime. Id. at 1205. The court noted, however, that the transaction might not be crimi-
nally punishable because the crime of prostitution requires the acceptance of a "fee," rather than the
trading of an employment advantage. Id. While helpful to the employee's case, the analogy to
prostitution is unfortunate since it tends to focus on the victim's response (i.e., accepting money for
sex) rather than on the defendant's threat. It suggests that the foreman's behavior might not be
actionable if prostitution were decriminalized in the state.
CONTROL OF SEXUAL CONDUCT
little importance in sexual harassment law. Concepts of coercion and
bargain are likely to reflect judgments involving the relative culpability of
the victim and the gravity of the sanction to be imposed. The law of
sexual harassment is beginning to afford women a sanctuary from eco-
nomic pressure, whether labeled coercion or a proposed bargain. This
sanctuary is appropriate because most women now are employed, many
out of economic necessity. Moreover, even for economically secure
women, jobs are increasingly important to their self image and their sta-
tus in the community. Sexual harassment law recognizes that the choice
of women to work, like the choice of men, is not unfettered; for most
women, remaining outside the labor force is not a practical option.
Given this lack of meaningful choice, there is now less of a tendency to
blame the victim for being in a vulnerable position. Additionally, the
sanctions for sexual harassment generally have been civil in nature and
have often focused on deterrence and prevention. A man found guilty of
sexual harassment may suffer serious harm, particularly if the incidents
are publicized, but he is unlikely to be stigmatized to the same degree as
a convicted felon.
In contrast to sexual harassment law, the law against rape applies in
all contexts. Any protection against economic coercion in the law of
rape thus would be more far-reaching and would cover what are often
regarded as private, wholly discretionary encounters.2 °7 As the commen-
tary to the Model Penal Code illustrates, there is a reluctance to
criminalize many of these privitized encounters. The unwillingness to
prosecute the wealthy man who threatens to cut off his girlfriend, for
instance, probably stems from two implicit judgments that underlie the
notion of bargain: first, that the woman is to blame for getting herself in
this predicament; second, that even if the man's tactics are objectionable,
his conduct is not so outrageous as to warrant a loss of liberty.208 The
tolerance of economic pressure in this context may reflect a belief that, in
their personal lives, women have the freedom to choose whether to
encumber their sexual relationships with material dependence. The
belief is that although women may have to work, they do not have to be
supported by their lovers. By so assuming, the criminal law saves itself a
207. In addition to the wealthy man hypothetical, the commentary also hypothesizes the situa-
tion of a man who threatens to "withhold an expensive present unless his girlfriend permits his
advances." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 312 (1980). By giving no context to the
example other than to describe the aggressive person as a "man" and the target as "his girlfriend,"
the Code implies a quintessentially private situation in which the parties play no role other than
lovers or intimates.
208. The Model Penal Code, for example, describes threats of economic reprisals as threats of a
less serious sort than threats of physical harm. Id.
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difficult case by case inquiry into consent. The refusal to regard econom-
ically coerced sex as rape allows men to continue to use their economic
superiority to gain sexual advantage, provided that they use only their
own resources (not their employer's) and target only those women who
show some willingness to tie sex to financial gain. From the target's
standpoint, however, the economic pressure may feel the same regardless
of whether it is her employer or her lover who threatens economic harm
if sex is denied them.
It is interesting to compare the law's unwillingness to treat economi-
cally coerced sex as rape with the prevailing legal stance on prostitution.
Prostitution is currently illegal in every state except Nevada.209  It is
unlikely, however, that there is any coherent theory supporting the
criminalization of prostitution. The prostitution laws could be viewed as
relics of a traditional attitude toward sex. This characterization, how-
ever, does not explain why prostitution laws have not been affected by
liberal or feminist reforms. The current prohibition on prostitution may
derive its principal support either from the belief that prostitution is not
a truly consensual activity or from the belief that prostitution causes
harm to persons other than the prostitutes themselves. If the criminal-
ization of prostitution is justified because of the nonconsensual nature of
the sex, it is hard to explain why economically coerced sex triggers crim-
inal penalties for prostitution, but not for rape. That is, if prostitution is
nonconsensual, it is presumably because a prostitute's solicitation of sex
for money is not truly consensual. Not only would this judgment make
the law of rape puzzling, but the characterization of prostitution as eco-
nomically coerced sex would also make it unreasonable to impose crimi-
nal penalties on the prostitute herself, because she is the coerced party in
the encounter.21°
209. See CANADIAN REPORT, supra note 16, at 474. Forty-six states outlaw the act of prostitu-
tion, even if it takes place in private. Solicitation is outlawed in forty-five states, and loitering is
illegal in nine states. All states outlaw pimping or pandering (arranging for prostitution or inducing
someone to become a prostitute). Id. In contrast to the American system of suppressing prostitu-
tion, Great Britain and Canada do not proscribe private acts of prostitution. Public solicitation and
other acts related to prostitution are, however, criminally punishable. Id. at 404, 479.
210. Whether prostitutes should be viewed as "coerced" parties in the transaction should
depend on whether prostitutes are far more likely to experience work related physical abuse. One
California study documented extremely high levels of victimization of street prostitutes. Silbert &
Pines, Occupational Hazards of Street Prostitutes, 8 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 395-98 (1981); see also
D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME AND THE LAW 112-13 (1977) (prostitutes have been
stigmatized, discriminated against, and considered "fair pickings" for extortion).
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On the other hand, if prostitution is outlawed because of its sup-
posed external effects--contribution to sexually transmitted disease, fos-
tering of other crimes, the deterioration of neighborhoods, or even the
decline of the moral climate of the community-criminal penalties for
prostitution may be supportable. From this perspective, even if the
encounter is viewed as consensual, it nevertheless might be rational to
punish both the prostitute and her customer insofar as each may contrib-
ute to the asserted external harm.
Because the law has tended to target prostitutes for criminal prose-
cution,2 11 it is not well designed to prevent the victimization of prosti-
tutes. The external effects rationale clearly fits better with the current
formal pattern of criminal penalties. However, the limited amount of
empirical evidence on the external effects of prostitution does not provide
a convincing case for criminalization.21 2 This shaky legal foundation,
coupled with the advocacy of decriminalization by important liberal
organizations, 21 3 should encourage reform of the laws banning prostitu-
tion. Yet there has been no significant change in prostitution laws in
recent years.
The failure to change prostitution laws may stem in part from disa-
greement about the consensual nature of prostitution itself. Many femi-
nists believe that prostitution is generally a form of economically coerced
sex. For example, a recent feminist law review writer depicted the aver-
age prostitute as a teenage runaway who later suffers psychological and
physical abuse at the hands of pimps, police, and customers.214 Studies
also indicate that, as children, prostitutes are often victims of incest.215
211. Although in some jurisdictions, customers are also punishable under the prostitution laws,
they are only rarely arrested. CANADIAN FPORT, supra note 16, at 390-91. Targeting prostitutes
has been upheld as a rational attempt to concentrate on the "profiteer" rather than on the customer.
People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 338, 562 P.2d 1315, 138 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1977). One court,
however, has recently ruled that such selective prosecution is systematically biased against women.
Commonwealth v. Unnamed Defendant, 39 Cr. L. Rptr. 2218 (Mass. App. May 22, 1986).
212. See, eg., R. TONG, supra note 4, at 43-44 (disputing that prostitution is responsible for
rapid spread of venereal disease or herpes or is linked to organized crime); Milman, New Rules for
the Oldest Profession: Should We Change Our Prostitution Laws?, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1980)
(Boston study finding no strong evidence that prostitution causes robbery, other serious crimes, drug
addiction, or neighborhood deterioration). It is also difficult to separate the harms of prostitution as
an activity from the harms stemming from its status as an illegal activity.
213. See, eg., A. JAGGAR, supra note 4, at 350-51 (discussing positions of the American Civil
Liberties Union and the National Organization of Women Task Force).
214. See Erbe, Prostitutes: Victims of Men's Exploitation and Abuse, 2 LAw & INEQUALITY:
609, 610-19 (1984).
215. See CANADIAN REPORT, supra note 16, at 373-74; Erbe, supra note 214, at 614.
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The legacy of this childhood victimization may be that, as adults, prosti-
tutes are psychologically more vulnerable to sexual exploitation by men.
Apart from concern for the treatment of prostitutes, some feminists
also object to prostitution on ideological grounds.2a 6 They see prostitu-
tion as reinforcing the sexist view that a woman's role in a sexual encoun-
ter is to please a man and that the sexual or emotional desires of the
woman are properly subordinated. In this view, the world of prostitution
is an exaggerated version of the real world of sexual relationships, in
which men often possess the resources to dictate the terms and nature of
sexual encounters, without taking proper account of the subjective
desires of their partners. This account of prostitution places it on a
moral plane with rape; if a woman must be paid for sex, the sex must by
definition be regarded as coerced. Although few feminists would agree
that imposing criminal penalties on prostitutes is a good way to limit
prostitution, this is a far cry from approval of prostitution from a moral
standpoint.
Unlike the favorable reception given to feminist accounts of
acquaintance rape and sexual harassment, the feminist account of prosti-
tution as an extreme form of economically coerced sex has yet to gain
widespread acceptance. Prostitution remains a difficult issue in the law
of sex for three reasons.
First, we know very little about the reality of the lives of prosti-
tutes.21 7 Whether prostitutes are more often sexual slaves than liberated
women is not just a matter of perception, but depends on the facts of
their daily existence. If prostitutes are routinely beaten up, forced to give
up most of their earnings to pimps, and likely to die young, it would be
incorrect to categorize prostitution as a truly voluntary or consensual
activity. However, this depressing portrait of the prostitute still com-
petes with a far more favorable image. The competing image is that of a
sexually uninhibited woman who has made a rational decision to sell sex-
ual services, given her restricted options for other high paying work.21
216. See, eg., R. TONG, supra note 4, at 52-53 (descriptions of the radical feminist ideological
objections to prostitution); see also A. JAGGAR, supra note 4, at 359-63.
217. For two very different, first hand accounts of prostitution see THE MAIMIE PAPERS (R.
Rosen and S. Davidson eds. 1971) and L. LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1980); see also Millett, Prostitution:
A Quartet for Female Voices, in WOMEN IN SExisT Soc'Y (V. Gornick & B. Moran, eds. 1971)
(taped interviews with two former prostitutes with ambivalent feelings about their lives as
prostitutes).
218. Judith Walkowitz takes the position that the Victorian antivice crusade against prostitu-
tion changed both the perception and reality of prostitution. She describes the early feminist cam-
paigns as designed to end official persecution of prostitutes. Prostitution was seen as "the end result
of the artificial constraints placed on women's social and economic activity." As the campaign
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Until we are able to discount the latter image as unrepresentative, there
will be disagreement as to whether prostitution represents economic
coercion or economic bargaining.
Second, the economic coercion present in prostitution appears to be
of a different sort than that found in the paradigm sexual harassment
case. Prostitutes are often subject to varying types of economic pressure.
For example, pimps and other "protectors" may force prostitutes to pay
them off from their earnings. This kind of economic exploitation is on an
individual level and is readily accepted as coercion, primarily because we
assume that pimps stand ready to back up their demand with physical
force. But when the focus is directly on the sexual encounter between the
customer and the prostitute herself, there likely exists no such individual-
ized coercion. Instead, the economic pressure inherent in the transaction
derives from social forces, rather than from any choice put to the prosti-
tute by her individual customers. It is the prostitute's social predicament
rather than the actions of the particular customer that may be character-
ized as coercive. Pressure at such a macro level is far less likely to be
viewed as coercion in our individualistic legal system. Particularly in
sexual matters, the law tends to regard an act as voluntary so long as it is
not constrained by the will of another identifiable individual.21 9
Third, it is difficult to classify a sexual encounter as coerced when
the party who initiates the encounter is also the party subjected to eco-
nomic pressure. In the search for a refurbished concept of consent that
takes into account the needs and desires of women, it is risky to ignore
the fact that it is the woman herself who proposed the encounter. Ordi-
narily we presume that persons who initiate sexual encounters consent to
those transactions. 2 0 Until we have a clearer definition of what consti-
tutes exploitation in sexual encounters, it is difficult to override such pre-
sumption in any but the most extreme cases.
For these three reasons, prostitution is a particularly difficult prob-
lem for feminists trying to create an egalitarian model of sexual conduct;
shifted to a more right-wing antivice movement, however, prostitutes were more likely to be viewed
as sexual slaves. At the same time, the legal repression forced prostitutes underground, severing
their connection with working class neighborhoods and forcing them to be more dependent on pimps
for protection and emotional support. Walkowitz, supra note 53, at 147-50.
219. See R. TONG, supra note 4, at 60 (contrasting individual and institutional coercion affecting
prostitutes).
220. Compare the distinction between participation and tolerance in the sexual harassment con-
text discussed at supra text accompanying notes 144-47. A caveat applicable in both the sexual
harassment and prostitution contexts is that if the initiator has little or no influence in setting the
terms of the exchange or the limits of participation, it may be hazardous to equate even overt behav-
ior with actual desire.
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it poses the basic question of whether sex traded for money must always
be viewed as exploitation.
In summary, it is impossible to arrange the rules governing sexual
harassment, rape, and prostitution into a coherent position on the legal
status of economically coerced sex. Nor is there a definition of coercion
that is consistently applied in each context. What can be said, however,
is that the law of sexual harassment has highlighted the issue of eco-
nomic coercion and much effort has been directed toward identifying
those sexual encounters in which the use of economic pressure is most
objectionable. Equally important, there seems to be little current senti-
ment in active support of the practice of trading sex for economic gain.
Although the law has not been willing to declare that economically
coerced sex is rape, this probably stems more from the severe nature of
the criminal sanction than from approval or even tolerance of sexual
encounters where consent is secured through economic pressure.
Indeed, the continued criticism of prostitution reflects a continuing
disapproval of the use of sex for commercial purposes. I discern a trend
here to regard economic pressure as an unacceptable inducement to sex
and to create a range of legal sanctions to discourage economically
coerced encounters, even if such sex is not subject to direct criminal
sanctions.
C. DECEPTION
It is debatable whether the law is at a point where deception is gen-
erally regarded as an impermissible inducement to sex. It might be
claimed that the current legal prohibitions against deception in sexual
relationships are exceptions to a more general rule that immunizes sexual
encounters from charges of fraud. My reticence to pronounce any gen-
eral tendency in the law stems principally from the scarcity of recent
fraud cases. 221 However, because the new tort claims for deception in
221. There are only a few cases involving tort claims based upon deception in sexual inter-
course. See supra notes 151, 157. Criminal prosecutions for fraudulently induced sex were more
prevalent before the turn of the century. See, eg., Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (1872); People v.
Bartow, I Wheeler C.C. 378 (N.Y. 1823); Commonwealth v. Childs, 2 Pitts. Rep. 391 (Pa. 1863).
They tapered off after 1900 and only a few criminal prosecutions have been reported since 1960,
predominantly in California courts. See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 210
Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985); Matthews v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 309, 173 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1981);
People v. Harris, 93 Cal. App. 3d 103, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1979); People v. Minkowski, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 832, 23 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1962); State v. Oshiro, 5 Hawaii App. 404, 696 P.2d 846 (1985);
People v. Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d 815, 301 N.E.2d 1 (1973).
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sexual relationships may arise in typical, rather than only in extraordi-
nary sexual encounters, they take on a special normative significance.
Similar to the approach taken in cases of economic coercion, there
seems to be a greater willingness to impose civil sanctions for fraudulent
sexual conduct, while saving criminal penalties for only the most egre-
gious cases. The result is that the kind of consent that provides a defense
to a criminal charge may not qualify as effective consent in a tort suit
regarding the same conduct.
The criminal law recognizes only a very few instances of rape by
fraud. The most consistently punished deceptive activity involves the
administration of drugs or intoxicants to an unsuspecting victim in order
to prevent her physical resistance to intercourse.222 These drug cases are
the only rape by fraud cases that are likely to occur with any frequency.
The prohibitions found in criminal codes against husband impersona-
tion223 or other types of "fraud in the factum"22' 4 are of little practical
importance.
Significantly, the law of rape does not generally prohibit intercourse
that results from fraudulent inducement,2 2 5 provided that the deceived
party was aware that she was actually engaging in sexual intercourse.2 2 6
222. See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(b) (1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(3) (West
1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-404(1)(d) (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.00, 130.05 (McKinney
1925).
223. For a sampling of the criminal prohibitions on sex fraudulently induced by spouse imper-
sonation, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(c) (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(d)
(1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(5) (West 1970).
224. Fraud in the factum typically denotes a situation in which the victim consents to the doing
of act X and the perpetrator of the fraud, in the guise of doing act X, actually does act Y. Fraud in
the factum is most often distinguished from fraud in the inducement, whereby the victim is fraudu-
lently induced to consent to the doing of act X and the perpetrator of the fraud does indeed commit
act X. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 215 (1982). For a powerful philosophical
critique of the traditional legal dichotomy, see generally Feinberg, supra note 87, at 330.
225. In Hawaii, however, one recent appellate decision noted in dicta that no distinction should
be made between fraud in the inducement and fraud in the fact and that any consent induced by
deception was statutorily ineffective. See Oshiro, 5 Hawaii App. at 407 n.2, 696 P.2d at 849 n.2
(1982).
226. A few rape prosecutions have been brought against doctors who tricked their patients into
believing that they were undergoing a medical examination, rather than engaging in sexual inter-
course. The most recent and highly publicized case was that of a Wyoming physician who was
convicted of committing forcible rape and lesser sexual abuse crimes with five of his patients while
they were undergoing pelvic examinations. See Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1986); see also
People v. Minkowski, 204 Cal. App. 2d 832, 23 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1962) (doctor convicted of raping
women he was treating for menstrual cramps); People v. Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d 815, 301 N.E.2d 1
(1973) (doctor convicted of deviate sexual assault that occurred during gynecological exam); State v.
Atkins, 292 S.W. 422 (Mo. 1926) (doctor convicted of rape occurring during examination to discover
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False promises of marriage, false representations of sterility, or false pro-
fessions of love will not vitiate the deceived party's consent, even if the
consenting party would never have agreed to the encounter if the truth
were told. The law of rape in these cases requires only technical or
apparent consent, even though it is the defendant who is solely responsi-
ble for the deception. The judgment here may be that the man who lies
to get his way is less blameworthy227 than one who resorts to physical
force or some forms of economic coercion. Correlatively, the woman who
is deceived may be a less sympathetic victim.228
Cases of alleged fraud are particularly likely to trigger common
prejudices about the behavior of men and women in sexual encounters.22 9
The notion that women really want (or need) to be tricked into having
sex has not yet been dispelled.230 Additionally, many still believe that
women have more control over their sexual desires than men and should
therefore be assigned the responsibility to resist any resistible advances,
including the psychological pressures exerted through deception.23'
the cause of patient's eye trouble); State v. Ely, 114 Wash. 185, 194 P. 988 (1921) (doctor convicted
of raping patient during examination of her ovaries).
Some states have modified their sexual abuse statutes to specifically encompass abuse that
occurs during a physical exam. See, eg., Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-303(a)(vii) (1979) (sexual assault in the
second degree).
227. Indeed, some descriptions of the law of rape suggest that lies designed to induce sexual
intercourse may not be regarded as morally unacceptable at all, but rather as normal conduct for
men. See, for example, People v. Evans, 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 1099, 379 N.Y. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (1975),
in which the court distinguished violent rapes from fraudulently induced sex:
It is not criminal conduct for a male to make promises that will not be kept, to indulge in
exaggeration and hyperbole, or to assure any trusting female that, as in the ancient fairy
tale, the ugly frog is really the handsome prince. Every man is free, under the law, to be a
gentleman or a cad.
Id.
228. For example, the Model Penal Code treats the rape of an unconscious woman as a more
serious offense than rape of a deceived woman who did not understand that she was engaging in
sexual intercourse. The comments justify the downgrading of rape by fraud by claiming that most
women can prevent that kind of activity, the implication being that the deceived woman is partly to
blame and may not warrant similar protection. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 331
(1962). The comments also speculate that rape by fraud is more easily deterred by less severe sanc-
tions than is the rape of unconscious women. Id.
229. One writer speculates that the scholarly fascination with cases of rape by fraud might be
partly responsible for the law's willingness to equate consent with nonresistance in cases involving
coercive inducements other than deception. The author posits that in the fraud cases, doubts about
the credibility of the complainant are magnified and the harm to the victim is less severe than in
cases of violent rape. Note, supra note 87, at 628-35.
230. See, e.g., supra note 90.
231. See P. FRANKLIN, H. MOGLEN, P. ZATLIN-BORING, & R. ANONESS, SEXUAL AND GEN-
DER HARASSMENT IN THE ACADEMY, 16 (1981) (citing Jurnovoy, Sex in the Office, HARPER'S
BAZAAR, Aug., 1980, at 34).
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Perhaps the principal impediment to criminalizing rape by fraud is
the desire to avoid the difficult task of choosing which lies will be treated
as material and which will be dismissed as insignificant.232 There is a
reluctance to judge the materiality of the deception solely from the vic-
tim's viewpoint, particularly when the sanction is criminal. A woman
who consents to have sex with a man only because he falsely tells her that
he is unmarried may well view the deception as material to her consent.
So far, however, the criminal law continues to treat the woman's conduct
as consensual, despite the material deception.
The few recent tort cases involving deception in sexual relationships
have not yet developed a standard of materiality. To prove causation, the
courts require that the victim prove that the lie was material from her
standpoint. 233  However, the victim's perspective will probably not
emerge as the sole gauge of materiality. For example, recent cases appear
to require an additional showing that the fraud concerned the defend-
ant's physical condition and produced physical harm,2 34 as opposed to
only psychological or financial harm. Because of the anti-heart balm
statutes235 and the values they represent, the courts will likely continue
to refuse to monitor false representations about a party's social status or
intentions regarding the relationship.
In the language of tort law, the question of materiality tends to arise
in determining the scope of the claimant's assumption of risk. For exam-
ple, if a court wishes to regard a false representation of a partner's mari-
tal status as immaterial to a tort claim, it may state that the claimant
assumed the risk that the sexual partner would not be truthful about
personal circumstances.2 36  Like the distinction between coercion and
232. One court refused to permit instances of fraud in the inducement to be chargeable as rape,
fearing that "where consent to intercourse is obtained by promises of travel, fame, celebrity and the
like-ought the liar and seducer to be chargeable as a rapist? Where is the line to be drawn?" Boro
v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1230 n.5, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 n.5 (1985).
233. See supra note 159 (discussing the requirement of justifiable reliance). Although she does
not analyze the subject along sex-based lines, Sisela Bok's analysis of lies underscores the importance
of perspective in determining the harms of deception in public and private life. She contrasts the
perspective of the deceived with the perspective of the liar, concluding that the latter possess a
greater tendency to ignore the effects of their lies. S. BOK, supra note 151, at 24.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
235. See supra notes 45-47.
236. See Alice D. v. William M., 113 Misc. 2d 940, 950-51, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350, 357 (1982)
(holding that no award could be made for pain and suffering resulting from the deterioration of the
couple's relationship: "[A]ffection and love are often transitory and mercurial. This may be stated
in terms of the tort doctrine of assumption of risk: one who enters a love relationship assumes the
risk that the feelings and emotions of the other party may change.") (citation omitted).
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bargain often made in the economic pressure cases, 237 assumption of risk
functions as a shorthand label that masks an implicit balancing of factors
other than the actual effect of the deception on the deceived party. How-
ever, the courts have not fully explained why a deceived person in a sex-
ual encounter does not assume a risk of physical injury, but does assume
the risk of serious emotional or financial harm.
Beneath the physical harm limitation may be the concern that no
limits should be placed on a person's decision to sever an intimate rela-
tionship or to control the level of intimacy. One good reason for refusing
to afford a cause of action for a breach of a promise to marry, for exam-
ple, is that, regardless of any emotional harm caused, it is desirable to
permit everyone the opportunity to extricate themselves from unwanted
intimate relationships. On balance, we tend to weight this interest in
autonomy more heavily than the emotional harm suffered by the loss of
the relationship.23 Otherwise, we might allow damages for emotional
harm when one spouse obtains a divorce over the objection of the other.
Instead, the trend has been to deny any monetary compensation to the
objecting spouse, unless based on severe economic need or past economic
contributions to the marriage.239
A more difficult question is posed in a breach of a promise to marry
suit in which the claimant alleges that the defendant's conduct was
deceitful from the outset. 4" If the promisor never intended to fulfill the
promise, a cause of action does not penalize a change of heart but targets
only the knowing, harmful falsehood. A refusal to allow even this lim-
ited cause of action might stem from a fear that it is often difficult to
separate false promises from those sincerely made but not kept. More-
over, perhaps the most common risk in any sexual relationship is the risk
that one party will end the relationship unilaterally, against the wishes of
237. See supra note 191.
238. In Kenneth Karst's analysis of the values underlying intimate associations, choice-partic-
ularly the ability to reject or terminate a relationship-is given a central role. A person's choice to
stay within a relationship when he or she has the legal means to opt out reflects a genuine commit-
ment, rather than simply the operation of law. Karst, supra note 73, at 637-38. Karst eloquently
explains that "the freedom to leave gives added meaning to the decision to stay." Id. at 638 (foot-
note omitted).
239. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 38, at 147-53.
240. Some jurisdictions with anti-heart balm statutes have nevertheless allowed deceit actions,
reasoning that they are distinct from traditional claims for breach of a promise to marry. See, e.g.,
Piccininni v. Hajus, 180 Conn. 369, 373-74 429 A.2d 886, 888-89 (1980); Perthus v. Paul, 81 Ga.
App. 133, 136, 58 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1950). For an analysis of the arguments supporting retention of
deceit claims after passage of an anti-heart balm statute, see Note, Heartbalm Statutes, supra note
45, at 1780-83.
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the other party. Given this pervasive risk, the judgment may be that peo-
ple (especially women) should assume the risk that the other party might
someday break off the relationship. If this is the implicit moral judgment,
then the only damages properly cognizable in a breach of a promise to
marry suit would be those for insult or indignity traceable to the decep-
tion, omitting any damages flowing from the relational loss. When so
pared down, the claim for a breach of a promise to marry, or any other
suit based on a deception relating to the status of the relationship, loses
much of its apparent monetary value.241 The harm that flows from the
exploitive relationship alone, from the after the fact realization that one
has been taken advantage of sexually, is not easily measured, nor yet
clearly accepted as a harm that should be redressed at law.
In summary, the use of deception as an inducement to sex now runs
some legal risk. Although it is unlikely that a criminal sanction will be
imposed for deception, the prospect of civil liability is no longer far-
fetched. Indeed, the one value likely to constrain civil liability in the
future is the desire to limit legal intervention to avoid unwarranted
threats to the universal interest in ending unwanted relationships. This
concern could be met by limiting recovery to cases in which a plaintiff
proves that the defendant consciously misrepresented a material fact
with the purpose of inducing sex. So far, however, the law has not placed
an independent value on the sexual autonomy of plaintiffs and has only
provided compensation to victims of deceit who also allege and prove
serious physical injury. Even this limited coverage, however, makes the
point that deceptive inducements to sex may be legally precarious. The
fact that not all lies trigger legal liability does not undercut the legal
recognition that some minimum standard of honesty in sexual relation-
ships may be essential to effective consent.
III. TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN IDEAL OF
SEXUAL CONDUCT
Legal regulations concerning sex typically take the form of prohibi-
tions and thus express a social judgment as to what kinds of sexual con-
duct are inappropriate. As the regulations affect more and more
contexts, however, the negative image may evoke a positive image as
241. One writer proposes that damages in sexual deceit actions be limited to those that arise
directly out of fraudulently induced reliance and change of position. Such an award would encom-
pass restitutionary, reliance, and possibly punitive damages, but not damages stemming from the
emotional distress caused by the breakup of the relationship. Note, Heartbalm Statutes, supra note
45, at 1786-94.
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well. Traditional sex regulations as I describe them fit a legal ideology
that favors sex in marriage. Likewise, liberal sex regulations can be seen
as expressing a legal ideology that favors consensual sex. We can thus
expect to articulate another ideology of appropriate sex as legal regula-
tions are increasingly reshaped under the feminist critique.
The positive ideal of sex that I infer from the legal developments
described above is an ideal of sexual conduct based not just on consent,
but on mutuality. Because egalitarian inroads into the law of sex are still
new and incomplete, I do not mean to assert that the ideal which I shall
describe is clearly defined or that it is the inevitable consequence of
recent developments.242 However, it does appear that the concept of
mutuality captures the ideas embodied in the feminist critique of both
liberalism and traditionalism and provides a rationale for recent reforms.
At this stage, the ideal I posit must be understood as a mixture of legal
analysis, political advocacy, and philosophy.
An egalitarian ideal of mutuality is perhaps most clearly embodied
in the current law of sexual harassment, which has moved beyond older
notions of consent or voluntariness to a more victim oriented standard of
appropriate sexual conduct. In the sexual harassment context, mutuality
is determined whether the more passive target of sexual overtures actu-
ally welcomed the initiative.243 The welcome character of the initiative
can in turn be determined by asking a hypothetical question-whether
the target would have initiated the encounter if she had been given the
choice. If we answer the question in the affirmative, there is some assur-
ance of mutuality in the sexual encounter. The response of the target in
such an encounter is more positive than, for example, an ambiguous deci-
sion not to resist. By redefining consent to mean welcomeness from the
target's viewpoint, we can begin to incorporate the interests of women in
the formulation of a legal standard.
In each context, however, there are special problems associated with
the implementation of a victim oriented conception of mutuality. In the
criminal law, our notion of culpability most often is tied to the perspec-
tive of the perpetrator, and, for serious crimes at least, we are reluctant to
criminalize behavior unless the defendant deliberately disregards the
expressed wishes of the victim. Consequently, the crime of rape may
242. In fact, the feminist pressure for change has contributed to a significant rise in antifeminist
politics, with sexual issues at the forefront. For an account of the rise of the neoconservative state in
the 1980s and the attempts by conservatives to "reprivatize sexuality" and resuscitate the traditional
family, see R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY AND
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 241-76 (1984).
243. See supra notes 130-47.
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continue to be reserved for the most egregious forms of sexual imposition
involving displays of active hostility toward the victim.
Outside the sphere of criminal law, there is a greater willingness to
view mutuality from the victim's perspective and to impose stricter liabil-
ity. The principal problem here is to fashion a standard of mutuality in a
society otherwise marked by inequality between the sexes. The simple
test of mutuality proffered above-whether the target would have initi-
ated the encounter-may be very difficult to apply in practice and does
not invariably yield satisfactory answers.
The following two examples demonstrate that the concept of mutu-
ality, -like its predecessor consent, is defined by limits that may differ
depending on the context in which the sexual encounter takes place.
Suppose, for example, that an applicant for a job is told that she must
acquiesce in the sexual demands of the personnel director in order to get
the job. If the job is more important to her than her sexual freedom, she
might be pressured into submission. Although she would prefer to be
hired without the sexual obligation, this is not quite the same as saying
that she would not have initiated the encounter if she had been given a
choice. In judging the welcomeness vel non of the exchange, the key
question is whether we should consider the actual economic context. It
may be that, if the target thought that sexual submission was the only
way to get the job, she would have initiated the encounter. The real
world connection between constrained choice in economic matters and
relative lack of sexual freedom makes the notion of welcomeness-like
the notion of consent-dependent on the particular set of options avail-
able in the concrete context. In the sexual harassment context, however,
it appears that the law displays a willingness to presume unwelcomeness
whenever sex is made a condition of employment. Only if it can be
shown that the applicant in fact explicitly proposed the encounter, is the
encounter likely to be viewed as welcome and outside the legal definition
of harassment. In all other cases, we tend to regard any economic pres-
sure exerted as unwarranted and thus try to ignore the impact of the
economic pressure when we ask whether the victim actually welcomed
the conduct.
The test for mutuality is likely to be altered when the pressure
occurs outside the employment context, and arises from the threat to
break off an intimate relationship. Take, for example, the situation of a
teenage girl whose boyfriend threatens to stop seeing her unless they have
sexual intercourse. Assume that she would prefer to keep the relation-
ship without the sex. If she nevertheless gives in to the demands of her
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boyfriend, it is harder to classify the encounter as forced in the legal
sense, at least as compared to the economically pressured sexual encoun-
ter occurring in the employment context. 244 There is a greater inclina-
tion to particularize the incident and ask whether the girl's choice was
voluntary, given the ultimatum of the boyfriend. We might, for example,
ask whether she would have initiated the encounter knowing, even with-
out his vocalizing it, that the offer was the only way to save the
relationship.
In determining the mutuality of sexual encounters, it is critical to
evaluate the nature of the inducements to sex operating in each particular
context. If the parties' goal is thought to be sexual pleasure or emotional
intimacy, the encounter is unlikely to be viewed as so clearly exploitative
as to warrant legal prohibition. Even when one party conditions the rela-
tionship, and thus emotional intimacy, on sexual compliance, the induce-
ment is likely to be viewed as legally acceptable. Thus, for example, it is
still commonly agreed that a spouse should be able to obtain a divorce if
the other spouse refuses to have sex.24 5 While marital rape effected by
physical force is no longer legally acceptable, it is legally acceptable for a
spouse unilaterally to condition the continuation of the marriage itself on
sex.
When the law declares that certain inducements to sex are unaccept-
able, it implicitly endorses other common inducements. A list of accept-
able inducements would surely include procreation, emotional intimacy,
and physical pleasure. Of these three inducements, procreation probably
plays a less significant social role today than either intimacy or pleasure.
This is because pregnancies can now be planned, and sex for procrea-
tional purposes will account for only a very small percentage of sexual
encounters.24 6 It is the large residual category of sexual encounters
244. The encounter might possibly be subject to criminal sanction if the state's statutory rape
law criminalizes even consensual relationships between teenagers. However, many states have
recently changed their laws in order to decriminalize encounters where there is no significant age
disparity between the parties. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(5) (West 1979) (criminalizing
encounters where one participant is 14 or 15 years old only if other party is 6 or more years older).
245. For recent cases granting a divorce to a husband on the ground that his wife refused to
have sex with him, see Culver v. Culver, 383 So. 2d 817 (Miss. 1980); Pfeil v. Pfeil, 100 A.D.2d 725,
473 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1984); Rollman v. Rollman, 280 Pa. Super. 344, 421 A.2d 755 (1980). For a rare
case in which the wife complained of her husband's refusal to have sex with her, see Barr v. Barr, 58
Md. App. 569, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). In Louisiana, a spouse's refusal to have sex may also justify a
denial of permanent alimony. See Broussard v. Broussard, 462 So. 2d 1386 (La. App. 1985); Derbes
v. Derbes, 462 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 1985).
246. Philosopher Robert Soloman claims that it is now "beyond argument" that human sexual-
ity is no longer primarily concerned with reproduction and makes the argument that "most human
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engaged in for the purpose of creating intimacy or generating sexual plea-
sure that most clearly approaches my egalitarian ideal of nonexploitive
sex.
There are two fundamental reasons why sexual encounters engaged
in for emotional and physical gratification may be characterized as the
most egalitarian kind of sexual encounters. First, unlike their unequal
access to wealth and power, men and women are regarded as possessing
an equal capacity to experience sexual pleasure and emotional intimacy.
Thus, if we allow sex to be traded for money, men have an unfair advan-
tage. The legal reforms directed at economically coerced sex, particu-
larly the law of sexual harassment, recognize and attempt to ameliorate
the sex differentiated effects of economic pressure. Moreover, the history
of the law of rape dramatically illustrates that, if physical resistance is.
used as a proxy for non-consent, women will be treated inequitably. One
challenge to feminists is to find a currency in sexual encounters which
places women at the least disadvantage. At this historical period, the
reservation of sex for intimacy and pleasure seems more likely to
empower women in sexual encounters than either the traditionalist insis-
tance on marriage or the permissive stance of the liberal.
Second, sex which has intimacy or pleasure as its goal seems more
capable of avoiding the dangers of sexual objectification which feminists
have identified as a chief mechanism by which male supremacy is estab-
lished and maintained. Alison Jagger, for example, explains sexual
objectification as a process by which women are regarded as something
other than "whole persons," as "sexual objects evaluated primarily in
terms of their physical attributes and secondarily in terms of their skill
(charm) in displaying these attributes."2 47 So objectified, women become
more vulnerable to sexual aggression because men erroneously assess
women's desires in a self-serving fashion. Moreover, women may be
deprived of the capacity for self expression because the objectified indi-
vidual also experiences herself as an object and to this extent embraces
the male perspective of the sexual encounter. Sexual objectification is an
effective method for accomplishing the subordination of women because
it renders sexual abuse invisible and prevents women from realizing their
sexual activity not only is not aimed at reproduction but is practiced in spite of the threat of repro-
ducing." Solomon, supra note 19, at 270.
247. A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 309 (1983) (describing the social-
ist feminist account of sexual objectification); see also MacKinnon, Desire and Power: in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAw 55 (1987) (describing the relationship between male
dominance, objectivity, and objectification).
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own desires with sufficient precision to enable them to make comprehen-
sible demands for their recognition.
Not surprisingly, there is a divergence of opinion among feminists as
to which sexual practices present the greatest chance for appreciating
women's subjectivity and expanding women's choice in sexual matters.24
Much of the debate has centered around whether sex for sexual pleasure
or sex for emotional intimacy better achieves this goal. Each of these two
conceptions of ideal sex seems noninstrumental in the sense that the chief
value of the activity, whether pleasure or intimacy, is seen as deriving
from the activity itself rather than from some extrinsic benefit conferred
after the fact as a payment for the activity.249 Moreover, encompassed
within both of these visions is a view of sex as a reciprocal activity in
which each party's gratification is highly dependent on the other's
response.250
While these feminist conceptions of ideal sex are often not developed
in detail, they seem clearly to exclude sexual encounters in which money,
248. A brilliant and concise explanation of the positions taken by two of the prominent feminist
"camps" is given in Ferguson, Sex War: The Debate Between Radical and Libertarian Feminists, 10
SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y 106 (1984) (essay in Forum: The Feminist Sexuality
Debates). For radical feminists, "ihe ideal sexual relationship is between fully consenting, equal
partners who are emotionally involved and do not participate in polarized roles." Id. at 108. For
libertarian feminists, it is "between fully consenting, equal partners who negotiate to maximize one
another's sexual pleasure and satisfaction by any rmeans they choose." Id. at 109.
249. Robert Soloman attributes to Freud the revolutionary conception that sex in its purest
form is noninstrumental:
People use sex as an expression of power, or as an expression of impotence (the one often
parading as the other), as a way of going to sleep, as a way of getting even, .... as a way of
demeaning themselves, and so on. On Freud's account, these various extrasexual aims,
however commonly they might be conjoined with sexual desire and activity, are not them-
selves sexual, and sexuality is not to be identified with any of them.
Despite this conceptual breakthrough, Soloman contends that Freud's account of sexuality remained
stultified by then-prevailing notions of sexual morality. Soloman, supra note 19, at 273.
Barbara Ehrenreich has also charted the shift in the conceptualization of desirable sex from
instrumental to noninstrumental behavior. B. EHRENREICH, RE-MAKING LovE: THE FEMINIZA-
TION OF SEX (1986). She characterizes the early 1960s as a time when girls learned to "use sex
instrumentally: doling out just enough to be popular with boys and never enough to lose the esteem
of the 'right kind of kids.'" Id. at 21. The advent of "Beatlemania" signaled a change as the new
stars came to represent the possibility of noninstrumental love for its own sake. Id. at 27. This new
vision of sexuality was "freed from the shadow of gender inequality" because the "Beatles' androg-
yny" was sexy, blurred the line between the sexes, and opened up new possibilities. Id. at 35.
250. In an essay on sexual perversion, Thomas Nagel provides an existential account of sexual
desire which emphasizes mutuality, reciprocity, and interdependence. Nagel, Sexual Perversion, in
PHILOSOPHY & SEX, supra note 19, at 247. While his essay is not self-consciously feminist and
seems to proceed on the assumption that mutuality is the norm in heterosexual relationships, Nagel's
portrait of sexual desire "as a complex system of superimposed mutual perceptions" fits the egalita-
rian ideal of mutual sexual relations. Id. at 253.
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power, prestige, or financial or physical security is traded for sexual plea-
sure or intimacy. Although each party might be said to have gained
something from these encounters, they are not premised on mutuality
because the gains of each are so different in character. Additionally,
because the success of the encounter is not dependent on the reciprocal
response of the parties, it increases the chance that the sex will be an
alienating experience for both parties and will perpetuate the sexual
objectification of women.
The egalitarian view of sex offered here differs in significant respects
from both the traditional and liberal views of sexual conduct. Unlike the
traditional view, the egalitarian view does not determine the acceptability
of sexual encounters solely from the status of the parties. Exploitive sex
can exist within a marriage when one spouse uses physical force or eco-
nomic coercion to pressure the other to submit. To determine whether
the encounter is moral from an egalitarian perspective requires an exami-
nation of each party's motivation. Moreover, these motivations must
always be subject to reassessment to assure the continuing mutuality of
the relationship. Compared to the static assessment of status under the
traditional view, the assessment of motivation central to the egalitarian
view is dynamic and, partly for this reason, tends to present particularly
difficult problems of legal implementation.
The principal difference between the egalitarian view and the liberal
view of acceptable sexual encounters centers on their differing under-
standings of the relationship between individual choice as manifested in
sexual behavior and the broad goal of sexual freedom per se. Under the
liberal view, the characterization of an encounter as sexual tends to rele-
gate it to the private sphere and insulate it from legal regulation, absent
strong evidence of physical coercion or harm to third parties. The max-
imization of individual choice in the liberal view necessarily maximizes
freedom in society as a whole. Thus, for example, no convincing liberal
argument can be made against prostitution because it is possible to view
prostitution as expressing the sexual autonomy of the individual prosti-
tute and the data are unpersuasive that prostitution causes harm to third
parties.
The egalitarian perspective, in contrast, is more reluctant to equate
individual choice with sexual freedom and is consciously directed toward
expanding the choices actually available to women. For example, the
egalitarian view does not conclude that because prostitutes initiate sexual
encounters, prostitution necessarily furthers the sexual freedom of
women. Because prostitution may be a choice of last economic resort for
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many women, the egalitarian is as likely to see it as the degrading artifact
of sexual inequality as the expression of women's liberty. Insofar as gen-
uine sexual freedom depends on sexual equality, full legal approval for
prostitution may be appropriate only when resource equality between
men and women is achieved.
Although I believe that sexual encounters which have pleasure or
intimacy as their purpose come closest to the egalitarian ideal of good
sex, even these encounters are not risk free for women. Every individual,
regardless of gender, may possess the capacity to experience sexual plea-
sure and to form intimate relationships. However, this seeming equality
of emotional resources operates in an unequal social setting. As long as
men possess more of what is highly valued in society, both men and
women may continue to place greater weight on their relationships with
men. This gravitational pull towards men and their interests often means
that intimate heterosexual relationships are more important to women
than to men. If this is true, the threat to end a relationship may be more
formidable when made by a man. If the pressure to maintain intimate
relationships is too powerful an inducement to sex for women, this will
continue to pose a barrier to sexual freedom and mutuality in sexual
encounters.
Additionally, the egalitarian perspective of sexual conduct may be
inadequate insofar as our experience of sexual pleasure is also related to
our notions of power in the society. Scholarship debating the impact of
pornography on sexual arousal, attitudes toward sex, and sexual conduct
is uncovering a link between what we experience as a physical, sexual
response and the structure of our social relationships.25 ' If male domi-
nance plays a central role in the sexual fantasies of many men and
women, sexual pleasure, like emotional intimacy, may not be equally
accessible to men and women.
The above two limitations on the egalitarian view of acceptable sex-
ual encounters, while significant, do not amount to a fatal critique. The
question should not be whether any class of sexual encounters is entirely
free from inequality, because such mutuality may be impossible in our
unequal society. As long as celibacy is an unacceptable mass strategy,
we cannot avoid a choice among the lesser evils and there will not always
be bright line differences between acceptable and unacceptable
251. See, e.g., PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION, supra note 33.
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encounters.252 It thus makes sense to impose legal burdens only on those
encounters we can confidently call exploitive and nonmutual.253 We can
expect that in the legal effort to discourage exploitive sex, civil sanctions
of an indirect nature will be used with more frequency than direct crimi-
nal prohibitions.
IV. APPLYING THE EGALITARIAN VIEW: "ASYMMETRIC"
SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS AT WORK
AND AT SCHOOL
This Part applies the egalitarian view to the controversial subject of
the regulation of amorous, apparently consensual relationships that
occur at the workplace and in educational institutions. The following dis-
cussion points to the different conclusions an egalitarian might reach on
this subject from the conclusions of a traditionalist or a liberal. Yet, the
message of the discussion is as much its complexity as its conclusions.
Because the egalitarian ideal of mutuality places high value on individual
autonomy, an egalitarian cannot judge the appropriateness of sexual
encounters based on mere status with the confidence of a traditionalist.
Moreover, the egalitarian, unlike the liberal, is wary of apparently con-
sensual behavior that is nonetheless unwelcome, and does not regard the
lack of an overt complaint as precluding the need for legal intervention.
The egalitarian perspective tends to be more contextual than either the
traditional or liberal perspective. Even if the approach yields ideas for
appropriate categorical rules, 254 it counsels the need to reexamine those
rules because the social facts that render them appropriate today may
change.
252. See Olsen, supra note 1, at 431 (describes celibacy as "no choice for women"). Olsen's
point is that resistance to unwanted sexual aggression is not an ambitious enough goal for feminists
who should also attempt to construct a positive agenda of creating "new choices" for women. Id.
253. Ann Ferguson makes a similar point in her trisection of sexual practices into basic, risky,
and forbidden sexual practices. Ferguson, supra note 248, at 111. She classifies forbidden sexual
practices as "those in which relations of dominance and submission are so explicit that feminists
hold they should be illegal." Id. Risky practices are "suspected of leading to dominant/subordinate
relationships, although there is no conclusive proof." Id. Basic feminist practices are "those we
would advise our children to engage in." Id. at 112. For the present, Ferguson advocates that we
adopt a "transitional feminist sexual morality" that recognizes a right of persons to engage in risky
as well as basic sexual practices. Id. In her category of forbidden sexual practices, Ferguson lists
"incest, rape, domestic violence and sexual relations between very young children and adults." Id. at
I 11. In the risky category is "[sladomasochism, capitalist-produced pornography, prostitution, and
nuclear family relations between male breadwinners and female housewives." Id. Basic feminist
practices include "casual and more committed sexual love, co-parenting, and communal relation-
ships." Id. at 112.
254. Application of a contextual approach does not necessarily mean that decisions about the
propriety of individual sexual relationships should be made on a case by case basis. Rather, the
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Employers and educational administrators have been drawn into the
issue of amorous, apparently consensual relationships in the course of
implementing policies and rules prohibiting sexual harassment. 255  The
issue is related to sexual harassment because, in both contexts, sexual
conduct is interjected into an inappropriate public setting. The principal
distinction between the amorous relationship case and the paradigm case
of sexual harassment is that complainants in the amorous relationship
context are not themselves targets of sexual overtures. Instead, com-
plaints are typically pressed by fellow employees 256 or students257 who
claim they are being disadvantaged in the competition for employment or
contextual approach I suggest in this Part is frequently best implemented by adoption of categorical
rules, taking into account the relevant features of the regulating institution (i.e., the institutional
context). A categorical rule (eg., no sexual contact between a professor and a student in the profes-
sor's class) has the advantage of being easier to apply than an ad hoc assessment (ag., forbidding any
"exploitive" relationship between a professor and a student) and may deter a broader range of risky
"borderline" behavior. The disadvantage of a categorical rule (even those fashioned within the
framework of a particular institutional context) is that it does not provide the opportunity for the
parties to specify just which aspects of a relationship are exploitive or harmful to third parties.
255. The most recent policy addressing both sexual harassment and amorous relationships was
adopted by the University of Iowa in July, 1986. The University of Iowa prohibits faculty members,
graduate students with teaching responsibilities, and other instructional personnel from engaging in
amorous relations with students enrolled in their classes or who are subject to their supervision, even
when both parties appear to consent to the relationship. The policy does not flatly prohibit amorous
relationships between faculty members and students occurring outside the instructional context.
However, if a conflict of interest arises, the faculty member must withdraw from participating in
decisions that may reward or penalize the student involved. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, POLICY ON
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIPS §§ 7-8 (July 28, 1986) [hereinafter
IOWA POLICY]; see also TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, POLICY PROHIBITING SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
STUDENTS (1985) (prohibition on sexual or romantic relationships within instructional context);
HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE, STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONAL FITNESS, IN FACULTY HANDBOOK (1983)
(caution that sexual relationships could impair teacher's fitness); UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA,
OFFICE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ON
SEXUAL HARASSMENT (July 1, 1984) (warning that existence of sexual relationship will make it
"exceedingly difficult" for faculty member to prove defense of consent); MASSACHUSETTS INSTI-
TUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (1985) (urging faculty members involved in
sexual relationships with students to be "attentive to feelings of colleagues and to potential conflicts
of interest."); Letter from Harvard Dean Henry Rosovsky to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences (1983)
(guidelines for faculty declaring that amorous relationships between students and faculty members
are "always wrong" if the teacher has a professional responsibility for the student) [hereinafter
Harvard Letter]; UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, GENDER AND RESPECT IN THE UNIVERSITY COM-
MUNITY (1986) (faculty guidelines warning that sexual relationships between faculty members and
students are potentially exploitative and should be avoided) [hereinafter MICHIGAN GUIDELINES].
256. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986) (male respira-
tory therapists alleged requirements for promotion were modified so that position would go to a
woman with whom supervisor was engaged in a romantic relationship); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d
878 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (nurse challenged promotion awarded to competitor who had a sexual relation-
ship with supervisor); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983) (unsuccessful applicant
for hospital administrative position alleges promotion awarded to employee who had sexual affair
with supervisor); Kersul v. Skulls Angels Inc., 130 Misc.2d 345, 495 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1985) (female
employee alleges discharge and replacement by supervisor's lover).
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educational benefits. Often the disadvantage stems from favoritism
accorded to another employee or student because of that person's sexual
relationship with a supervisor or professor.
This species of sexual encounter has not yet been given a name that
captures all of its dimensions. The term "sexual payoff" describes the
situations posed in cases where a favored employee or student is given a
benefit as a payoff for sexual favors.258 This term focuses our attention
on the nature of the specific benefit given the favored employee. We
could also think of the issue in terms of providing protection for indirect
victims of sexual conduct. This formulation tends to leave open the
question of whether the sexual encounter should be viewed as truly con-
sensual, and does not focus as directly on any specific benefit given to the
participant in the sexual relationship.
From the perspective of an institution developing policies and rules,
the amorous relationship issue perhaps can best be characterized as
involving the management of asymmetric sexual relationships.259 This
formulation tends to focus simultaneously on two concerns: the poten-
tial for harassment of the target of sexual conduct and the chances of
favoritism prompted by the sexual relationship. This dual focus is neces-
sary from an administrative perspective because it may be impossible to
predetermine whether a sexual encounter will generate charges of harass-
ment from the target of the sexual advances, or charges of favoritism
from others in the work or school community.
In setting policy, the employer or educational institution confronts
the task of defining those encounters that present an unacceptably high
risk of producing either evil. The notion of an asymmetric relationship
comes into play here as a label for such high risk encounters. The princi-
pal challenge is to identify those relationships so affected by the disparate
257. While there is apparently no case law involving a student's objections to a faculty mem-
ber's consensual relationship with another student, the potential for third party complaints exists
and is recognized by educational institutions. The Yale College Grievance Board has recommended
that it consider further the Board's role in such third party complaints, although it currently pursues
only complaints brought by harassed persons. Brandenburg, Sexual Harassment in the University:
Guidelines for Establishing a Grievance Procedure, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y
320, 334-35 (1982); see also, IOWA POLICY, supra note 255 (expressly addressing the effects that
faculty/student relationships may have on other students).
258. See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65, 68-69 (D. D.C. 1984).
259. The Iowa policy statement and the Harvard guidelines for faculty describe sexual relation-
ships between faculty members and students as "fundamentally asymmetric." IOWA POLICY, supra
note 255, at § 6b; Harvard Letter, supra note 255; see also MICHIGAN GUIDELINES, supra note 255
(such a relationship is ultimately and structurally asymmetrical); HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE, supra note
255 (the faculty student relationship embodies an unequal power relationship).
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power of the parties that the relationship likely constitutes a form of sex-
ual harassment or will be used for extrinsic objectives-namely, the trad-
ing of employment or educational benefits for sex. This formulation of
the issue presupposes that some amorous relationships occurring in the
work or school setting are acceptable because they do not pose a high
risk of either harassment or favoritism.
The scheme used for categorizing types of sexual harassment fits the
context of asymmetric relationships as well.260 Some asymmetric
relationships might generate complaints of quid pro quo discrimination.
In this type of case, the complainant can point to a specific benefit, such
as a promotion, that was awarded to the favored sexual partner. Such
favoritism often simultaneously denies a scarce employment benefit to a
qualified competitor.26' In the educational context, quid pro quo dis-
crimination may produce less tangible consequences for persons outside
the relationship, if, for example, there is no fixed grade distribution given
in a particular course. However, when the resource to be distributed is a
limited one (for example, a research assistantship), any favoritism
accorded the sexual partner may also deprive another student of a tangi-
ble benefit.
More frequently, asymmetric relationships generate complaints of
an offensive working or educational environment, rather than of quid pro
quo discrimination. The essence of the offensive environment complaint
is that the sexual relationship has had a negative impact on working rela-
tionships or has poisoned the educational environment, particularly the
atmosphere of the classroom. The distinction from quid pro quo dis-
crimination is that no specific benefit-scarce or otherwise-need be
given to the sexual partner. This genre of complaint sometimes amounts
to an anticipatory claim of quid pro quo discrimination-that is, a claim
that sooner or later the relationship will prompt favored treatment that
might be hard to prove. In other cases, however, the offensive environ-
ment complaint may result solely from a worker's or a student's negative
260. For the distinction between quid pro quo and offensive work environment harassment, see
supra note 127.
261. Studies have found that in approximately one-third of the cases, office romances are char-
acterized at least by perceptions of favoritism. Anderson & Hunsaker, Why There's Romancing at
the Office and Why it's Everybody's Problem, 62 PERSONNEL 57, 62 (Feb. 1985); Quinn & Lees,
Attraction and Harassment: Dynamics of Sexual Politics in the Workplace, 13 ORG. DYNAMICS 35,
42 (Autumn 1984). For a review of the surveys, studies, and reports on office romances, see CORPO-
RATE AFFAIRS: NEPOTISM, OFFICE ROMANCE & SEXUAL HARASSMENT (BNA Special Report,
1988).
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response to the existence of the relationship itself.262 Students may com-
plain, for example, that they feel uncomfortable when a professor deals
with one particular student on personal, rather than professional,
terms.263 Similarly, workers may be offended by a display of affection or
familiarity in a business setting. In still other cases, strain might result
from injecting a person of a different status into the otherwise segregated
social life of the institution. To take a familiar example, a student's pres-
ence at a faculty party may mean that certain discussion will be curbed to
insure that other students do not learn too much about the inner Work-
ings of the more privileged group.
In addition to dealing with specific complaints of either variety,
employers and educational institutions also confrofit the problem of
asymmetric relationships when conducting personnel evaluations. The
decision maker typically must determine whether the relationship alone,
even if unaccompanied by specific complaints from people in the commu-
nity, should weigh against the person evaluated. A key question, for
example, might be whether a professor who dates a student or a supervi-
sor who dates an employee should be penalized for engaging in "unethi-
cal" conduct. Moreover, the low status individual in the sexual
relationship could also be sanctioned for unethical conduct. Employers
must decide whether to apply anti-fraternization rules to nonsupervisory
personnel; educational institutions must consider whether students
should also be disciplined for engaging in sexual relationships with
faculty members.
The law governing asymmetric relationships is undeveloped and has
not yet touched on many of the situations described above. The most
262. Negative consequences attributed to office romances are increased gossip, hostilities, dis-
torted communications within the workplace, lowered productivity, and perceptions that the image
or reputation of the work unit is being jeopardized. Quinn, Coping with Cupid: The Formation,
Impact, and Management of Romantic Relationships in Organizations, 22 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 30, 42
(1977).
263. In academia, consensual relationships may disrupt the academic environment by "jeopard-
izing collegiality among other students and faculty," IOWA POLICY, supra note 255, at 10 n.9 app.,
or by making students uncomfortable about interacting with an instructor who is sexually involved
with another student. Brandenberg, supra note 257, at 320, 322. One commentator described the
negative impact on student attitudes: "The student singled out for sexual attention is the object of
speculation. Even if there is no overt exchange of favors, other students may assume that she has
garnered academic advantages they are being deprived of. This cynical evaluation mars the aca-
demic climate." Winks, Legal Implications of Sexual Contact Between Teacher and Student, 11 J. L.
& EDUC. 437, 459-60 (1982). See Korf v. Ball State Univ., 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984); Naragon
v. Wharton, 572 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (M.D. La. 1983).
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significant cases on this issue2 have dealt with the question of whether
Title VII's ban on sex discrimination encompasses third party complaints
of quid pro quo type discrimination. There is currently a split in the
circuits on this threshold question. The District of Columbia Circuit
allowed a cause of action where a promotion was made as a payoff for
sexual favors.265 The court relied on an EEOC Guideline that warned of
liability to qualified competitors "[w]here employment opportunities or
benefits are granted because of an individual's submission to the
employer's sexual advances or requests., 266 The use of the term "sub-
mission" in the Guideline suggests that the underlying sexual encounter
may not have been welcome from the standpoint of the favored
employee. Read narrowly, this provision merely allows more remotely
disadvantaged parties to complain about the sexual harassment of other
employees. The court went beyond this narrow construction, however,
and allowed a cause of action in any case in which sex was a substantial
factor in the promotion decision.267
By allowing plaintiffs to recover without a showing that the sexual
conduct was unwelcome from the target's perspective, the court seemed
to characterize the evil in these lawsuits as a taint in the decision making
process. From this perspective, the sex based nature of the discrimina-
tion stems from sexual influence in the decision making process, rather
than from the sex of the complainants.
A more restrictive view of the scope of Title VII protection was
expressed by the Second Circuit which denied a cause of action in
264. DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986); King v. Palmer,
778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983). Only two
other sex discrimination cases have touched upon this issue: Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581
(N.D. Cal. 1986) (Title VII) (sexually offensive working environment may result in part from
employer affording preferential treatment to consensual sexual partner); and Kersul v. Skulls
Angels, Inc., 130 Misc. 2d 345, 495 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (state antidiscrimination law).
265. King, 778 F.2d at 878. On appeal, the parties in King agreed that plaintiff's allegations of a
sexual relationship between the promoted employee and her supervisor stated a cause of action
under Title VII. Id. at 880. Thus, the appellate court had no occasion to examine the legal issue.
The court did state, however, that it agreed with the lower court's conclusion that the grant of a
promotion as a sexual payoff violates Title VII, citing the circuit's most prominent sexual harass-
ment precedent. Id.
266. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1982).
267. King, 778 F.2d at 880. The appellate court in King held that the plaintiff need only demon-
strate that the sexual relationship was a substantial factor in the promotion decision and reversed the
trial court by ruling that plaintiff is not required to prove sexual intercourse. Other forms of sexual
conduct (eg., kisses or embraces) will satisfy the burden of proof. Id. at 882. If the promotion
decision is not based on a sexual relationship, but on sexual attraction alone, however, there may be
no violation. Id. at 882.
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another sexual payoff/promotion case.2 68 The court held that it was not
sex discrimination to award a promotion as a sexual payoff, drawing a
distinction between employment decisions based on the sexual affiliation
of employees and those based on gender alone. Because the unsuccessful
competitors could be of either sex in a sexual payoff case, the court rea-
soned that there was no "causal connection" between the sex of the
plaintiff and the employment disadvantage. 269 The court gave a narrow
reading to the relevant EEOC Guideline, declaring that it authorized
third party complaints only in cases in which the sexual relationship that
forms the basis of suit was coercive in nature.270
The doctrinal disagreement exhibited in the sexual payoff cases is
not new to Title VII litigation. The question of whether the ban on sex
discrimination should encompass all sexually inspired decision making or
only decisions that exclusively disadvantage one sex has been raised in
sexual harassment suits271 and in suits brought by homosexual and
transsexual employees.272 In the sexual harassment context, the
Supreme Court has declared that sufficient linkage exists between sexual
harassment and the systemic disadvantage of women employees to justify
the application of Title VII. However, the courts have provided no pro-
tection to sexual minorities perhaps because they are less able to see the
connection between prejudice against these groups and the systematic
discrimination against female employees.
The sexual payoff cases pose an interesting problem that does not fit
precisely into either the sexual harassment or sexual minority model. In
sexual payoff litigation, male plaintiffs might not be as rare as they are in
sexual harassment litigation, because competitors for promotions may be
of either sex. Thus, neither sex is systematically disadvantaged by sexual
payoffs. However, a real connection between sexual harassment and sex-
ual payoff probably exists because work forces permeated with harass-
ment also tend to be likely environments for sexual payoffs. Moreover, in
268. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.
269. Id. at 307-08.
270. For a sexual payoff case in which the promoted woman may also have been a victim of
sexual harassment, see Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983). The supervisor in that
case had a reputation for harassment and had propositioned employees other than the promoted
woman.
271. See supra note 129 (citing the doctrinal problem posed by hypothetical bisexual supervisor
who harasses employees of both sexes).
272. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (denying cause of action
for discrimination based on employee's transsexualism), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); DeSantis
v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (no cause of action under Title VII for
discrimination based on employee's sexual preference).
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sexual payoff cases, the "advantaged" employee is likely to be a woman,
and the decision maker, a man. In these cases, the specter of sexual har-
assment is often present. If the courts are particularly desirous of elimi-
nating sexual harassment, they will be inclined to prohibit sexual payoffs
as well.2 73
Although there are no reported sexual payoff cases involving profes-
sors and students,274 policy statements recently issued by some universi-
ties indicate that these educational institutions are also beginning to treat
certain amorous relationships as sex based discrimination. The 1986
University of Iowa sexual harassment policy explicitly states that amo-
rous relationships between faculty members and students are inappropri-
ate when the faculty member has professional responsibility for the
student-for example, if the student is currently in the professor's
class. 275 The professor is subject to discipline if a complaint is initiated
by any person in the university community even if the relationship is
apparently consensual.2 76 Neither does there appear to be a requirement
that a charging student allege any specific injury stemming from the rela-
tionship. The policy thus goes beyond a ban on quid pro quo discrimina-
tion and addresses offensive educational environments as well.277
Although not banned, amorous relationships occurring outside the
instructional context are also frowned upon.278 The University of Iowa
policy statement focuses only on the misconduct of faculty members and
273. Moreover, the courts' reluctance to extend Title VII coverage to sexual minorities may
reflect hostility to the sexual practices of these groups and a presumption that Congress would not
want to protect these minorities to the same degree as racial and ethnic minorities and women.
There is no similar hostility toward the class of plaintiffs in sexual payoff cases.
274. There are only two reported cases of sexual harassment of students brought under Title IX,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1982). Recovery was denied in each case, but the courts affirmed that a cause
of action for harassment exists. See Moire v. Temple Univ. School of Medicine, 613 F. Supp. 1360,
1366 (D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136; Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn.
1977). For a comprehensive discussion of sexual harassment claims in the university environment,
see Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REv. 525 (1987).
275. IOWA POLICY, supra note 255, §§ 6-7.
276. "[T]he University will view it as unethical if faculty members engage in amorous relations
with students enrolled in their classes or subject to their supervision, even when both parties appear
to have consented to the relationship." Id. § 6.
277. The policy notes that amorous relationships may affect other students and faculty "because
it places the faculty member in a position to favor or advance one student's interest at the expense of
others and implicitly makes obtaining benefits contingent on amorous or sexual favors." Id.
278. The policy states that other amorous relationships occurring outside the instructional con-
text may also "lead to difficulties." It warns that when the faculty member and student arc in the
same or allied academic units their consensual relationship may be viewed by others as exploitive,
and that the faculty member has an obligation to withdraw from participation in any decisions that
could reward or penalize the student. Id. § 8.
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does not address whether the student who initiates or welcomes such a
relationship will also be subject to discipline.
In addition to the sexual payoff cases in the employment and aca-
demic contexts, the legal status of asymmetric relationships is also impli-
cated in cases challenging dismissals of employees for engaging in sexual
relationships. In the private sector, employees have charged sex discrim-
ination when the employer decided to discharge the female party to an
office romance, but retained the male employee.279 The developing
wrongful discharge doctrine has also been applied to sustain a claim of
arbitrary termination based on an employer's disapproval of an
employee's sexual relationship.280
In the public sector, employees have challenged dismissals on the
theory that the constitutional right to privacy prohibits the government
from penalizing them for forming or maintaining sexual relationships.28'
Most of these cases have challenged policies prohibiting certain classes of
279. See, e.g., Duchon v. Cajon Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 1986) (discharge of female recep-
tionist for her relationship with male employee actionable under Title VII); Oldfather v. Ohio Dep't
of Transp., 653 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Ohio 1986), (Title VII violated by dismissing only female
employee because of her affair with a male supervisor), appeal dismissed, 816 F.2d 681 (6th Cir.
1987); Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 589 F. Supp. 662, 667 (W.D. Tenn. 1984), (prima facie case
of sex discrimination established by showing female employee discharged because of affair with male
superior while male superior was not discharged), aff'd in part, 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985);
Reber v. Mel Falley, Inc., 235 Kan. 562, 566, 683 P.2d 1229, 1233 (1984) (termination of female
employee engaged in an affair with her male superior established a prima facie case, but was rebutted
by evidence that affair interfered with the woman's job performance but had no effect on the man's
job performance).
One commentator asserts that a woman is twice as likely as a man to be terminated for her
participation in an office romance because the man is generally in a superior position, is viewed as
more of an asset to the company, and is more costly to replace. Quinn & Lees, supra note 261, at 41.
Another author suggests that if lovers hold positions of equal status and are equally effective in their
roles, the man should be dismissed to avoid the appearance of sexism. Collins, Managers and Lovers,
61 HARV. Bus. REv. 142, 151 (Sept.-Oct. 1983).
280. Rulon-Miller v. International Bus. Mach. Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1984) (dismissal of plaintiff for relationship with manager of rival firm violated company rule guar-
anteeing employee's right of privacy); see also Mason v. South E. Ill. Elec., 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2022 (7th Cir. 1987) (insufficient evidence to warrant finding of constructive discharge based on
employee's affair with foreman's wife).
281. See, eg., Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior C., 498 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (challenging
a change in job classification because of an adulterous relationship with an employee), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Libr., 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Penn. 1977)
(library employees challenge discharge for living together in "open adultery"), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1374
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978); Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F.
Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss.) (challenging local policy prohibiting employment of unwed parents), aff'd,
507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of public employee cases, see Note, Public Employees
or Private Citizens: The Off-Duty Sexual Activities of Police Officers and the Constitutional Right of
Privacy, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 195 (1984).
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public employees from engaging in nonmarital sexual relationships.282 In
some cases, the prohibited liaison involved two employees at the same
worksite.283
The results in these public employee lawsuits are quite evenly split
between plaintiffs and governmental defendants. Courts do not agree on
whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate,284 or on any list of accepta-
ble justifications for sexually based dismissals.285 However, the courts
seem more likely to sustain dismissals in cases involving homosexual con-
duct or adultery,286 rather than those involving premarital heterosexual
cohabitation.287 There may also be a greater willingness to allow an
employer to ban amorous relationships between employees, particularly
282. See, ag., Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 472 (5th Cir.) (police department rules pro-
scribing conduct that" 'if brought to the attention of the public, could result in justified unfavorable
criticism of that member or the department.' ") (quoting General Rules and Regulations of the
Amerillo Police Department, § 113, part 8), cert. deniedsub nom., Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S.
965 (1983); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555, 562 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (prohibiting police department
employees from conducting "their private and professional lives [in such a manner as to avoid]
bring[ing the Department into disrepute," or "engaging in any immoral or indecent conduct ......
(quoting Greensboro Police Dept. Rules 410.03 & 410.67).
283. See Shawgo, 701 F.2d at 470 (two police officers disciplined for off-duty dating and alleged
cohabitation); Krzyzewski v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 584 F.2d 802
(6th Cir. 1978) (female police officer discharged for dating fellow officer); Swing, 463 F. Supp. at 555
(police officer demoted for engaging in an alleged extramarital affair involving another police officer);
Hollenbaugh, 436 F. Supp. at 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (two library employees fired for living together
in "open adultery").
284. Some courts require more than minimal rationality, but less than strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Hollenbaugh, 439 U.S. at 1054 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Briggs v. North
Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 590 (W.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1475 (1984).
Others have applied a rational basis test. See Shawgo, 701 F.2d at 483; Johnson, 498 F. Supp. at 576.
285. Most notably, some courts insist on a showing that the employee's sex life adversely
affected job performance in a specific tangible way (e.g., an actual disrupting influence on working
relationships). See, e.g., Briggs, 563 F. Supp. at 591. Other courts are ready to sustain governmental
interference if the employee's sexual relationship is unlawful or does not coincide with what the
court perceives as popular morality. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(no need for social science data to prove that intramilitary gay sexual relationship would be deleteri-
ous to morale and discipline).
286. For cases upholding discharges of homosexual persons, see Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1388;
Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist., 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977). For cases upholding dismissal or demotion of employees for adultery, see Krzyzewski, 584
F.2d at 802; Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1982); Johnson, 498 F. Supp. at 555;
Hollenbaugh, 436 F. Supp. at 1328.
287. Only one recent case has sustained the dismissal of employees engaged in a premarital
heterosexual relationship. See Shawgo, 701 F.2d at 470. Moreover, when the parties to the relation-
ship are not both employees, the premarital heterosexual relationship is a better candidate for protec-
tion under the right to privacy. Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485
(N.D. Calif. 1970).
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if the defendant can articulate a possible conflict of interest. 88
The juxtaposition of the sexual payoff cases and the public employee
dismissal cases dramatizes the tension that occurs when the law simulta-
neously attempts to control exploitive sex and to encourage mutual sex-
ual relationships. The theory underlying the Title VII sexual payoff
cases is that employment advantage should not be traded for sex.
Together with the sexual harassment cases, the sexual payoff cases repre-
sent an effort to eliminate sexual coercion at the workplace.289 In con-
trast, the constitutional theory in the public employee dismissal cases is
that every person should have the opportunity to seek intimacy through
sexual relationships.29 °
For the public employer, the case law pulls in opposite directions
and may seem to expose the employer to liability, regardless of whether
amorous relationships are permitted or banned. From an egalitarian per-
spective, however, the theories underlying each of the two types of law-
suits are compatible. Taken together, the lawsuits reinforce the
distinction between exploitive sex prompted by economic gain, and
nonexploitive sex prompted solely by a desire for intimacy or pleasure.
Endorsement of an egalitarian perspective in the amorous relation-
ship context suggests that legal intervention and mandatory noninterven-
tion may logically coexist. But it does not tell us how to determine
whether a particular encounter should be put into one or the other cate-
gory. Perhaps only in the most blatant cases of sexual harassment or
favoritism in which a specific benefit is tied to sex will it be clear that the
relationship is exploitive. A great many, if not most, relationships may
be characterized partially by the exertion of external pressure and by
shared intimacy.291 Moreover, what starts as an intimate, seemingly per-
sonal encounter might well change into a more instrumental relationship
288. See Shawgo, 701 F.2d at 470 (finding a rational connection between the exigencies of police
department discipline and forbidding officers, especially those different in rank, to share an apart-
ment or cohabit).
289. Affording a cause of action in sexual payoff cases provides additional assurance against
exploitive relationships by justifying institutional intervention, even absent a complaint by the
employee in the relationship. The third party action thus may function as a mechanism for uncover-
ing clear cases of harassment when the victim is too intimidated to complain, as well as for reaching
those more debatable cases that defy classification as either mutual or coercive relationships.
290. The most thorough statement of the associational and privacy interests arguably protected
by the Constitution is Karst, supra note 73, at 633-39.
291. Catharine MacKinnon asserts that between clear coercion and clear mutuality exists a
"murky area where power and caring converge." C. MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 54. She calls
this area "coerced caring" and explains that it is often unclear whether the coercion or the caring is
the weightier factor in the relationship. Further, the predominance of one factor over another may
shift over time and each may be causally related to the development of the other. Id. at 54-55.
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as opportunities for harassment or favoritism arise. Conversely, if the
parties ultimately marry or stay with each other for a long period of time,
we are apt to engage in revisionist history and declare the relationship
nonexploitive, out of a reluctance to analyze the possibly oppressive
character of marriage or long-term relationships.
To fashion a workable policy on amorous relationships in the
employment and educational context, it is therefore preferable not to
focus narrowly on the actual nature of the relationship at issue, but
rather to create rules or guidelines based on the potential for exploitation
and external harm. To do so, we first need to identify the positive and
negative effects of amorous relationships, both on the parties themselves
and on others in the workplace or school community.
On the positive side, the workplace and school are now important
sites for the establishment of intimate relationships.292 No one disputes
that many relationships begun at these sites are long lasting and emotion-
ally significant. Particularly with the decline in importance of some
other community social organizations, many people look to work or
school as the place to make friends and form relationships of all sorts.293
The use of the workplace and the classroom for this social purpose is
logical because these sites are often more sexually integrated than other
places in which people interact, particularly since most women are now
in the labor force.294 The increasing importance of work has meant that,
for many people, there is no longer a sharp distinction between their
social life and their working life. While much of the debate about amo-
rous relationships in the employment context has focused on the dangers
of fusing work and social life, this blurring of the private/public distinc-
tion could also have positive effects for women. Women have tended to
292. For many, work is "well on its way to replacing the family as a source of affection, commu-
nity, and support. We separate from our biological families in our twenties and find replacement
families at our jobs." P. HORN & J. HORN, SEX IN THE OFFICE, 3 (1982). Factors contributing to
the emergence of intimate relationships within the work and school environments include the close
physical and psychological proximity of the individuals and the empathy, understanding, and famili-
arity that accompany the sharing of common tasks. For further consideration of these and other
factors, see Anderson & Hunsaker, supra note 261, at 57; Quinn & Lees, supra note 261, at 35,
293. "As contacts with community organizations, churches, and extended families diminish,
many people become socially isolated and find the work environment becoming the primary setting
in which to meet people." Driscoll & Beva, The Sexual Side of Enterprise, 69 MGMT. REv. 51, 52
(1980).
294. The proportion of women who are in the labor force has grown from one-third in 1950, to
more than one-half today. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN AT
WORK: A CHARTBOOK 2 (April 1983). Since 1980, women have taken more than 80% of the new
jobs in the economy. If the trend continues, women will outnumber men in the workforce by year
2000. Hacker, Women at Work, The New York Review of Books, Aug. 14, 1986, at 26 col. 1.
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be viewed as private, sexual beings who are out of place and out of char-
acter in the workplace. When sexual relationships are no longer sepa-
rated from working relationships, the mystique of sex may break down.
The hope is that such a demystification of sexuality could cause men and
women to be viewed as more alike and as needing both work and sexual
relationships for a fulfilling life.295 Moreover, when sexual partners also
work together, they may better appreciate the role that work plays in the
life of each person, thus strengthening their personal relationship.2 96
On the negative side, there is the danger that it may be impossible to
separate sexual harassment from truly mutual relationships. Particularly
where there is an appreciable difference in power between the parties to
the relationship, the lower status person may submit to sex out of fear of
retaliation.297 In some cases, the very fact of submission may indicate
that the economic coercion was severe. Moreover, in cases in which the
initiator of the sexual relationship carries both economic clout and moral
authority, the target may submit to an unwelcome encounter, even if the
target does not fear retaliation.2 98 A young student, for example, may be
conditioned to trust a professor and may tend to do what the professor
295. See Bradford, Sargent & Sprague, The Executive Man and Woman: The Issue of Sexuality,
in SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ROMANTIC AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS AT WORK 26 (D. Neu-
garten & J. Shafritz eds. 1980).
Professor Wasserstrom has discussed the mystification of sexuality created by segregation in his
comparison of racially and sexually segregated bathrooms. He contends that while racially segre-
gated facilities were based upon a white supremacist fear of contamination, sex segregated facilities
reinforce that "same sense of mystery or forbiddenness about the other sex's sexuality which is
fostered by the general prohibition upon public nudity and the unashamed viewing of genitalia."
Wasserstrom, Racism and Sexism, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES 11, 20-21 (1980). Wasser-
strom explains that although this sense of privacy appears mutually desired by both sexes, it may
function to the detriment of women by "maintain[ing] the primacy of heterosexual sexual attraction
central to that version of the patriarchal system of sexual relationships we have today." Id. at 21.
296. While admitting that it is only conjecture, one author suggests that office romances may, in
the end, make marriage stronger. "As people work together and experience the problems of the
office, as they understand each other's anxieties and the demands their jobs place on them, marriage
may well become more of a shared experience than the unequal relationship it has been." L. WES-
THOFF, CORPORATE ROMANCE 14 (1985).
297. Such coerced submission may occur even if the higher status initiator believes that an
employee's receptiveness to a sexual advance is motivated by mutual personal attraction. In such
cases, the lower status employee may be more conscious of the differences in status and feel that
compliance is "dictated by the implicit use of power and authority." Brewer, Further Beyond Nine
to Five: An Integration and Future Directions, 38 J. Soc. IssuEs 149, 155 (No. 4 1982).
298. For an argument that supervisors can become the subjects of an employee's "transference"
of respect and admiration, similar to that bestowed on "father figures" like doctors and teachers, see
Josefowitz, Sexual Relationships at Work- Attraction, Transference, Coercion or Strategy, 27 PERS.
ADMIN. 91, 95 (March 1982); see also B. DZEICH & L. WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR 74
(1984) (role disparity between professor and student makes it virtually impossible for a student to act
as freely as the student would with a peer).
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suggests. Even if the relationship is exploitive, only rarely will a party to
an ongoing relationship complain. Thus, a ban on some amorous rela-
tionships might be a necessary safeguard against harassment.
Beyond the fear of sexual harassment, amorous relationships may be
perceived as harmful insofar as they taint the decision making process.
Any grant of a benefit based on considerations other than merit is likely
to be viewed as unfair, even if not always illegal.299 What makes sex
based favoritism so damaging, however, may flow more from the message
it conveys than from any specific misallocation of benefits. When a
female employee observes that another female employee has received
favored treatment because of her sexual relationship with the supervisor,
she may be led to believe that sexual receptiveness is expected from
female employees: Even if the actual party to the relationship is not
coerced, the message transmitted to other workers may be coercive and
threatening.3" The existence of an amorous relationship may add to an
offensive working environment, particularly in work environments not
otherwise free from sexually abusive incidents. 0 1
When no significant disparity in power exists between the parties in
the sexual relationship, however, the likelihood of both sexual harass-
ment and favoritism declines. Any harm engendered by these more sym-
metric amorous relationships chiefly depends on the quality of the
relationship and the reactions of others in the community.302 If the sex-
ual relationship turns sour and creates bitter feelings, this could have a
negative effect on the parties' working relations and could disrupt the
299. For a discussion of the concept of individual merit as a central, if problematic, value in
American culture, see Daniels, Merit and Meritocracy, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207 (1978); Fallon, To
Each According to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of
Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. REV. 815, 815-16 (1980); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and
Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 962 (1974).
300. See IowA POLICY, supra note 255, § 5(b) (even consensual amorous relationships are
potentially damaging to third parties because of implicit coercive message).
301. See Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986). But see Anderson v. University
Health Center, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1197, 1199 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (sexual relationship
between supervisor and coworker irrelevant to plaintiff's claim of sex-based discharge).
302. Office romances need not necessarily result in a less cohesive or efficient working environ-
ment (although negative effects are more likely than are positive effects). See Quinn, supra note 262,
at 42. Two studies have found that the participants in an office romance may become easier to get
along with and more productive as a result of their liaison. See id. at 39; Andersen & Hunsaker,
supra note 261, at 61. One writer suggests that even though productivity may decrease at the begin-
ning of a relationship, managers should refrain from interfering until the couple have a chance "to
get over their initial excitement, because in the long run their happiness could result in increased
productivity." Westhoff, What to do About Corporate Romance, 75 MGMT. REv. 50, 52 (Feb. 1986).
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normal working pattern.30 3 The dynamics of a working group might also
be adversely affected if there is a perception that lovers will team up and
make it difficult for others to deal with them as individuals. 3 4 The above
two harms, however, do not seem qualitatively different from the risks
flowing from other types of personal relationships in the workplace.305
For example, when close friends work together, there is a similar risk of
estrangement and co-worker alienation. In contrast, the potential harms
flowing from asymmetric relationships-the coercive power of sexual
harassment and the coercive message of sexual favoritism-dispropor-
tionately harm women. Therefore, these harms are more disturbing than
the damage to harmonious worker relationships caused by more symmet-
ric amorous relationships.30 6
The choice of regulatory strategies for dealing with amorous rela-
tionships in the employment and educational contexts will no doubt be
affected by which of these harms are emphasized and whether the bene-
fits attributed above to school or workplace relationships are considered
303. See Handley, Saying No to Office Romances, THE BUREAUCRAT 35, 36 (Winter 1985-
1986). In addition to disrupting normal working patterns, employers find that "one of the more
threatening aspects of the breakup of an affair is that the incident can degenerate into charges of
sexual harassment." L. WESTHOFF, supra note 296, at 103. For cases litigating the fallout from
soured relationships, see Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th
Cir. 1983); Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 589 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. Tenn. 1984); Williams v. Civi-
letti, 487 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D.D.C. 1980); Evans v. National Post Office Mail Handlers Union, 32
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 634 (D.D.C. 1983).
304. "Many people are resentful of the intimacy, feel excluded and are threatened by the power
block the two may represent." Josefowitz, supra note 298, at 94. A relationship between two
managers can be perceived as dangerous because it challenges the organizational structure and
"affects the organization's power alliances." Collins, supra note 279, at 143; see also M. CUNNING-
HAM, POWERPLAY (1984) (first hand account of cUebrated corporate romance); L. WESTHOFF,
supra note 296, at 8 (romantic relationship between male and female executive distorts power
structure).
305. For a view emphasizing the similarity between sexual conflicts of interests and other con-
flicts of interests, see Westhoff, supra note 302, at 53.
306. Margaret Mead might have disagreed. In a short article for Redbook Magazine, she took
the view that sexual harassment in employment would not be eliminated by legal prohibitions, but
would persist until sex at work becomes a taboo, which she defines as a "deeply and intensely felt
[prohibition] against 'unthinkable' behavior." Mead, A Proposal. We Need Taboos on Sex at Work
in SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ROMANTIC AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS AT WORK supra note
295, at 54 (reprinted from REDBOOK MAGAZINE, April, 1978). Although she is not precise on this
point, the article suggests that the taboo should include relationships between co-workers and stu-
dents who are equal in status. Mead seems to believe that people need certainty in matters of sexual
relationships and that only in periods of historic transition is there confusion about acceptable rules
of sexual behavior. Although the elimination of exploitive sex is also Mead's chief concern, she
seems to advocate a bright line approach that would avoid some of the difficult problems of charac-
terization posed by my contextual approach. Mead's taboo proposal, however, has the disadvan-
tages of limiting sexual freedom and failing to educate persons on precisely which aspects of sexual
relationships make them potentially exploitive.
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weighty. I suspect that most institutions are likely to tend toward a
broad ban on amorous relationships because the threat of sexual harass-
ment or sexual favoritism is more concrete than any countervailing
advantage that workers and students gain from expanded opportunities
for intimate relationships.3 ° 7 Further, many policy makers might be
tempted to adopt an expansive definition of asymmetric relationships,
hoping to chill risky relationships without actually having to enforce the
ban.
From an egalitarian perspective, it seems appropriate in most set-
tings to prohibit those amorous relationships in which one party has
direct authority to affect the working or educational status of the other.
In such direct supervision cases, the danger of harassment or favoritism
is particularly high. This situation presents a classic conflict of interest
in which even the supervisor who tries to act ethically may find it difficult
to treat the subordinate fairly. Most importantly, unless the employer or
educational institution can act to prohibit these apparently consensual,
high risk relationships, we may become reluctant to accept a victim ori-
ented standard of consent in sexual harassment cases. By giving the pol-
icy maker a greater opportunity to prevent harassment, we can create a
climate in which charges of harassment are not viewed with as much
suspicion or defensiveness. Finally, we lose little in the way of sexual
liberty by prohibiting this class of asymmetric encounters. Potential lov-
ers usually have the alternative of taking steps to reduce a direct conflict
of interest. For example, a professor who wants to date a student can
wait until the student completes the course. An employee in love with a
supervisor can seek a transfer. If a matter directly affecting one party to
a relationship becomes an issue for collective decision making, the other
party can recuse himself. Even if such insulation is not possible in partic-
ular settings, an outright prohibition does not seem particularly harsh
because only a limited number of persons are likely to be affected by the
ban.
Beyond cases of direct supervision, it is difficult to articulate criteria
for gauging asymmetry in sexual relationships. I suspect that the greater
the disparity in power, the greater the risk of harassment, favoritism, or
307. For some companies, the key question will be whether the fear of legal liability overcomes
their ordinary reluctance to intervene in employees' private lives if there is no evidence of a concrete
employment effect (e.g., lowered productivity). Josefowitz, supra note 298, at 96 ("bottom line" is
whether affair hurts morale and productivity); Graham, My Lover, My Colleague, Wall St. J., Mar.
24, 1986, at 26, col. 3. ("many companies eschew hard-and-fast policies, preferring to treat romance
as a performance issue"). For further comments about the effect of relationships upon productivity,
see Jamison, Managing Sexual Attraction in the Workplace, 28 PERSONNEL ADM'R 45 (Aug. 1983).
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poisoning of the institutional atmosphere. A relationship between a
Ph.D. candidate and the only chaired professor in a close knit depart-
ment may be risky, even if the student is never in the professor's course.
Other faculty members, for example, might tend to favor the student,
either out of respect for their colleague or simply because the student
becomes more visible to them as a result of the relationship. As these
collateral benefits become more significant, there is a corresponding dan-
ger that they might become the inducement to the relationship itself, thus
making the encounter exploitive from an egalitarian perspective. In a
highly competitive atmosphere in which the recommendation of a single
professor makes a great difference, the ban on amorous relationships
might have to include all student/faculty relationships within the depart-
ment. Likewise, the influence of some individuals in a working environ-
ment might be so great that any relationship into which they enter will
inevitably have an impact on the job. It might be best to encourage
"loneliness at the top" in these instances.
Aside from these structural factors, the relative age of the parties
and the sexual composition of the job or occupation often may also be
used as indicia of asymmetry. First, when the powerful individual has
"the edge" in terms of job status as well as age, the likelihood of mutual-
ity of the relationship is reduced. I have little trouble, for example, with
a total ban on amorous relationships between high school teachers and
their students.3 °8 Even when the lower status individual is above the
legal age of majority, inexperience may result in more vulnerability to
pressure. Young workers on their first job, for example, are particularly
good targets for harassment. 0 9
Second, amorous relationships between women working in predomi-
nantly female jobs and higher status males in the same workplace may
pose an unacceptably high risk. If the female character of the job has
contributed to a perception of the job in sexualized terms, the workers in
that job may already be subjected to disproportionate sexual pressure.310
The existence of amorous relationships in this context may reinforce the
perception that these women workers are present in the workplace for
308. See Winks, supra note 263, at 437, 447-51 (discussion of the negative effect that a
student/teacher sexual relationship can have on an adolescent's emotional development).
309. For a discussion on the vulnerability of young workers to sexual harassment, see L. FAR-
LEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 113 (1978); B.
GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 55 (1985).
310. For a discussion on the sexualization of female dominated jobs, see C. MACKINNON, supra
note 4, at 23.
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sex, not work.3 11 Such perceptions may encourage sexual harassment
and legitimize other discriminatory treatment, such as depressed wages
and unfavorable rules governing only predominantly female jobs.
Whichever encounters are included under the rubric of an asymmet-
ric relationship, there remains the difficult question of whether also to
impose a sanction on the lower status individual in the relationship.
Even if the ban on amorous relationship is framed in gender neutral
terms, the lower status individual is likely to be a woman. If the regula-
tory pattern tends to immunize women from sanctions, there is a danger
that the pattern might reinforce the belief that women must be protected
against sex, even against their own wishes.312 Further, there is no guar-
antee that this sexist ideological message might work against women's
interests in the long run, even if the incidence of exploitive sexual rela-
tionships is reduced through bans on harassment and asymmetric rela-
tionships. However, the alternative-punishing both parties to the
relationship-is even less appealing. If the risk of favoritism were the
exclusive risk presented by asymmetric relationships, imposing sanctions
on both parties might be just. But as long as we are unsure that the
encounter was truly welcome and is not harassment, it seems unfair to
punish the lower status party. This is particularly true when the lower
status person is also likely to be more expendable to the institution. It is
probably wise to sanction such persons only in those unusual cases where
harassment is conclusively ruled out and the lower status person actively
and expressly solicited favored treatment.313
311. See Winks, supra note 263, at 444 (arguing that women who are lower in rank in any
hierarchy are perceived as being sexually available).
312. One author has suggested that institutional statements prohibiting amorous relationships
reflect paternalistic policies of earlier eras (eg., curfew regulations and overnight guest prohibitions)
and that amorous relationship policies risk reinforcing the inequities they seek to alleviate, Hoff-
mann, Sexual Harassment in Academia: Feminist Theory and Institutional Practice, 56 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 105, 113 (1986). A similar dilemma is posed by statutory rape laws that criminalize
sexual encounters involving underage females, but not those involving underage males. See Olsen,
supra note 1, at 402.
313. A frequent objection to the punishment of a male professor or other supervisor for engag-
ing in a sexual relationship with a female student or employee is that the woman may be the seducer
and the man only the passive recipient of sexual initiative. Regardless of the truth of the perception,
this objection does not justify immunizing the professor or supervisor because, even if he is not the
aggressor, he has the ability and obligation to resist such sexual initiatives. See Freedman, The
Professional Responsibility of the Law Professor: Three Neglected Questions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 275,
280 (1986). It is difficult to regard the professor or supervisor as being victimized by a sexual liaison
with a subordinate, in the same fashion as the exploitation of students and employees. Sexual
aggression from students or employees may be disturbing or perhaps even harassing, but it differs
from sexual harassment by high status individuals because it carries no danger of economic retalia-
tion and far less likelihood of creating an offensive atmosphere. See B. DZIECH & L. WEINER, supra
note 298, at 24-25 (1984). Whether the subordinate is the sexual aggressor in a relationship might
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The foregoing egalitarian perspective on the treatment of asymmet-
ric relationships in the employment and educational contexts differs sig-
nificantly from a pattern of regulation that would likely emerge under
either the traditional or liberal views of sexual conduct. Under the tradi-
tional view, a nonmarital relationship between employees probably
would expose both parties of the relationship to unfavorable employer
action. The law would not protect immoral persons from the impact of
community disapproval, regardless of whether the relationship resulted
in identifiable harm to third parties. The traditional view would also
tend to treat the power differential between the parties as irrelevant to
the pattern of regulation. From a traditional perspective, anti-fraterniza-
tion rules are simply one kind of rule designed to discourage immorality,
both on and off the job. The traditionalist is also likely to view the
employee who engages in publicized non-marital encounters as lacking in
good judgment and perhaps even as untrustworthy.
In contrast, there is little, if any, room for the legal regulation of
amorous relationships under the liberal view of sexual conduct. Unless
the lower status party to the relationship complains of exploitation, the
relationship is likely to be viewed as a private consensual matter that
does not warrant intervention. The disparity in power alone, absent evi-
dence of economic coercion on an individual level, will not likely operate
to vitiate consent. With respect to the danger of favoritism, the liberal
view might endorse intervention if there is evidence of a misallocation of
a specific benefit. The response to favoritism in sexual payoff cases, how-
ever, would not be different from the response in any other case of misal-
location based on non-merit considerations. The liberal perspective
would tend not to focus on the sex based nature of the action and not to
see the systemic link between harassment and favoritism in asymmetric
relationships.
The egalitarian perspective on asymmetric relationships presented
here attempts to balance the interest in avoiding sexual coercion with the
interest in affording opportunities for the formation of noncoercive rela-
tionships. Because no blunt strategy can hope to accomplish both objec-
tives, the balance of equality and liberty necessitate a sensitivity to
context and a fact specific assessment of power relationships.
properly affect our views on whether to punish both parties to the relationship in order to protect the
interest of third parties.
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CONCLUSION
The legal regulation of sexual conduct increasingly reflects the influ-
ence of a feminist critique of both the traditional and liberal views of sex
that have dominated for nearly all of this century. Over the last thirty
years, liberal philosophy has eroded a traditional pattern of legal regula-
tion that judged the appropriateness of sex largely from the marital status
of the parties. Feminism is now challenging the liberal tendency to pre-
sume the appropriateness of sexual conduct simply from the absence of a
complaint by either party. Rules intended to foster sexual freedom for
women cannot unreflectively judge the propriety of sex by the acquies-
cence of individual women. The risk is too great that acquiescence
reflects inequality, not free choice.
I have illustrated the egalitarian impact on the law by tracing devel-
opments in three important areas: the laws respecting rape, sexual har-
assment, and sexual deception. Developments in these areas suggest a
tendency, however incomplete, to treat sex as not consensual when
acquiescence is induced by physical force, economic pressure, or decep-
tion. Regarding sex so induced as inappropriate may be taken to imply a
new positive ideal of mutual sexual conduct. Under this egalitarian view,
sexual conduct is mutual and acceptable when animating inducements
are the parties' desires for sexual pleasure or for intimacy.
So long as feminist pressure on legal institutions remains great, the
egalitarian perspective is likely to continue as a significant force shaping
the ideology of law. In the regulation of new areas of legal concern, such
as amorous relationships at school or in the workplace, it is likely to
demand a more subtle contextual analysis than either liberalism or tradi-
tionalism has yielded. In some cases, egalitarians may sponsor legal reg-
ulation to reduce exploitive sex; in others, they may counsel forbearance
from regulation in order to promote both sexual freedom and equality.
The feminists' twin focus on freedom and equality means that no one
legal stance-interventionist or noninterventionist-can ever be pre-
sumptively correct without careful analysis of the power relationships at
play in a particular regulatory context.
